APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Patrick Deshun Paris, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in not stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order denying Petitioner post-conviction relief. Petitioner also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal because his counsel (1) failed to request the removal of juror, Daisy Foster; (2) questioned Marco Brooks about his family's criminal history to the detriment of Petitioner's case; (3) failed to adequately investigate Petitioner's case and prepare for trial; and (4) failed to object to the prosecutor's leading questions during Mr. Brooks' direct examination. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Michael W. Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Smith was convicted of rape in Shelby County and received an eight-year Department of Correction sentence, to be served consecutively to a three-year Department of Correction sentence in a separate case. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because his eight-year sentence has expired.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on grounds that Smith has failed to establish that his sentence has expired.

Plaintiff was injured in a fall and the jury returned a verdict for damages against defendant which was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

Cathy L. Chapman, Brandon Chapman, Kaylan L. Chapman, and Dana L. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) retained attorney Rick J. Bearfield ("Defendant") to represent them in a medical malpractice action. During the course of this representation, Defendant filed an amended complaint repudiating a theory of the case originally alleged. Plaintiffs later hired new counsel and filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted on the grounds that Plaintiffs' expert's affidavit was deficient technically and did not comply with the locality rule. We vacate the grant of summary judgment.

This appeal involves protracted litigation over a parcel of land conveyed by the City of New Johnsonville, Tennessee, to a member of the New Johnsonville City Council. The mayor, on behalf of the city, subsequently filed suit against the councilman seeking to nullify the transaction. During the pendency of that litigation, several taxpayers filed their own suit against the councilman alleging the same causes of action set forth in the city’s complaint. The city and the councilman ultimately settled their lawsuit. The taxpayers’ lawsuit continued, ultimately naming the city as a defendant.  The trial court partially granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment by ruling that the taxpayers did not have standing to contest the land transaction between the city and the councilman.  The court ruled that the taxpayers did have standing to continue with their other causes of action concerning allegations that the councilman engaged in illegal business transactions with the city.  The taxpayers subsequently took a voluntary nonsuit on their remaining claims and filed an appeal to this Court to contest the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on their claim regarding the land transaction. We vacate the trial court’s decision regarding the land transaction, and we remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Dana Lynn Armstrong, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation, and in revoking his probation and ordering that the sentence be served by incarceration. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the careful reasoning in the majority opinion, with clarification on the remedy ultimately available. Here, ouster of the public official alleged to have engaged in self-dealing, Handley, is likely a moot issue, since the record apparently indicates that his term of office as Councilman ended the day before the settlement with the City. The settlement, however, left the Handleys with a handsome profit from the land transaction at issue, profit that the Taxpayers apparently allege should be disgorged as the product of the wrongdoing.

In this divorce case, husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding wife rehabilitative alimony and attorney's fees and contends that a post-judgment change in circumstances warrants termination of alimony. Because husband failed to submit a transcript or statement of evidence, failed to support his argument with citations of authority and appropriate references to the record, and failed to raise the issue of post- judgment change of circumstances prior to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

Petitioner, Anthony Lamont Singleton, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that his Alford pleas in case No. S45,328 and case No. S47, 632 were involuntarily entered into, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in connection with the negotiation and entry of his Alford pleas, and that the trial court improperly appointed trial counsel to represent him in case No. 47,632. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Harold Holloway, Jr., was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of second degree murder, attempted theft over $10,000, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, Holloway was sentenced to an effective forty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Holloway raises seven issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear an ex parte motion for the appointment of a forensic psychiatrist and a neuropsychological examiner; (2) whether the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate double jeopardy principles; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for attempted carjacking; (4) whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses of carjacking; (5) whether the court erred in allowing the State to question a defense expert in addiction medicine regarding prior bad acts committed by Holloway which were enumerated in reports relied upon by the expert; (6) whether the State improperly impeached a defense witness by questioning the witness regarding prior convictions which were not admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 609; and (7) whether the trial court properly sentenced Holloway. After review of the record, we conclude that the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate principles of double jeopardy. The Appellant's remaining issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences for second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking are affirmed. The judgment of conviction for attempted theft over $10,000 is merged with the Appellant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery, and the sentence for attempted theft is vacated.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, David Gene Hooper, of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of eight years for the rape and three years for the incest to be served on community corrections after serving eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred (1) in failing to grant a mistrial based upon the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence until the middle of trial and in prohibiting him from cross-examining the victim concerning the exculpatory evidence; (2) in repeatedly admitting testimony which bolstered the victim's complaint through multiple witnesses; (3) in allowing testimony from various witnesses concerning the fact that victims of sexual abuse frequently delay reporting an attack; (4) in allowing the state to cross-examine the defendant concerning his possession of marijuana on the day he was arrested, approximately two years after the crime; and (5) in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of attempted rape, attempted sexual battery, and assault pursuant to State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). We conclude that although the trial court should have allowed the defendant to cross-examine the victim concerning the evidence the state failed to disclose until trial, the error was harmless. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Morris Lamonte Marsh, was convicted of four counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault. After merging two of the first degree felony murder convictions and the two second degree murder convictions into the first two felony murder convictions and merging the aggravated assault conviction into one of the attempted second degree murder convictions, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus forty years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law governing criminal responsibility; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bonzie Lavender, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves the collateral consequences of the dismissal of a wrongful death claim for failure to prosecute. The mother of a student who fell to his death from a dormitory window filed suit in both state and federal court against the university her son was attending. After the state proceedings lay dormant for over one year, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the university moved to dismiss the federal suit on the ground that the dismissal of the state suit was res judicata with regard to the federal claim. The mother filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion in state court requesting modification of the dismissal order to reflect that it was not an adjudication on the merits. The state court denied the mother's request for Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 relief and also denied her request for permission to file a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal. The mother has appealed both decisions. We have determined that the trial court erred by denying the mother's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion.

This case is about nuisance and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff homeowners and their minor child lived in a house in a subdivision. The defendant landowner owned a house next door to the plaintiffs’ home. The defendant landowner rented his house to tenants. The tenants allegedly began to engage in disturbing conduct, including illegal drug use, discharging firearms, and harassment. The plaintiffs sued the tenants and the defendant landowner for nuisance and for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant landowner filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs had no medical evidence of their emotional distress. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not respond to the motion for summary judgment and did not notify the plaintiffs of the pending motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The plaintiffs later got a new attorney and filed a motion to set aside this judgment. The trial court set aside the grant of summary judgment, to enable the plaintiffs to file a response. After the plaintiffs filed a response, the trial court again granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and reverse as to claims of nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner is appealing the lower court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.

The petitioner, Eugene J. Kovalsky, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Gary Randall Yarnell, the petitioner, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court found his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in its finding that the employee suffered 55% permanent partial disability to the whole person as the result of a back injury and only an 85% permanent partial disability to the right lower extremity as the result of a knee injury, both injuries occurring in the course of appellant's employment with the Atlantic Soft Drink Company, Inc., a/k/a Pepsi Cola Company. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a work-related injury during the course of her employment with V.F. ImageWear (West), Inc., that would entitle her to benefits under the workers' compensation laws.  We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in its finding that the employee had sustained an 85% permanent partial disability to the whole body and in awarding 237.1 weeks of temporary total disability for an inguinal hernia sustained in the course of his employment with JD Construction.  Because the employee had not reached maximum medical improvement and had not received surgical treatment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-212, we find the award of permanent partial disability to be premature and reverse. The trial court’s award of temporary total disability benefits is modified to award temporary partial disability benefits, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Kevin White, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner presents one issue for review: whether the trial court erred in refusing to exclude his trial counsel from the courtroom during his testimony at the post-conviction hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I fully concur with Judge Hayes' notable and well-written opinion. Like Judge Hayes, I believe that the defendant was seized when the officer asked him to step out of his vehicle and that the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. I also agree that the defendant's consent to search his person was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure so as to be free from any taint. In consequence, the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

I concur in all respects with the majority opinion save its view of the admissibility of the search warrant under Rule 41(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. The defendant complains that his trial counsel failed to object to the state’s introduction of a copy of the search warrant into evidence. He asserts that the warrant states that “there is probable and reasonable cause to believe that Marvin O. Norton B/M is now in unlawful possession of the following . . . cocaine or derivatives of same . . . .” He argues that the content of the search warrant was objectionable because it contained hearsay, was irrelevant to the facts at issue, and made specific reference to the defendant as the individual in possession of the cocaine.

I respectfully dissent. Based upon my review of the record, the encounter leading up to Defendant’s consent to submit to a search was a brief police-citizen encounter requiring no objective justification. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.