APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The majority concludes that the proof is sufficient to support the Appellant’s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. I respectfully dissent.

I & L Investments, LLC ("I & L"), and Wet Willy's Fireworks Supermarkets of Tennessee, Inc. ("Wet Willy's"), sued Cagle's Construction, LLC, and Ed Cagle (collectively the "Cagles"), seeking to enforce restrictive covenants with respect to real property owned by Cagle's Construction, LLC. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that the defendants' tender of $100,000 to I & L as liquidated damages pursuant to the provisions of a document entitled "Settlement and Mutual Release" barred the plaintiffs' attempt to enforce the restrictive covenants. The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's judgment, contending that the court erred in failing to enforce the restrictive covenants against the Cagles in of their plan to construct a building on the property for the purpose of selling fireworks. We affirm.

The defendant, William Yates Cramer, was convicted by a Lake County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with probation after ninety days in jail and ordered the defendant to pay a fine of $600.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the state to use his prior conviction for aggravated assault to impeach his testimony, and (3) his sentence of confinement violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is before us after remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, John C. Walker, III, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years. On direct appeal, this court originally affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. John C. Walker, III, No. M2003-01732-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed Aug. 11, 2004). Subsequently, this court granted the Appellant's motion to rehear, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, as to the application of enhancement facts, in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon rehearing, the Appellant's sentence was reduced to twenty years due to Blakely violations in the application of enhancement factors. See State v. John C. Walker, III, No. M2003-01732-RC-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed Feb. 8, 2005), perm. to appeal granted (Tenn. June 20, 2005). Subsequently, our supreme court released the case of State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, No. M2002-01209-SC-R77-CD, ____ S.W.3d ____ (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2005). Therein, the court concluded that Tennessee's sentencing structure is not impacted by Blakely. This case has now been remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of Gomez. See State v. John C. Walker, III, No. M2003-01732-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. at Nashville, June 20, 2005). After our review in light of State v. Gomez, we affirm the conviction and sentence as imposed by the trial court.

The Appellant, Bobby Joe Lester, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and coercion of a witness. As a result of these convictions, Lester received an effective eighty-five year sentence. On appeal, Lester argues that: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror; and (3) consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, we conclude that the proof is sufficient to support Lester’s convictions on all counts. Moreover, we conclude issues (2) and (3) are without merit.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Burn Harris Dockery, Jr., of reckless aggravated assault, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years, as a Range I standard offender, and it ordered that the Defendant serve sixty days in the county jail and the additional two years and ten months on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court improperly sentenced him. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence.

In this action, the Trial Court granted appellees summary judgment which adjudicated fewer than all of the claims or rights and liability of all of the parties. We dismiss the appeal from that Judgment and remand with instructions.

The Defendant, Michael A. Pounds, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner challenges the denial of his post-conviction petition, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence on appeal does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings that: (1) counsel adequately informed the petitioner regarding the filing of a motion to suppress; and (2) no hearingwas necessary on the motion because the petitioner opted to plead guilty. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Gary Lee Miller, stands convicted of aggravated kidnapping, for which he was classified as a habitual offender and, therefore, ordered to serve 100 percent of his 16-year sentence. See State v. Gary Lee Miller, No. M1998-00788-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 6, 2000). He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Aggrieved by the lower court's ruling, the petitioner now brings the instant appeal. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to discover the true identity of the State’s primary witness at an earlier date; and (2) failing to adequately meet with him in preparation for trial. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden with respect to both claims; therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

After pleading guilty to various charges, the appellant, Thomas White, Jr., was placed on intensive probation for seven (7) years in 2002. In February of 2003, the appellant was arrested twice for violation of the Motor Vehicle Offencer Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sec. 55-10-616. A probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant. After a bench trial, the appellant was found guilty of both counts of violating Tennessee Code Annotated sec. 55-10-616. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered the appellant to serve an effective fourteen (14) year sentence. Because we are unable to discern the trial court's intentions from either the transcript of the hearing or the judgments, we reverse and remand this case for entry of corrected and clarified judgments.

Appellant, Kevin Joseph Karr, has appealed from the trial court's order summarily dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion for the trial court's judgment to be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. After the State's motion was filed, Appellant filed a motion for an attorney to be appointed to represent him. In light of our ruling on the State's motion, the defendant's motion is denied by separate order.

The Appellant, Samuel Pendergrass, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Pendergrass argues that his guilty pleas to four misdemeanor counts of passing worthless checks and one count of felony theft of property over $1,000 were not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Johnny L. Butler, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis.  In this appeal, he asserts that his conviction is void because the indictment was defective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In 1980, the Appellant, Willie Joe Frazier, was indicted for multiple counts of armed robbery and related assaults stemming from his participation, along with two other accomplices, in the robbery of a number of employees and customers of a pharmacy in Lewisburg. However, Frazier escaped from jail before his scheduled trial and was not apprehended until 2002. In 2003, Frazier was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of malicious shooting, one count of assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, one count of assault with intent to commit first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, six counts of armed robbery, and two counts of assault with intent to commit robbery. The jury sentenced Frazier to indeterminate sentences for all the convictions except the six armed robberies, for which the jury fixed sentences of life imprisonment. The trial court grouped the thirteen convictions into three categories for purposes of consecutive sentencing, resulting in six concurrent life sentences consecutive to concurrent sentences of eight to twenty years and consecutive to a ten to twenty-five year sentence. This resulted in an effective sentence of life plus eighteen to forty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Frazier argues: (1) he was sentenced to crimes for which no guilty verdicts were returned by the jury; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for assault with intent to commit robbery of Ollie Bagley and assault with intent to commit robbery of Goldie Crabtree; (3) the jury's sentencing verdicts reflect two sentences which were not authorized for the crimes for which he was convicted; (4) his convictions for malicious shooting must be set aside because (a) he was never indicted for these crimes, (b) they are not lesser offenses of any indicted offenses, and (c) his dual convictions for malicious shooting and assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter of Judy Watson constitute double jeopardy; and (5) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we find no error with regard to issues (1) and (5). With regard to issue (2), we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support his two convictions of assault with intent to commit robbery; therefore, the convictions are modified to reflect convictions for aggravated assault, with the respective sentences fixed at not less than two years nor more than ten years. Issue (3) is rendered moot in view of our holding in issue (2). With regard to issue (4), we conclude that double jeopardy principles preclude dual convictions for assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter and malicious shooting. Accordingly, we merge the Appellant's conviction for assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter into his conviction for malicious shooting and remand for entry of a single judgment of conviction for malicious shooting.

This is a public nuisance case. The Shelby County district attorney general filed a petition in general sessions court, asking the court to declare a local nightclub a public nuisance and to enjoin the nightclub from further operation. This division of the general sessions court was designated as an environmental court pursuant to Tennessee statute. After a hearing, the environmental court found that the nightclub was a public nuisance and permanently enjoined operation of the nightclub. The nightclub appealed this ruling to both the circuit court, requesting de novo review, and to this Court.  The circuit court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the appeal would lie with this Court. Because the environmental court had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, we affirm the trial court’s holding that the appeal from environmental court lies in this Court.  Further, we affirm the environmental court’s finding that the nightclub is a public nuisance and the grant of a permanent injunction.

The defendant, Frankie Sue Dees, pled guilty to one count of theft over $1,000. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court should have placed her on community corrections or full probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Billy Ray Riley, of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Keith Kennedy, entered pleas of nolo contendere in Chester County and in Henderson County to aggravated burglary, possession of marijuana, and numerous counts of burglary of an automobile, theft, and vandalism. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals the denial. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for one of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed to this Court. After reviewing the record, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is a child custody dispute involving the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The parties agreed to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. After an investigation, the guardian ad litem recommended that primary custody be awarded to the father. The mother filed a motion to remove the guardian ad litem. The trial court did not do so. After a bench trial, the father was designated the primary residential parent. The mother asserts that the guardian ad litem appointed by the trial court appeared biased towards the father because the guardian ad litem knew the father’s sister. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to remove the guardian ad litem.

The Petitioner, Jorge Acosta Rubio, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Christopher Robert Smith, seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After being convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell over 300 grams of cocaine, the petitioner appealed. On direct appeal this Court affirmed both his conviction and sentence. State v. Christopher Robert Smith, No. M2001-02297-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31202132 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 27, 2002), perm. app. denied (Feb. 24, 2003). The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark S. Armstrong, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty years, as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial when inadmissible evidence was admitted through an inadequate redaction of a videotaped statement; (2) the trial court erred in failing to provide an adequate limiting instruction to the jury regarding a videotape sound malfunction; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to require the State to make an election of the offense for which it sought a conviction; (4) the trial court erred in failing to grant the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.