APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, James T. Brackins, pled guilty to robbery. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant received a six (6) year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve the sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, John A. Judkins, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the DeKalb County Criminal Court following termination of his judicial diversion. Judkins was indicted for aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property and was granted judicial diversion and placed on supervised probation for a period of three years. Simultaneously with the entry of an order of judicial diversion, a negotiated plea agreement was presented and approved by the court to the indicted offenses which provided that Judkins would receive two three-year sentences and one eleven month and twenty-nine day suspended sentence for the three crimes. The agreement further provided for concurrent sentences to be served on "straight probation." A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging that Judkins had committed additional offenses. Following termination of judicial diversion, in the absence of a sentencing hearing, Judkins was sentenced to three years confinement in the Department of Correction. Judkins argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not imposing the effective three-year sentence of "straight probation" as provided in the plea agreement. After review, we conclude that the Sentencing Act does not contemplate the coexistent grant of judicial diversion and service of a sentence imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement as the two are inconsistent in purpose. Accordingly, the trial court's consideration of the terms of the plea agreement in the sentencing decision was error. The case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court for a sentencing hearing.

In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court's suppression of various statements allegedly made by the defendant, Michael D. Street. At the suppression hearing, the trial court excluded the statements based solely upon the fact that the State failed to comply with discovery Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring notice to the defendant. The trial court did not reach the constitutionality of the statements or otherwise recite its reasoning for admission of some statements and exclusion of others. In consequence, we remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration and additional findings.

The petitioner, Kelvin A. Lee, appeals pro se from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief without a hearing. Specifically, he alleges that he was improperly transferred from juvenile to criminal court and that the trial court failed to comply with the terms of his plea agreement. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has not presented any claims that justify habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of his petition.

A Giles County Jury convicted the Petitioner, Kendrick F. Love, of multiple felony cocaine offenses, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Donald Wayne Joiner, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court following revocation of probation. In July 2001 and July 2002, Joiner was convicted of multiple felony and misdemeanor offenses, resulting in an effective thirteen-year sentence in confinement with the Department of Correction. On October 28, 2003, while still an inmate in the Sullivan County Jail, Joiner escaped from confinement. At the time of Joiner's escape, in addition to the thirteen-year sentence, he was also under an effective eighteen-year suspended sentence, which was imposed consecutively to the thirteen-year sentence of confinement. Based upon Joiner's escape, his eighteen-year suspended sentence was revoked. On appeal, Joiner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering confinement of the eighteen-year sentence instead of reinstating his probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Demarcus O'Shea Walker, pled guilty to various offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years, which it ordered the Defendant to serve on probation. While the Defendant was on probation, a probation violation report was filed and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of this case. I have very little dispute, if any, with the law as set forth in the majority’s Opinion.  Likewise, I have no dispute with the majority’s statement that “[t]he determinative issue, as we perceive it, is whether the action was correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.” I, however, respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of the law to the facts of this case.

Alma Edna Smith ("Wife") sued Don Edward Smith ("Husband") for divorce. The Trial Court entered its Final Decree on July 20, 2004, finding and holding, in part, that both parties were entitled to a divorce and that Wife was to be awarded various items of personal property and the marital home with Husband to assume the indebtedness on this property. Husband received two other parcels of real property and certain items of personal property. Husband appeals the division of property. We modify the Trial Court's property division in this short duration marriage as it concerns the marital home, and we affirm as so modified.

This is an action to enforce a foreign judgment. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Because the Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants was proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified to clarify that the dismissal is without prejudice.

This is a direct appeal from convictions on a jury verdict of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and sale of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(c)(2) and (d)(1). The trial court determined the Defendant to be a
Range II, multiple offender and imposed nine- and seven-year sentences to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The Defendant argues three issues on appeal: 1) the chain of custody was not sufficiently established to admit into evidence the drugs involved in the sales; 2) the two separate drug sale charges should have been merged into a single conviction; and 3) the sentences imposed were excessive due to the trial court’s failure to consider a mitigating factor. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the denial of a beer permit. The beer board denied the appellant’s application for a beer permit because of the detrimental effect that beer sales would have on the health, safety, and morals of the community. The appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the trial court upheld the beer board’s decision. The appellant appeals. We reverse.

In 2002, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the circuit court. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce and incorporated the court’s permanent parenting plan. The trial court ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for three years, awarded the parents joint custody of their minor son, and ordered both parents to pay child support. The wife filed an appeal to this Court contesting the trial court’s decision regarding joint custody. The husband filed an appeal to this Court contesting the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony and child support. We reverse the trial court’s decisions regarding alimony, child custody, and child support, and we remand this case tot he trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for the cocaine conviction and three years for the marijuana conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The Defendant argues two issues on appeal: 1) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty on both charges, and 2) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Mitchell D. Strong, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humphreys County Circuit Court following the revocation of his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief, specifically contending that trial counsel was ineffective in guaranteeing that he would be sentenced to a boot camp program when he was statutorily ineligible for it. Upon review, we agree with the post-conviction court that counsel did not guarantee boot camp but stated that it was a possibility, based upon the judge’s recommendation that the petitioner be admitted to the program. Moreover, the petitioner’s responses during the plea colloquy indicated that the petitioner understood the charges he pled to and the nature and consequences of his pleas. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This court granted Defendant’s petition to rehear to consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) on Defendant’s sentence. Since that time, the Tennessee Supreme Court has considered the impact of Blakely on Tennessee’s sentencing scheme and concluded that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989and its procedures do not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a jury as described in Blakely. See State v. Edwin Gomez, ____ S.W.3d _____, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 WL 856848, at *22 (Tenn. Apr. 15. 2005). In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gomez, this court determines that Defendant’s argument that his sentence is improper under Blakely has no merit. This court’s previous opinion is affirmed in all respects. Costs are assessed against the State.

This appeal arises from a petition to establish visitation filed by the paternal grandparents on behalf of themselves and the father of the minor child. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order wherein it found that the grandparents had failed to establish the statutory requirements for grandparent visitation. The juvenile court granted the father shared parenting time. However, the order provided that, if the father was unable to exercise his visitation for one full month due to his service in the military, the grandparents were granted the power to exercise the father’s visitation for the last full weekend of any such calendar month. From this order, the mother appeals. For reasons stated herein, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the judgment of the juvenile court.

The defendant, Christopher T. Starnes, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of ten years with one year to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on intensive probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's revocation of his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition, contending that: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (2) the judgments and sentences violated his right to due process. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner's classification as a multiple rapist is an operation of law and does not require any notice to the petitioner or any further proceedings post-trial. As such, the convictions and sentences are not void, and we affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The appellant, Stephen Anthony Scott, has filed a petition for rehearing, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to have this Court reconsider its opinion previously filed in this case on June 7, 2005. Specifically, the appellant urges this Court to revisit its ruling that
the trial court properly applied sentence enhancement to count seven of his convictions. In his petition, the appellant contends that this Court misconstrued or “overlooked” his argument, though he admits that his argument was inartfully drawn in his appellate brief, stating, “the issue is not as precisely stated as it should have been.”

On July 10, 1997, Edward A. Miller ("Father") was designated the primary residential parent for the parties minor child. Kerry L. Kelk ("Mother") was not ordered to pay any child support at that time as that order was silent on the issue of child support. No order requiring Mother to pay child support was entered until May 26, 1999. In the May 1999 order, the Trial Court refused to award Father any retroactive child support back to when he was awarded custody. The Trial Court in a later order also held Father responsible for all of the health insurance premiums covering the child from November of 1999 through March of 2002. The Trial Court held each party responsible for one-half of the health insurance premiums from that date on. We conclude that the Trial Court erred in refusing to award retroactive child support to Father for the period from when he was designated the primary residential parent up until May 26, 1999. We further conclude that the Trial Court erred by refusing to hold Mother responsible for all of the child's health insurance premiums.

The defendant, Julio Cesar Hernandez Salinas, was convicted of conspiracy to deliver more than 70 but less than 300 pounds of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress on the basis that he lacked standing; (2) not allowing defense counsel, during voir dire, to ask prospective jurors about their involvement in religious and social organizations; (3) permitting the State to question a trial witness as to the defendant's prior bad acts; and (4) imposing a sentence of eleven years. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Avis N. Neal, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He seeks relief from his jury conviction for rape of a child and resulting sentence of twenty years in confinement. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a legal malpractice case. The plaintiff sued his former lawyer, claiming the lawyer was negligent in his representation of the plaintiff in a case involving alleged racial discrimination. Upon our finding that the defendant supported his motion for summary judgment with expert proof that he did not violate the applicable standard of care in his representation of the plaintiff and our further finding that the plaintiff submitted no expert proof that the defendant did violate the applicable standard of care, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.