APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case involves a dispute over compensation for property taken by eminent domain. The Knoxville Community Development Corporation insisted that the property was worth only $19,500 and deposited that amount into the court. The landowner claimed it was worth much more. Following a trial, the jury found the fair market value of the property to be $25,700. The landowner appeals, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they could consider the tax assessment figures in their valuation of the property. We agree, and we reverse the trial court.

The appellant, Patricia Marie Jenson,² was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of child neglect and possession of drug paraphernalia. She received a total effective sentence of four years, to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for child neglect and the sentence imposed by the trial court on that offense. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Daylon Roberts, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm
the judgment.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s upholding the conviction. I do not believe the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of child neglect as that offense is described in State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 2001). In Mateyko, our supreme court held that “a mere risk of harm” was insufficient and that the state was required to show “that the defendant’s neglect produced an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s health and welfare.” Id. 53 S.W.3d at 671-72.

Appellant was held in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay alimony. We affirm the action of the trial court and find the appeal to be frivolous.

The Juvenile Court reduced the monthly amount of child support the father was obligated to pay from $345 to $130. The State of Tennessee, acting under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, appealed the trial court's determination. The State argues that the court should have either maintained the father's support obligation at the presumptive level of $345 or deviated downward from the guidelines in accordance with the method enunciated by this court in the case of Casteel v. Casteel. Although the trial court impermissibly used the mother's income as a factor in calculating support, father was entitled to a downward deviation, and the amount awarded was within guiding legal principles. Accordingly, we affirm.

The Chancery Court granted Rule 11 sanctions against James Saffles and Connie Saffles (“Plaintiffs”)1 based upon their actions and the resulting delay that occurred after the filing by Roger Watson and Tammy Watson (“Defendants”) of a motion seeking Rule 11 sanctions. We hold that the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds relied on by the Chancery Court was error, vacate the grant of Rule 11 sanctions, and remand for a reconsideration of Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions and a determination of whether the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper based on the grounds raised in the Rule 11 motion.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff’s right hand was drawn into a machine and squeezed. She suffered a minor laceration with perhaps soft-tissue injury. She had no apparent serious injuries, and lost no time, not even one day, from her job. Expert testimony focused on a loss of grip strength. The trial judge found 65 percent permanent partial disability, and 65 percent permanent impairment. Reduced to 27.5 percent.

The petitioner, Kent Ousley, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Eddrick Johnson, originally charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a Range II sentence of seven years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Patrick John Marshall, entered pleas of guilt to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the community corrections sentence and, after a sentencing hearing, imposed a Range II sentence of twenty years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, Joe Kelly, the employee, insists that the trial court erred in finding that he sustained no permanent disability from his work-related injury. The Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. Further, the Panel finds that Mr. Kelly has sustained a vocational impairment of 16% to the body as a whole due to his injury and that Mr. Kelly should receive future medical expenses in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204.

The petitioner, Gregory Christopher Fleenor, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years respectively. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Raymond A. Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition/petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery (a Class B felony). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of robbery (a Class C felony) and was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. Upon the grant of a delayed appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the identification evidence; and (2) whether his confession was sufficiently corroborated so as to establish the corpus delicti. After careful review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was indicted for evading arrest, a Class E felony, in count one; for carjacking, a Class B felony, in count two; for reckless endangerment of Officer Billy Moyer, a Class E felony, in count three; for reckless endangerment of Officer Joe MacLeod, a Class E felony, in count four; for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, subsequent offense, a Class A misdemeanor, in count five; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in count six. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of Class E felony evading arrest, carjacking, reckless endangerment of Officer Moyer, and driving on a revoked license in counts one, two, three and five. Defendant was found not guilty of reckless endangerment of Officer MacLeod and resisting arrest in counts four and six. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to two years for the felony evading arrest conviction, twelve years for the carjacking conviction, two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and reckless endangerment, and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on robbery and theft of property as lesser included offenses of carjacking. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Wesley Earl Brown, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that the employee’s lung condition was causally related to his employment, by ignoring evidence that the employee omitted his pre-existing condition on his employment application and failed to give proper notice of his work related injury, and by finding that the employee was permanently and totally disabled and holding that the employer was liable for both the employee’s pre-existing sarcoidosis and aggravated asthmatic condition. For the reasons set out below, the Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs assessed against the employer.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that Cheryl Smith Graves ("Wife") is not entitled to post-judgment interest on alimony due her under her judgment of divorce from Richard C. Graves, Sr. ("Husband"), which judgment was entered December 3, 2001, nunc pro tunc August 24, 2001. The trial court premised its judgment on its finding that "[Wife] ha[d] been obstructive in the conclusion of this matter." We hold that Wife is entitled to interest on all alimony payments to the extent that those payments were not timely made. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tyrone D. Conley, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a "Constitutional Challenge to Vacate Invalid Sentence." The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that if the document was a petition for post-conviction relief, it was time-barred. Further, the trial court determined that if the document was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner did not allege that his judgment was void. On appeal, the petitioner contests the trial court's dismissal of his petition. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury found the appellant, LeShaun Norwood, guilty of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his confession to police, and (3) that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael D. McDade, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the petitioner is not attacking the revocation of his probation, which, as the majority correctly points out, is not permitted. It is my understanding that the petitioner claims that he would not have entered guilty pleas to the two misdemeanor charges if he had known that he was not eligible for boot camp. He also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine in advance of his plea that it was the policy of the Department of Correction to arbitrarily exclude from boot camp those offenders who had originally been charged with aggravated robbery by the use of a deadly weapon.