APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Marico Vales, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Marico Vales, No. W2018-00424-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 328436 at *1, (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 20, 2019). The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that Counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to inadmissible evidence and evidence admitted without the proper foundation. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgement.

A McNairy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Terry Wayne Henson, of two counts of rape of a child, one count of incest, and one count of violating the sex offender registry requirements. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-five years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. State v. Terry Wayne Henson, No. W2019-00462-SC-R11-CD, 2020 WL 6317113 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 28, 2020), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2021). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in several regards. The post-conviction court held a hearing, after which it denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dominique Jamal Nichols, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of evading arrest, and two counts of driving on a suspended license. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); 39-16-603 (evading arrest); 55-50-504 (driving on a suspended license). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 12 years for each of the firearm convictions, 11 months and 29 days for the evading arrest conviction, and 6 months for each driving on a suspended license conviction, for a total effective sentence of 12 years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress “the stop and subsequent seizure of [the Defendant]’s vehicle[,]” and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Andre Anthony (“Petitioner”) appeals the ruling of the Chancery Court for Davidson County (the “trial court”), dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). We conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal. 

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant personal representative appeals two forms of attorney’s fees awarded against her: (1) attorney’s fees incurred by the appellees in opposing the appellant’s motion for sanctions; and (2) attorney’s fees incurred by appellees in enforcing a confidential settlement agreement. We affirm the attorney’s fees awarded relative to the motion for sanctions and vacate the award of attorney’s fees relative to enforcement of the settlement.

Defendant, Ebony Robinson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license.  The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served on probation with periodic confinement each year near Christmas and each victim’s birthday.  On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting probation because Defendant was not statutorily eligible.  Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and briefs of the parties, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of probation and remand for execution of Defendant’s sentence and entry of amended judgments of conviction. 

The Defendant, Randall Lee Pruitt, pleaded guilty in the Monroe County Criminal Court to three counts of rape, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed nine and one-half years for each conviction and ordered consecutive service, for an effective twenty-eight-and-one-half-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the court erred by ordering consecutive service. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his five-year-old daughter. The father filed his petition after the child’s mother decided to move from Wilson County—where the father lived and the child attended preschool—to Williamson County, where the mother’s fiancé lived. The mother was the primary residential parent and wanted the child to attend school in Williamson County, but the permanent parenting plan gave the parties joint authority over educational decisions, and the father wanted the child to attend school in Wilson County. In his petition, the father contended that the mother’s move constituted a material change in circumstance, and he asked the court to name him as the primary residential parent, implement a 50/50 residential parenting schedule, and give him authority over where the child would attend school. After a three-day trial, the court ordered the parties to send the child to school in Williamson County. The court also found the mother’s move was a material change in circumstance for the purpose of modifying the residential parenting schedule but not for the purpose of changing the primary residential parent or reallocating decision-making authority. The court concluded that a 50/50 residential schedule was in the child’s best interests. This appeal followed.We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all regards.

The Defendant, Billy Wayne Locke, was convicted in two McMinn County Criminal Court bench trials of two counts of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; driving while his license was revoked, a Class B misdemeanor; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603(b) (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest); 55-50-504 (2020) (driving while license revoked), 39-13-103 (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment). The Defendant, a career offender, is serving an effective twelve-year sentence, consisting of six years in the Department of Correction and six years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his evading arrest convictions. Because the Defendant waived his right to an appeal of his convictions, we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children upon the juvenile court’s finding of the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We vacate the statutory ground of persistent conditions due to insufficient findings of fact. However, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Defendant, David Allen Donton, Jr., was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for one count of observation without consent, involving an eight-year-old female victim. Defendant pleaded guilty as charged and agreed to serve one year as a Range I offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for probation and imposed a sentence of confinement. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, and this Court granted his motion to waive the timely filing. Defendant contends that the trial court departed from the principles and purposes of sentencing in several ways. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12, determining that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Following the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment relief, the plaintiff appealed to this Court.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Jason Albert Hayes, Defendant, was charged with aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and assault. He pled guilty in exchange for an effective sentence of three years. After the denial of judicial diversion, Defendant appeals. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the denial of judicial diversion.

The defendant, Dustin Russell, appeals the trial court’s imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Patrick Lamar Moore, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Timing is everything. In this case, at least, that adage holds true. Marvin Maurice Deberry committed a criminal offense and was convicted. But the legislature repealed the statute creating that criminal offense before he was sentenced. Years ago, the legislature enacted a default rule to govern this situation and similar ones. That rule, known as the criminal savings statute, provides generally that an offense must be prosecuted under the law in effect at the time the offense is committed, even if the law is later repealed or amended. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-112 (2018). If the later-enacted law “provides for a lesser penalty,” however, the savings statute dictates that “any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act.” Id. At first, the trial court sentenced Deberry under the law in effect at the time of his offense. But Deberry eventually convinced the trial court that the “lesser penalty” exception applied, and the trial court entered an amended judgment retaining Deberry’s conviction but imposing no punishment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We now reverse and reinstate Deberry’s original sentence. We hold that a statute that repeals a criminal offense does not “provide for a lesser penalty” within the meaning of the criminal savings statute. Rather, a person who commits an offense that is later repealed should be convicted and sentenced under the law in effect when the offense was committed unless the legislature provides otherwise.

The parental rights of Taleada K. (“Mother”) and Lashaun K. (“Father”) were terminated by the Juvenile Court for Dickson County on September 8, 2021. Both parents appeal. We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights to all four of the children for severe abuse, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. We reverse the juvenile court’s ruling that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated for abandonment by failure to support. We vacate the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are terminated for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests and, accordingly, affirm the overall ruling that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are terminated. 

William Lee Runion, Jr. (“Husband”) filed for divorce from his wife of many years, Dianna Lynn Mashburn Runion (“Wife”), in 2019. Throughout the parties’ marriage they lived on a farm owned by Husband’s father. When dividing the parties’ marital estate, the trial court determined that Wife had no interest in the farm land, the real estate thereon, or the profits generated by the farm. The trial court found that these were neither separate nor marital assets, as they belonged solely to Husband’s father. Wife appeals, arguing that Husband and Grandfather were engaged in an implied partnership. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Conner Lewis Bell, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated robbery. Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault, and the remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of three years as a Range I offender to be suspended on probation. Defendant requested judicial diversion, which the trial court denied following a hearing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of diversion.

In this interlocutory appeal of a health care liability action, the only issue for review is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss based on its finding that “extraordinary cause” existed to excuse the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this divorce case, Claude Ellis (“Husband”) challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate, the award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to Melisa1 Jane Godfrey Ellis (“Wife”), and the trial court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital assets. We hold that the trial court misclassified some of the assets in contention as marital, and we remand for a reconsideration of the division of the marital estate in light of this holding. Because the issue of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido is only properly considered after the issues of estate valuation and distribution are settled, we vacate the award of alimony in solido, so that the trial court has the opportunity to reconsider the award if the court finds it necessary. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

A circuit court found that a motorist violated the city’s ordinance prohibiting speeding. On appeal, the motorist argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion to dismiss. He also argues that the court improperly excluded evidence from Google Maps showing his speed and that the evidence preponderates against the finding that he was speeding. Although the court erred in excluding the Google Maps evidence, we affirm. 

Homeowner appeals the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees after an action to enforce a construction contract. Trial court found the provision to be unenforceable based on its undefined “where applicable” language. Applying the rules of contract construction, we conclude that this provision is enforceable and entitles the homeowner to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with this action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine reasonable attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.