APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Charles Tawwater, pled guilty in Franklin County Circuit Court to facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and received two years probation in the Community Corrections Program. The defendant appeals upon certified questions of law from the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of his car. He claims the trial court should have granted his motion because (1) the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe he had committed a criminal offense when stopping his vehicle; (2) his consent to the search of his car was not voluntary; and (3) statements made by him to officers during his detention were inadmissible because he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). We affirm the trial court.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Wayne Pryor, of robbery, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years and six months in the Department of Correction consecutive to sentences in another case for which he was on probation. In this appeal, the single issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a class action on behalf of purchasers of 3,876 lots at Hidden Valley Lakes Development, a residential development in Hickman County. Plaintiffs seek to recover compensatory damages resulting from a breach of contract by the developer, National Development Company, Inc., and its alleged alter ego, Clyde W. Engle. Plaintiffs allege that National breached its contract by failing to provide the centerpiece of the development, a thirty-acre lake. The lake failed to hold water and thus became a thirty-acre hole in the ground. It was stipulated that the failure of National to provide the thirty-acre lake was a breach of contract. The trial was bifurcated into two phases. The first was limited to the plaintiffs' claim for damages against National, following which the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $2,540,867 against National. The second phase of the trial was limited to the plaintiffs' claim that Clyde Engle was the alter ego of National and thus liable for the damages assessed against National. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court pierced the corporate veil and held Engle personally liable for the judgment against National. The defendants appeal contending that the plaintiffs' proof of damages was neither competent nor sufficient, that the wrong legal standard was applied to pierce the corporate veil and that the proof was insufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Engle also appeals contending that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and thus the judgment against him is void. Finding no error, we affirm.

A Weakley County jury convicted the Defendant, Jason Cook, of three counts of forgery and three counts of facilitation of forgery. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no error in the judgments of the trial court, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The petitioner, Joseph W. Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

On April 7, 2003, Amy J. Doss ("Mother") filed divorce and custody proceedings in the Circuit Court for Lake County, Illinois (the "Illinois Court"). On that same day, Timothy L. Doss ("Father") filed divorce and custody proceedings in the Family Court for Rhea County, Tennessee (the "Tennessee Court"). Both the Illinois Court and the Tennessee Court have asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the custody proceedings and inconsistent orders have been entered regarding child support and visitation. The issues on this Tenn. R. App. P. 10 interlocutory appeal by Mother center around whether the Tennessee Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody proceedings and, if so, whether it properly exercised that jurisdiction. We conclude that: 1) the Tennessee Court did not have "home state" subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) even if the Tennessee Court had "significant connection" subject matter jurisdiction, it nevertheless should have declined to exercise that jurisdiction because the Illinois Court clearly is the more appropriate forum. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Tennessee Court with regard to the custody proceedings.

The defendant, Frank Peter Pinchak, entered a nolo contendere plea to vehicular assault, aggravated assault, and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court deferred the imposition of two concurrent two-year sentences for vehicular assault and aggravated assault, placing the defendant on judicial diversion for a term of six years. For violating the implied consent law, the trial court suspended the defendant's license for one year. The trial court then dismissed sua sponte the implied consent law violation, noting that the indictment failed to charge a criminal offense. The State appeals the single issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the implied consent violation and argues that diversion is inappropriate if the offense is reinstated. Concluding that an indictment is not a necessary prerequisite to adjudication of a civil implied consent law violation, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the charge, remand the case for reinstatement of the trial court's original imposition of a one-year suspension of the defendant's driver's license, and conclude that diversion is not appropriate for this civil offense.

The Appellant, Larry Mitchell, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Mitchell argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Michael Lindsey, appeals the dismissal of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-301, et seq. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2003) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court, findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the employee proved that his injury was compensable.  We affirm.

The petitioner, Eric Gilmore, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The opinion of the Court asserts:

The heightened burden of proof required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1) requires us to adapt Tenn.R.App.P.13(d)’s customary standard of review for cases of this sort. First, we must review the trial court’s specific findings of fact de novo in accordance with Tenn.R.App.P.13(d). Thus, each of the trial court’s specific factual findings will be presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Second, we must determine whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the elements required to terminate a biological parent’s parental rights. Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d at 838; In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548-49; In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d at 640; In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 654.

This appeal involves the parental rights of a father who has been incarcerated off and on for most of this fourteen-year-old daughter’s life. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in the White County Juvenile Court while he was serving a fifteen-year-sentence for first degree robbery. The juvenile court, relying on the grounds contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (3), (9) (Supp. 2004), terminated the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. We have determined that the Department has presented clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his daughter as proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2004), that he failed to remedy conditions as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A), and that terminating his parental rights is in his daughter’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating the father’s parental rights.

The defendant, Jesse Lee Creasman, entered a plea of guilt to burglary of a business. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years and ordered probationary supervision for a period of four years. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court directed restitution as follows: $207.05 for the replacement of the store window, $239.90 for stolen cigarettes, and $6,300 for increased insurance premiums. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the amount of restitution is excessive. Restitution is reduced by $6,300 to $436.95. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this action arising from a motor vehicle accident, plaintiffs claimed damages for personal injuries and the jury returned a verdict finding defendants 100% at fault for the accident, but awarded no damages for personal injuries to plaintiffs. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant was indicted for statutory rape and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  Thereafter, the trial court ordered an investigation to determine whether the defendant was suitable for pretrial diversion. Before the defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion, but after a pretrial investigation report was submitted, the prosecutor denied pretrial diversion. The trial court granted the defendant’s writ of certiorari and reversed the prosecutor’s decision. Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State was granted permission for an interlocutory appeal to this Court. On appeal, this Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. State v. Daniel Shane Malone, No. W1999-01678-CCA-R9-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 8, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 4, 2002). The defendant then filed an original application for pretrial diversion.  Again, the prosecutor denied pretrial diversion. The trial court granted a writ of certiorari and, thereafter, determined that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion. The defendant sought, and was granted, permission to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the appeal to address the defendant's contention that the prosecutor abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. Upon review, we conclude that the prosecutor failed to consider and weigh all relevant factors including substantial evidence favorable to the defendant. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the prosecutor for further consideration of all relevant factors attendant to the defendant’s pretrial diversion application.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff re-injured his back while operating a jackhammer allegedly in violation of his lifting limitations.  The thrust of the defense centered on the asserted misconduct of the plaintiff. The trial judge disallowed the defense. We affirm.

The Trial Court enforced a mediated Settlement Agreement, reduced to writing and signed by the parties, over the wife's objection. On appeal, we affirm.

The Defendant, Derrick Sawyers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Steven G. Hughes, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his Cocke County convictions of aggravated robbery. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.

The defendant, Marshaun Luden, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of five years as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant does not contest the revocation of his probation. Rather, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider any additional alternative sentencing options. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby County employee appealed denial of review by the County’s Civil Service Merit Board following elimination of her position. The Shelby County Circuit Court affirmed the denial of a review by the Board because employee’s position was eliminated due to loss of funding as opposed to disciplinary action against her. Employee appeals. We affirm.

After having been indicted for the offense of first degree murder, Petitioner, David Joe Douglas Blair, pled guilty to the lesser included offense of second degree murder on June 6, 1999, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and received a sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On January 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Appointment of Counsel" pertaining to this matter and referenced a statute pertaining to the right to petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed counsel and an amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed. The State answered, and in its answer alleged that the petition should be summarily dismissed because it was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed, and filed his brief. The State has filed a motion for this court to affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Curtis Tate, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) “[p]lain error exists in the record in that the two material and crucial witnesses were not called at trial”; (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury were incomplete and misleading; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction; and (5) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James A. Vaughn, was convicted of one count of first degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.