APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court permanently enjoined the City of Memphis from modifying its health care plan to require enrollees to obtain prescription medications through a mail-order pharmacy plan. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred (1) in failing to find ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (2) in denying the petitioner’s motion for a continuance. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner James Beasley appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus ad testificandum. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. An appeal as of right does not exist from a denial of a petition for habeas corpus ad testificandum. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

In the Divorce Decree Decedent was ordered to pay alimony "until remarriage or death of plaintiff". Decedent's estate refused to pay alimony. The Trial Court held the Decree required the payment of alimony after Decedent's death. On appeal, we reverse and dismiss.

The defendant, Doyle Arnel Whitlock, appeals from actions of the Washington County Criminal Court in the aftermath of his multiple, guilty-pleaded convictions, the denial of his motion to reduce his sentences, and his filing of a document titled "Appeal of Conviction," which despite the title raised issues of guilty plea validity and ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we dismiss the appeal in part and remand for further proceedings in the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.  § 50-6-225(e)(3) for reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends the trial court’s determination of sixty-five percent permanent partial impairment to the lower right extremity is excessive in light of the evidence. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Luther E. Fowler, appeals from the Johnson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

The appellant, Philander T. Fleming, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether "nursing services," as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a) (1999), includes care provided by an injured employee's spouse where the spouse is a certified nurse technician. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that care provided by a certified nurse technician is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law irrespective of the relationship between the caregiver and the employee. We further hold that the care here was reasonably necessary and was provided pursuant to what the employee understood to be the physician's orders. Accordingly, we reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel as to this issue and remand to the trial court for a determination of the value of the nursing services rendered by Mrs. Long. We affirm as to the other issues raised by the appellant employee.

Petitioner, Clarence Washington, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his sentence for his conviction of the offense of escape from a penitentiary. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

We granted review in this case to determine the proper standard of review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) (1996). We hold that the de novo review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) requires the trial court to conduct an independent evaluation of all of the evidence before it. We overrule Tucker v. Humphreys County, 944 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), upon which the Court of Appeals relied, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We remand this case to the chancery court for a review of the county commission's findings using the proper de novo standard as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-211-704(c) and this decision.

This is a state appeal from the Cumberland County Criminal Court's suppression of a handgun seized pursuant to a warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle. Because a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule has not been adopted as a facet of the state constitution, we affirm.

The appellant, Frazier Fashun Perry, was indicted for: (1) possession of cocaine over .5 grams with the intent to sell or deliver; (2) possession of marijuana over one-half ounce with the intent to sell or deliver; and (3) being a drug felon in possession of a handgun. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the items seized as a result of the execution of a “no knock” search warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to resell, a Class B felony. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law to determine whether exigent circumstances existed to justify execution of the “no knock” search warrant in violation of Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(e). The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We determine that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress as the State proved that exigent circumstances existed which justified the issuance of a “no knock” search warrant. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Terrance Dupree Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Doreen Jones, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of twenty-one years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain photographs of the victim; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding expert testimony provided by a defense witness; (5) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a videotape recording; (6) that the trial court erred by permitting the medical examiner to testify that the victim's death resulted from abuse and neglect and by refusing to redact this statement from the autopsy report; (7) that the trial court erred by permitting the state to read certain Social Security regulations; and (8) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a change of venue. The defendant has also asked this court to review the propriety of the sentence in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether evidence seized from the defendants’ residence
pursuant to a search warrant should be suppressed. Sheriff’s deputies entered the defendants’
residence without a warrant based upon an informant’s tip and the deputies’ recognition of the smell of anhydrous ammonia and ether. The deputies then detained the defendants while a warrant was obtained. We conclude that the deputies’ warrantless entry into the defendants’ residence was unlawful. However, the unlawful entry and any illegality in the subsequent detention did not taint the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, and the affidavit supporting the issuance of the warrant sufficiently established probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant appeals the sentence he received after a violation and revocation of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the sentence issued was illegal. Following our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

This is an action for breach of contract filed by Plaintiff/Contractor against the State, together with a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint against the surety company for Plaintiff/Contractor. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability because the State had failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in answering Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. After much procedural combat, the trial court adhered to its ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed the Third-Party Complaint against the surety and the Counterclaim of the State against Plaintiff, held that Plaintiff had failed to prove any damages against the State, and sustained the Motion of the State for an involuntary dismissal of Plaintiff's entire claim, taxing the costs to Plaintiff. We find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff as to liability without considering documentation and evidence submitted by the State subsequent to the initial non-final order granting partial summary judgment as to liability. It follows that the court also erred in dismissing the Counterclaim and the Third-Party Complaint against the surety. The grant of partial summary judgment as to liability is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

While Beatrice Harmon Montgomery ("Plaintiff") and Terry Lane Montgomery ("Defendant") never married, they lived together for many years beginning in 1969. Plaintiff and Defendant had one child, Brian Montgomery. During their relationship, Plaintiff and Defendant accumulated substantial assets and operated several businesses. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking dissolution of her implied business partnership with Defendant. Brian Montgomery intervened claiming he also was a partner in two of the business ventures. The Trial Court concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant were equal partners in all of their business pursuits, and that Brian also was a partner in two of them. It is this ruling that forms the basis for most of the numerous issues raised on appeal. We reverse in part, vacate in part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The defendant, Gustavo Chavez, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court classified him as a Range I offender and imposed a ten year sentence at 100% service in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. However, in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the defendant’s sentence to an effective sentence of eight years at 100% service. We, therefore, remand the case for entry of a judgment that is consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Thomas D. Stanton, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft, one count of Class D felony evading arrest, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the robbery offense; twenty-five years for the carjacking, to run consecutively; twelve years for the burglary offense, to run consecutively; five years for the theft, to run concurrently; ten years for the felony evading arrest, to run concurrently; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor evading arrest, to run concurrently; for an effective sentence of life plus thirty-seven years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence does not support his aggravated robbery conviction; that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury on certain lesser-included offenses; that the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach him on the basis of a prior conviction; and that his sentences are excessive. The State also filed a direct appeal, arguing that the Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction is illegal and should be modified to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We reverse and remand for a new trial the Defendant's conviction of Class D felony evading arrest. We modify the Defendant's sentence for his aggravated robbery conviction to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We remand for a correction of the judgment reflecting the Defendant's carjacking conviction. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he was classified as both a Range II, persistent offender and a Class X offender. We conclude that the petitioner was properly sentenced based upon both the classification of the offense (Class X) and the offender classification (Range II, persistent). As such, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the habeas petition.

This case involves a claim for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The accident occurred when the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a guest passenger was forced off the road by an unidentified motorist. The plaintiff asserted a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the provisions of an insurance policy issued to her former husband and his company. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant insurance company after concluding the undisputed facts revealed that, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff was not insured under the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Upon appeal to this Court, we conclude that the undisputed facts in the record do not support the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the insurance company. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was insured under the automobile insurance policy at the time of the accident and therefore entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Ronald Allen, was convicted of rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the state to ask leading questions of the minor victim; (3) that the sentence is excessive under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act; and (4) that the sentence must be modified under the terms of Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2351 (2004). The sentence is modified to twenty-three years. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellants, who were represented in a lawsuit by Appellees, appeal the dismissal of their attorney malpractice suit against Appellees on the ground, among other things, that the Appellants did not file suit within the one-year statute of limitations for attorney malpractice actions. Finding no error, we affirm.