APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce case. In contemplation of a divorce grounded on irreconcilable differences, Husband and Wife entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the complaint, inter alia, disavowed the prior executed Marital Dissolution Agreement. The divorce case proceeded to trial, and the trial court granted the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and enforced the Marital Dissolution Agreement,  dividing the marital property and debt. Husband appeals. Because Husband-Appellant repudiated the Marital Dissolution Agreement prior to the entry of the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce, there was no agreement between the parties, and the Marital Dissolution Agreement should not have been enforced. We reverse and remand.

Appellant challenges trial court’s dismissal of his petition, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(4), seeking to rescind his voluntary legitimation of child, modify custody, set aside paternity order and modify child support arrearage, based on results of DNA test that conclusively proves that he is not the father of the child. We reverse.

The defendant, Anthony D. Aziz, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately explain the consequences of the pleas and for failing to raise the issue of his mental competency at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Cornelius Boales, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of one count of felony possession of cocaine with the intent  to sell, a class B felony, and one count of felony possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a class E felony. For these crimes,  Boales received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. In addition, the trial court imposed a $100,000 fine as assessed by the jury for the cocaine conviction. On appeal, Boales  argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support either of his  convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence and the maximum fine for his class B felony conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence supports the convictions and the length of the sentence imposed.  However, we modify Boales’ fine of $100,000 to reflect assessment of a fine in the amount of $50,000.

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by Appellants seeking to invalidate certain inter vivos
transfers made by Decedent as well as the Wills executed by Decedent while living with Appellees. After a hearing in which a jury received evidence from numerous witnesses and exhibits, Appellants sought a directed verdict on whether, as a matter of law, the burden to prove the validity of the Wills and the inter vivos transfers shifted to Appellees. The trial court denied this motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees, upholding Decedent’s Last Will and Testament and the inter vivos transfers. Review by this Court is sought by Appellants, and, for the following reasons, we reverse.
 

The defendant attempts to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 while a motion is pending in the trial court. The trial court has held the defendant’s remaining motion in abeyance because the defendant has pursued this appeal. We find this appeal premature and remand the case to the trial court to complete the proceedings and issue a final judgment, from which the defendant may then appeal.

The petitioner, Christopher Lee Tuttle, appeals as of right the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for drug-related offenses and effective forty-year sentence. The petitioner contends (1) that the state breached his plea agreement which undermined the voluntariness of his guilty plea and (2) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by acting vindictively and violating Rule 8(a), Tenn. R. Crim. P., requiring mandatory joinder. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s rights to his non-marital child. When the child was almost five years old, his mother and her husband filed a petition in the Williamson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the biological father’s parental rights and to adopt the child. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court determined that the biological father had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him and that terminating the biological father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated the biological father’s parental rights and approved the adoption. The biological father has appealed.  We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the biological father abandoned the child and that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Appellant, Jerry Yates, appeals the denial by the trial court of a motion to suppress all evidence in a prosecution for driving under the influence, alleging an illegal warrantless misdemeanor arrest because he left the scene of the accident. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The petitioner, Preston U. Pendergrass, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the indictment, which charged him with two counts of attempted first degree murder, failed to state the facts constituting an offense, thereby depriving the convicting court of jurisdiction and rendering his judgments void. The petitioner further argues that the court erred by not appointing appellate counsel as requested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The defendant, Barry Wayne Dunham, was convicted by a Macon County Criminal Court jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his father and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) restricting defense counsel’s voir dire of the jury venire; (2) interfering with defense counsel’s examination of a witness and denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the court’s allegedly prejudicial commentary on the witness’s testimony; and (3) disallowing a defense expert witness on the subject of domestic violence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jesse David Teasley, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, request for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The trial court properly denied relief as the pleadings were untimely filed and without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of an action by Appellant for a claim of negligence. After the close of
Appellant’s proof, Appellee moved for involuntary dismissal based on the lack of evidence
concerning the actions of the emergency vehicle involved in the automobile accident. The trial court granted the motion on this basis, and Appellant now seeks review by this Court. We affirm.
 

I concur in most of the reasoning and results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the conclusion that Dr. Goetting was not qualified to testify as an expert in this parent-child homicide case. The trial court excluded her testimony because it was the first time she had testified in such a case, she was a sociologist, and she relied on facts that were not in evidence. It concluded that her testimony would not be a substantial help to the jury.

The Hamilton County Criminal Court Grand Jury indicted the defendant, George Lebron Johnson, on two counts of attempt to commit first degree murder. He entered into an agreement with the state to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in exchange for concurrent six-year, Range I sentences. The agreement provided that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the effective six-year sentence. On January 9, 2004, the trial court ordered him to serve the effective sentence in confinement. On February 6, 2004, the defendant moved the court to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas and for a new trial on the issue of the manner of service of his sentences. The trial court denied both motions, and the defendant has appealed. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a petition filed by the co-executors of the Estate of Billy F. Hawk, Jr. to approve a sale of real estate partially owned by the Estate. The issue presented is whether the trial court should have approved the private sale. The trial court held that the proposed sale was not in the best interest of all the beneficiaries of the Estate. The proposed buyer appeals. We hold that the trial court’s decision was not contrary to the preponderance of evidence, nor was it arbitrary or capricious, and therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Phyllis Hathaway, appeals from the trial court’s order modifying her probation and setting her restitution. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in (1) imposing consecutive sentences and probation on December 7, 1989 because the judgments had become final; and (2) in determining restitution fourteen (14) years after the sentencing hearing. Following review, we conclude that the judgment expiration issue is without merit. In addition, we affirm the trial court’s modification of the petitioner’s probation. However, after review of the record, we conclude that the trial court failed to follow the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304 when setting restitution. Therefore, regarding the issue of restitution, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and request for a delayed appeal. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to allow him to testify at his sentencing hearing, and in failing to file a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After review of the record, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal, and we stay further proceedings on his remaining post-conviction claim.

This case involves the alleged breach of a real estate sales contract. The plaintiffs argue that the defendant home builder is in breach of contract because he refused to sell them the house contracted for unless, in addition to the price stated in the contract, they paid him for costs attributed to changes in construction. None of these changes were implemented pursuant to written change orders as required under the contract. The builder countersued arguing that the changes for which he sought payment were agreed to orally after the contract was executed, that the written change order requirement of the contract was waived, and that the plaintiffs breached the contract by refusing to pay him the original contract price, plus the amount attributed to the changes. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

The petitioner, Paul K. Flannigan, appeals pro se from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his judgments, indictments, and jury
verdicts are invalid. He further argues that the trial judge and district attorney have acted improperly.  Finding no merit in this appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stevie W. Caldwell, was convicted in 1995 in the White County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to life, nineteen years, and six months, to be served concurrently. In a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the indictment was defective, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

The defendant, Patrick Harris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder. In this appeal, he insists that he acted in self-defense and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Finding that the evidence is sufficient and that it entitled the jury to reject the defendant’s claim of self-defense, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

Christa A. Avenell,¹ sometimes referred to herein as “the plaintiff,” brought this action against James Allen Gibson (“the creditor”), seeking to recover funds taken out of the Avenells’ two joint accounts by their bank in response to a levy of execution. The trial court held that the 1988 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 45-2-703 (2000) changed the law with respect to bank accounts held by individuals as tenants by the entirety; that Mrs. Avenell failed to prove she was entitled to the levied upon funds; and that the creditor was entitled to retain the funds paid into court by the Avenells’ bank. The plaintiff and her husband appeal. We reverse.