APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Sheila Ann Jones, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's denial of alternative sentencing following her guilty plea to attempt to commit aggravated child abuse. Because the record supports the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

The Appellant, Craig S. Cook, presents for review a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Cook pled guilty to Driving Under the Influence (DUI), first offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days jail confinement, to be suspended after service of ten days. As a condition of his guilty plea, Cook explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test administered by a private hospital in the course of medical treatment. Cook argues that the procedures utilized to obtain the results of the test violated both his constitutional right to privacy and due process. On appeal, the State asserts that the question presented is not dispositive and, thus, this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. After review, we agree that the certified question is not dispositive. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit alleging that he was unlawfully deprived his right to practice his religion and that certain of his religious tapes were confiscated and he was denied the right to congregate and worship in accordance with his faith. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit and Plaintiff responded with his own affidavit. Having determined that there are disputed issues of material fact, we reverse.
 

After the Jefferson County Circuit Court revoked his probation, the defendant, Johnny Arwood, agreed to consecutive sentences in exchange for being placed back on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences without first conducting a sentencing hearing or ordering a presentence report. We vacate the trial court's judgments and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Thaddeus D. Daniel, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This case involves premises liability. At her apartment complex, the plaintiff tripped and fell on the metal edging of a limestone gravel walkway and sustained injuries to her elbow. The plaintiff sued the owner of the apartment complex, alleging premises liability, and also sued the company that put in the metal landscape edging. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff did not establish that defendants violated the duty of reasonable care.

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal concerns a pyramid sales scheme involving the sale of unregistered investment contracts. After discovering that their contracts were worthless, four purchasers filed separate actions against the person who sold them the contracts. These cases were consolidated for trial in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the seller had breached his personal guarantee contract with two of the buyers and had violated the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980 by selling unregistered investment contracts to all the purchasers. Accordingly, the court awarded the four purchasers judgments totaling $99,450.00, as well as $44,979.50 for attorney's fees and legal expenses. The seller asserts on this appeal that the Tennessee Securities Act claims were filed after the statute of limitations had expired and that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel prevent the purchasers from asserting these claims. In addition, he insists that the court erred by permitting the purchasers to amend their complaints one week before trial to add their Tennessee Securities Act claims. He also takes issue with the trial court's decision to award the purchasers their attorney's fees. We affirm the judgments.

The Defendant, Jon Glen Akins, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued between
$10,000.00 and $60,000.00, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years, ordering that the Defendant serve 90 days in jail, followed by probation. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred by not granting him full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Yates, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life and twenty-three years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial based upon the state's opening statement; (3) that the trial court erred in the admission of certain of the evidence; (4) that the trial court erred by permitting the introduction of a postmortem photograph of the murder victim; (5) that the trial court erred by ordering his trial counsel to alter the form and manner of his questions; (6) that the trial court erred by denying his request for a mistrial based upon the state's violation of a discovery order; (7) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove venue; (8) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (9) that the sentence is excessive. The 23 year sentence for attempted first degree murder is modified to 20 years; otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The State appeals from an adverse ruling on a suppression motion. The State contends that the trial court erred in finding the consent to search was not knowing or voluntary and that discovery of the contraband was not inevitable. The State avers that the standard of review should be de novo without presumption of correctness. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff/Appellant, an unsuccessful candidate for mayor of The City of Memphis, brought “Complaint for Election Contest” against Defendant/Appellee, Shelby County Election Commission and Tennessee Division of Elections. Plaintiff/Appellant filed Motion to Compel Discovery and for Continuance, asserting that Defendant/Appellee had withheld information crucial to Plaintiff/Appellant’s case. The trial court denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s Motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s action pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). We affirm.

Indicted for aggravated burglary and the attempted first-degree murder of her estranged husband, Judy C. Turner entered a best-interests plea to assault with intent to commit second-degree murder, a Class B felony. As part of a plea agreement with the state, the aggravated burglary charge was dismissed. The length and manner of service of the defendant's sentence was reserved for the trial court's determination. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and imposed a nine-year incarcerative sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that she should have received an eight-year sentence making her eligible for probation or split confinement. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

Based on his participation in a home invasion and robbery that resulted in the death of a victim, the defendant, Spencer Peterson, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in thirteen separate indictments with one count of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted first degree murder; eight counts of aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated burglary; three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery; and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The indictments were consolidated for trial, at the conclusion of which the defendant was convicted of all counts as charged with the exception of the first degree murder and attempted first degree murder counts, in which he was convicted, respectively, of the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, a Class A felony; and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. After merging the three second degree murder convictions and the separate convictions of aggravated robbery involving the same victim, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to consecutive terms of twenty years for the second degree murder conviction and eight years for each of the four aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences for the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his second degree murder conviction; the denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police; the admission at trial of photographs of the victim; the propriety of the jurors having been allowed to directly question trial witnesses; and the consecutive sentencing imposed. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments as to certain of the offenses and for the trial court to set out its basis for consecutive sentencing.

This is an appeal contesting the award of discretionary costs by the Trial Court. We affirm.

This appeal involves the parental relationship between a three-year-old child and her biological father. Shortly after the child's birth in Ohio, her mother placed her for adoption with relatives residing in Tennessee. These relatives filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County seeking to terminate the biological father's parental rights and to adopt the child. The biological father thereafter filed a petition to establish parentage. Following a bench trial, the trial court established the child's parentage and determined that the biological father had not abandoned the child. Accordingly, the trial court denied the adoptive parents' petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and to adopt the child. Because it had reserved ruling on the custody and visitation arrangements, the trial court granted the adoptive parent's application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur that an interlocutory appeal is warranted in this case. We also concur with the trial court's conclusion that the adoptive parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the biological father abandoned his daughter.

Aggrieved of the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner appeals. Based upon Roger L. Hickman v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. E2002-01916-SC-R11-PC (Tenn., Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2004), we affirm.

The appellant, Demetrie Owens, was found guilty by a jury on two counts of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and one count of possession of contraband in a penal institution. The jury found the appellant not guilty of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two theft convictions and sentenced the appellant to three years and four months on the theft and four years and eight months on the drug offense. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions on the charge of possession of contraband in a penal institution, and his sentence. Because the appellant failed to include his challenge to the jury instructions in a motion for new trial, that issue is waived. As to the remaining issues, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced the appellant.

The petitioner, Frank W. Johnson, pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to thirteen and one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he pled guilty to an illegal sentence. The trial court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Raymond Roger Jones, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's dismissal of his pro se combined motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, petition for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for DNA analysis. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of first degree murder. He received consecutive life sentences. This Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Jones, 735 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Washington County Criminal Court. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this Court affirmed. See Raymond Roger Jones v. State, No. 03C01-9102-CR-00068, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 26, 1991), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1992). On June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, alleging that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), established a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application to his case. Petitioner subsequently filed a supplemental request for DNA analysis. The trial court dismissed the motion and denied Petitioner's request for DNA Analysis. Petitioner appeals. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This parental termination case presents the Court with two issues: (1) whether a case manager can testify regarding facts about which she has no personal knowledge but which are documented in a case file not made an exhibit, and (2) whether the guardian ad litem of a minor child can testify as a witness. At the trial of this case, the State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services presented only two witnesses: the case manager who had only been working on the file for six months and the child's guardian ad litem. The case manager had no firsthand knowledge of the facts except what she had read in the case file which was not present at the trial and not introduced into evidence. The defendant objected on the basis of hearsay and the trial court allowed the case manager to testify under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The guardian ad litem testified concerning her investigation into the matter over the Defendant's objection. We hold that the case manager's testimony was hearsay and was not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We hold that the guardian ad litem's testimony was not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40 which forbids such testimony. Because of the exclusion of the testimony of these witnesses, the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand to the Juvenile Court for Sevier County for a new trial.

The Defendant, Ronald Harrison, was indicted for rape, and he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. After holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, suspended sentence and probation, and sentenced the Defendant to two years in the county workhouse. The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his application for judicial diversion; and (2) sentenced him to two years. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion. Further, we hold that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and we reduce the Defendant’s sentence in accordance with this opinion to the presumptive minimum of one year. We remand the case for the entry of appropriate judgments of conviction.

This is a divorce case. The husband appeals from the trial court’s divorce decree distributing the marital and separate property and awarding the wife alimony in futuro. We affirm.