APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

While initially indicted on three counts of attempted first degree murder, the defendant, John Mark Burns, was convicted on three counts of attempted second degree murder. The trial court imposed sentences of eleven years for each offense, all of which are to be served concurrently. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues that the trial court erred in several of its instructions to the jury, and he contends that the sentence is excessive. Because the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors, the defendant’s sentences are modified to three concurrent nine-year terms. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's refusal to grant a summary judgment to the defendants in a negligence case. We find that the defendants have not affirmatively negated an element of this negligence claim and that reasonable minds could differ on the allocation of fault between the parties. Consequently, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore agree with the trial court and affirm the denial of summary judgment.

The Appellant, Tony Harp, was convicted in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court of one count of theft of property valued between $ 1,000 and $ 10,000, a class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a thirty-month community corrections sentence, with service of ninety days in the county jail. On appeal, Harp asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction and (2) the trial court erred in denying him full probation. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence.

In this Declaratory Judgment action, the Trial Court established the purchase price of property pursuant to a right of first refusal, awarded interest and denied a request for attorney's fees. On appeal by Seller, we Affirm.

The defendant appeals her resentencing following the revocation of her eight-year community corrections sentence for vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction, following her arrest for DUI. Based on the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration in light of its holding.

The Trial Court awarded possession to purchaser of property at foreclosure sale and dismissed possessor's action to rescind foreclosure. On appeal, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee.  Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm.

In this action to contest a Will, the Trial Court granted proponent summary judgment. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm.
 

In this divorce case, Teresa Lynn (Hurst) Fugate ("Wife") appeals the trial court's decision to set aside the parties' marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a quitclaim deed to the marital residence executed by the Husband shortly after the parties separated. The trial court found the residence to be marital property and equally divided the equity in the property between the parties. Wife argues that the trial court should have found the residence to be a gift from husband, and thus separate property, and that the trial court erred by not enforcing the quitclaim deed. Wife also appeals the trial court's award of $187.00 in attorney fees to Husband. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

Wife appeals the trial court's distribution of marital property as inequitable in of her contribution to the acquisition of the only significant asset, the marital home. The trial court clearly recognized that without Wife's contribution from her separate property, the parties would have been unable to buy the house. We modify the trial court's award of the equity in the house and affirm as modified.

Holli Thacker Haney ("Plaintiff") had two children who attended Michigan Avenue Elementary School (the "School") in Bradley County. Plaintiff's husband, Tracy Thacker ("Thacker"), was not the biological father of the oldest child, but he was the biological father of the youngest child. Thacker filed for divorce, and he and Plaintiff were in sharp disagreement over custody matters. Apparently believing he was going to lose on the custody issues, on the morning of December 12, 2000, Thacker went to the School and signed out both children. The School required Thacker to provide a written explanation as to why the children were being signed out. Thacker wrote "Keeping Promise by Mother" and "Pay Back" as his reasons for signing out the children. School employees did not read what Thacker had written prior to allowing him to leave the premises with the children. Tragically, Thacker then murdered both young children. Plaintiff sued the Bradley County Board of Education asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se based on the School's allowing Thacker to sign out the children and leave the School with them on December 12. The Trial Court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father, and both appealed. Because statutory grounds were proved by clear and convincing evidence and it was also shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between the owners of a convenience store and the Lewis County Beer Board over a permit to sell beer. After the Beer Board denied their application because their store was within two thousand feet of a church, the owners filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Lewis County asserting that the Beer Board was selectively enforcing its distance rule. The owners appealed after the trial court granted the Beer Board's motion to dismiss. We have determined that this appeal is now moot because the persons applying for the permit sold the store while this appeal was pending.

The defendant, Robin McNeal Vanhoose, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal by the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon reviewing the record, the defendant’s brief, and the State’s motion and brief, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence.

Seanise Shaw, the petitioner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for
post-conviction relief. The lower court found her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Raymond Mitchell, was convicted in 1996 of two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. He pled nolo contendere to a third rape charge, which was reduced to sexual battery. He received a total effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging he was entitled to earn sentence reduction credits and challenging his classification as a "multiple rapist." The trial court dismissed the petition and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Correction ("DOC") did not err by classifying the petitioner as a multiple rapist and determining he was not eligible for sentence reduction credits. The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper jury instructions, double jeopardy violations, and again challenging the sentence enforcement by the DOC. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this appeal followed. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court denying the petition but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3 to reflect that the petitioner is a "multiple rapist," and his sentences are to be served as such.

The defendant pled guilty in 2000 to vehicular homicide and the judgment ordered, in addition to setting the sentence at five years and the restitution amount, that he forfeit his driver's license for five years. Following his release from incarceration, he petitioned the trial court to reduce the period of suspension of his license to three years. The trial court granted this petition, and the State appealed, arguing that the court was without authority to alter the license revocation period. Upon our review, we find that the judgment, which was the basis for the defendant's request that the trial court reduce the suspension period to three years and the State's appeal of the court order doing so, had been superseded by an amended judgment entered several days after the first which corrected the listing of the statute for the defendant's conviction offense but omitted setting a period of suspension of his driver's license. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court reducing the suspension period to three years and remand for entry of a second corrected judgment, this one to set a period for the license revocation.

Father appeals termination of his parental rights. Father conceded and the juvenile court found that grounds exist for termination of Father's parental rights. The juvenile court also found that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. Father appeals the finding that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Raymond K. McCrary, pled guilty to one count of manufacture of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of possession for resale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, also a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Department of Correction on each count to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the length of the sentence but modify it to reflect a period of incarceration of sixty days, with the remainder to be served on probation with appropriate conditions to be established by the trial court.

Because of questions regarding the trial court's denial of appointed counsel in this proceeding that resulted in the termination of parental rights, the Department of Children's Services has acknowledged that the trial court's judgment must be vacated. We agree.

I agree with the majority opinion that application of enhancement factor (14) violates the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. _____, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). However, I would remand for a new sentencing hearing for the trial court to use the only applicable enhancement factor, the Defendant’s prior convictions. While the trial court did state that the prior convictions “should be considered very strongly as far as enhancement,” the trial court then immediately stated that Defendant had to be on probation at the time of the offense which is the subject of this appeal, and the trial court applied that enhancement factor also.

On November 13, 2002, the defendant, Leonard H. Cutshall, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for (1) transportation of untaxed beer in excess of 100 cases and (2) depriving the State of lawful revenue, both Class E felonies. The defendant pled guilty to these charges at a hearing held on April 21, 2003. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant was to be sentenced to two years as a Range II offender for each count and pay a fine of $2,000 for each count. In addition, the defendant was ordered to pay the State $511.27 in lost revenue. At a hearing held on September 15, 2003, the trial court denied the defendant alternative sentencing and probation. The defendant has appealed that decision to this Court. We have found no error on the part of the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.