APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns an alleged conversion of funds. Rebecca Durbin, Teresa Fletcher Kidd, and Ramona Lewis ("Plaintiffs," collectively), the adult children of the late Charles Lewis ("Charlie"), sued Bernice Lewis ("Defendant"), Charlie's widow, in the Chancery Court for Washington County ("the Trial Court").Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant exercised undue influence over Charlie in his later years and converted funds in a bank account that Charlie had intended for them to have. After a trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appeals, arguing among other things that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' claim had expired. Defendant also argues that the Trial Court erred by not awarding her any darnages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house, which Defendant continued to live in pursuant to Charlie's will. We hold that Plaintiffs were on constructive notice of their claim against Defendant no later than October 5, 2009, and thus their lawsuit filed in October 2019 is time-barred. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court with respect to Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant. However, we affirm the Trial Court as to its declination to award Defendant any damages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house as Plaintiffs owed her no duty to maintain the house; per Charlie's will, that was his Estate's responsibility. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the Trial Court's judgment.

This appeal arises from an unorthodox procedural history, wherein the trial court made its findings of facts and conclusions of law in an order granting summary judgment, the result of which terminated the mother/appellant’s parental rights. The court determined that the undisputed material facts clearly and convincingly established five grounds on which to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The court also found the undisputed material facts established that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals, asserting that the trial court violated her due process rights by terminating her parental rights without affording her an effective opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. She contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. She also contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on each of the alleged statutory grounds for termination as well as the issue of the child’s best interests. Following a careful review of the record, we have determined that the mother’s due process rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in denying her motion for a continuance. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that Petitioners proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Garric Dorsey, for one count of Class B aggravated sexual battery, one count of Class C solicitation of a minor, and one count of Class B felony sexual exploitation of a minor. Although Petitioner’s criminal history was that of a Range II offender, Petitioner entered a guilty plea as a Range III offender to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of a minor, both Class C felonies. The State dismissed the count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years’ incarceration on both counts and ran the sentences concurrently. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his due process rights were violated. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Robert Glen Gray, appeals as of right from the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for two counts of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) told Petitioner that he could “beat the charges” and obtain convictions for simple possession/casual exchange of methamphetamine; (2) failed to file a motion to sever; (3) failed to review the entirety of the discovery materials with Petitioner, specifically the laboratory report on the methamphetamine and photographs of Petitioner exchanging money and drugs; and (4) failed to explain the State’s plea offer “in its entirety.” Following our review, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child.  The mother appeals the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent of the minor child.  We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact to facilitate appellate review. 

This appeal involves the mortgagors’ petition to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of a piece of real property, alleging that the mortgagors and owner of the property were not given proper notice of the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The mortgagee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust concerning the property at issue is the City of Chattanooga. The property was sold to Vince Trotter in a foreclosure auction. In a court order, which was certified as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Trotter, determining that Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-106 prevented the foreclosure sale from being considered void or voidable due to lack of notice and that the mortgagors had a constitutionally adequate remedy of monetary damages. Despite the mortgagors arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-106 is unconstitutional as applied to governmental entities, the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04, Tenn. R. App. P. 32, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(b). Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Trotter and remand to the trial court to provide the required notice to the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office.

In 2020, a Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Mimms, of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder.  The trial court imposed concurrent fifteen-year sentences in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the proof was less than clear and convincing that termination was in her child’s best interest. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm.

On May 24, 2021, the Defendant, Milton Keith Perkins, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. He alleged that his negotiated Tennessee sentence was illegal because the judgment indicated it should be served “consecutively to any present sentence including Texas parole,” but his Texas sentence was adjudicated after the Tennessee conviction. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Montez Davis, was convicted of second degree murder, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a Hamilton County jury. State v. Montez Davis, No. E2011-02066-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6213520, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). The post-conviction court denied several of Petitioner’s claims but ultimately granted post-conviction relief and vacated Petitioner’s second degree murder conviction. The State appealed and Petitioner filed a cross-appeal. After a thorough review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s grant of post-conviction relief and reinstate Petitioner’s second degree murder conviction.

The pro se Petitioner, Raymond-Bernard Bailey, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the error coram court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing because he has newly discovered evidence to show his innocence of the crimes. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Breyon Bates, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se Motion to Correct Judgment Order. After review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

The Petitioner, Joseph Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the coram nobis court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to error coram nobis relief from his Alford guilty pleas. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Andre Anthony, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Deanna Lynn Akers (“Wife”) and Neil E. Powers (“Husband”) were divorced by the Circuit Court for Bradley County (the “trial court”) in 2016. Wife was awarded $1,100.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Following a slew of post-trial motions and proceedings, Husband filed a petition to terminate Wife’s alimony on August 6, 2019. A hearing was held after which the trial court terminated Wife’s alimony and entered a judgment against Wife for the overpaid amount. Because the trial court erred in terminating Wife’s alimony altogether, the trial court’s decision is vacated and remanded for reinstatement of Wife’s in futuro support. Because Husband established, however, a substantial and material change in his earning ability, a modification of the amount of alimony is appropriate and should be determined by the trial court on remand.

In this divorce, one of the former spouses appeals the court’s division of certain marital debt.  She claims that the division was inconsistent with the court’s final judgment and that there was no basis to revisit its previous decision absent a request for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02.  Because we conclude that the previous decision addressing debts was not a final judgment, we affirm the court’s division of marital debt.     

Defendant, Ronnie Lee Clayborn, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of rape of a child and incest, for which he received a sentence of twenty-seven years’ incarceration.  On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court committed plain error by the admission of prior uncharged sex crimes to bolster the victim’s testimony; (3) rebuttal testimony from the lead detective infringed upon Defendant’s right to remain silent; (4) the trial court erred when it excluded testimony from Defendant’s father about text messages sent from Defendant to the victim’s mother on the night of the offense; (5) the prosecutor engaged in improper prosecutorial argument; (6) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the use of a facility dog during the testimony of two minor witnesses; (7) he is entitled to plain error relief based on the prosecutors’ and the lead detective’s repeated use of the term “victim” to refer to the complaining witness; and (8) cumulative error necessitates a new trial.  Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

Following a traffic stop of his vehicle that yielded five packages of methamphetamine hidden inside the spare tire, the Defendant, Henry Dwayne Autrey, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury for possession of more than 300 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell and with the intent to deliver. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search of the spare tire was unconstitutional because it was conducted after the initial search of the vehicle had been completed and without sufficient probable cause. The trial court granted his motion to suppress and subsequently dismissed the indictment upon the request of the State. The State now appeals, arguing that the officers had probable cause for the search of the spare tire and did not unreasonably detain the Defendant to complete the search. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court granting the motion to suppress and remand for reinstatement of the indictment.

Petitioner, Randy Champion, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) failed to use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who was an active Tipton County prosecutor and (2) failed to object to the State’s inconsistent theories, thereby waiving this court’s plenary review of the issue on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

Petitioner, William Carl Godfrey, initially agreed to plead guilty to domestic aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and vandalism under $1000.  During the plea submission hearing, Petitioner stated that he was not guilty.  The State then offered to accept a plea of “no contest,” and after discussion with trial counsel and the trial court, Petitioner accepted the no contest plea.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years’ probation.  On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was unknowing and involuntary.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.  The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by determining that the divot in the brick step that caused her to trip and fall amounted to a minor aberration and that, as a result, the defendants did not owe her a duty of care.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Unwed parents filed competing petitions to modify a permanent parenting plan.  The parents agreed that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification.  But they disagreed over the parenting schedule and who should be the primary residential parent.  After a hearing, the trial court changed the primary residential parent and, based on proof of domestic abuse, limited the mother’s parenting time.  We conclude that neither decision was an abuse of discretion.  So we affirm.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie L. Tice, of two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and three counts of aggravated statutory rape, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years with release eligibility after service of thirty percent of the sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her two convictions for statutory rape by an authority figure; (2) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose payments made to a testifying witness and her husband; (3) the trial court erred in failing to provide a modified unanimity instruction in Count 4, and the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for aggravated statutory rape in that count; (4) the trial court committed plain error in improperly admitting hearsay statements of the Defendant’s husband, as well as the argument thereof, which violated the Defendant’s right to due process and confrontation; (5) the trial court erroneously deprived her of the right of cross-examination on certain topics; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (7) cumulative error deprived her of a fair trial.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.  

The Defendant, Jamee White-McCray, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder and facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not imposing a sentence of split confinement. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.