APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We have this case on direct appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, from an order of the Chancery Court suspending Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Esq., from the practice of law for three years. Slavin appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether Chancellor Richard E. Ladd erred in refusing to recuse himself; (2) whether Slavin's in-court speech is protected by the First Amendment; and (3) whether the sanctions imposed by the Chancellor are excessive. Upon careful review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that Chancellor Ladd did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself and that the speech at issue does not fall within the protective ambit of the First Amendment. After a thorough examination of the sanctions, we impose a two-year suspension. Slavin may, however, apply for reinstatement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 19.3, at the expiration of one year from date of this opinion.

The petitioner, Carlos Haynes, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to one count of possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a total effective sentence of two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and the trial court erred in failing to pursue the issue of the identity of the confidential informant whose tip led to the search of the petitioner’s home. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs appeal from trial court's dismissal of complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs allege that trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge annexation ordinance passed by City of Murfreesboro. Finding that the trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiffs were not entitled to challenge the annexation ordinance under Tennessee declaratory judgment statute, we affirm.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), effective June 2, 2003, applies retroactively to this parental termination case. Prior to the 2003 amendment, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2001) provided as follows:

A Marion County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Glenn White, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder for which he received concurrent life sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting statements which constituted double hearsay. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted review in this case to consider whether an employee is barred from seeking workers’ compensation benefits in Tennessee because the employee made a binding election of remedies by pursuing benefits for the same injury in another state. We hold that the employee’s filing of a claim in South Carolina, his request for a hearing there, and the taking of depositions in that matter constitute affirmative acts to obtain benefits in another state sufficient to constitute a binding election of remedies that bars the employee’s Tennessee claim. Therefore, we reject the conclusion of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel on this issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bruce Franks, Jr., pleaded guilty to arson, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301(a)(1) (2003), and agreed to a three-year, Range I sentence. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing to determine themanner of service of the sentence and ordered split confinement.  The defendant appeals the confinement component of his sentence. We affirm.

A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that H. Owen Maddux had wilfully and deliberately converted funds from his law firm. In addition to other sanctions, the hearing panel suspended Maddux from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. The Chancery Court for Hamilton County affirmed the judgment of the hearing panel but imposed additional sanctions. Disciplinary Counsel appealed to this Court, contesting only the sufficiency of the thirty-day suspension. We hold that the thirty-day suspension is appropriate. We affirm.

We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the liability of a surety company that issues bonds to self-insured employers under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-405(b) is limited to the penal amount listed on the face of each bond. Because section 50-6-405(b) requires that bonds be of a single, continuous term, we conclude that a surety company’s liability is limited to the penal amount on the face of the bonds. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I disagree with its conclusion that a sentence of split confinement fulfills the requirement of an alternative sentencing presumption. I believe an alternative sentence means one that is an alternative to confinement, as explained in my dissent in State v. Christina B. Jones, M2002-02428-CCA-R3-CD, Williamson County (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2003), app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003).

The defendant, Robert “Bobby” Powell, pled guilty to statutory rape and sexual battery, Class E felonies, in exchange for an effective two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Finding that a sentence less serious than confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offenses, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation or other alternative sentencing and ordered that he serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider, and the defendant appealed to this court. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Timothy E. Ballard, was convicted of DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended except for sixty days, with the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in denying full probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court awarded Petitioner alimony arrearages of $7,250 plus interest. Respondent appeals, asserting the statute of limitations and the defense of laches. We modify the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The Defendant, Robert Page, was convicted by a jury of the second degree murder of Roosevelt Burgess. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced as a Range II offender to thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; 2) whether the trial court improperly limited the impeachment of State witness Carrie Jones; 3) whether the trial court properly admitted a photograph of the victim; 4) whether the trial court committed error in providing supplemental jury instructions; 5) whether comments by the trial court compromised the Defendant’s right to a fair trial; and 6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation to commit second degree murder. Because the trial court committed reversible error in omitting a jury instruction on facilitation of second degree murder, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.

I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that the waiver provision of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110 is unconstitutional. Because the Defendant did not request that the jury be instructed as to facilitation, he has waived his right to challenge this issue on appeal.  Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.

Plaintiff sought rescission of a purchase of real property, and damages pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act. The Trial Court held plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof on the issues presented. On appeal, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant, a minor, was allegedly injured when an integrated car seat in a vehicle manufactured and sold by Defendant/Appellee malfunctioned. Plaintiff/Appellant asserts that: (1) the jurors conducted unauthorized experimentation with certain exhibits, which constituted extraneous prejudicial information under Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b); (2) that there is no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict; (3) that the trial judge failed to properly perform her duty as thirteenth juror; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing an expert to testify outside the scope of his expertise in violation of McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997); and (5) that the trial court erred, either under Tenn. R. Evid. 702 and 704 or on the theory of judicial estoppel, in excluding a portion of the testimony of a second expert. We affirm.

This case arises from events surrounding the shooting death of Decedent, Appellant’s son. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment claiming its policy of insurance did not apply to the
circumstances of this case because Appellant’s claim was specifically excluded from the insurance policy. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

The defendant, Christopher A. Davis, was convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder,¹ two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. The jury imposed death sentences for both counts of premeditated first degree murder after finding that evidence of three aggravating circumstances, i.e., (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, (2) the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the defendant, and (3) the murders were knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a robbery or kidnapping, outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions to run consecutively to concurrent 25-year sentences for the especially aggravated robbery convictions.

After the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences, the case was automatically docketed in this Court. We entered an order specifying seven issues for oral argument, and we now hold as follows: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the District Attorney General; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to withdraw; (4) the death sentences were not invalid on the ground that the aggravating circumstances were not set out in the indictment; (5) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to establish the “prior violent felony” aggravating circumstance by relying on an offense committed as a juvenile; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and its determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the death sentences were not arbitrary or disproportionate. We also agree with the Court of         Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We granted this appeal to determine whether an owner who negligently entrusted his car to another may be held vicariously liable for the driver's negligence in the operation of the car. The trial court submitted the case to the jury for allocation of fault on comparative fault principles, and the jury found the owner twenty percent (20%) at fault and the driver eighty percent (80%) at fault. The trial court later amended the judgment by holding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and thus liable for all of the compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the driver-entrustee's actions and reinstated the initial judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an owner-entrustor's liability for negligent entrustment does not result in vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and that the trial court erred in holding the owner-entrustor liable for all the damages. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We granted review in this case to address three issues: (1) whether the State is a “governmental
entity” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(g) (Supp. 2003); (2) whether the State may be liable for medical malpractice under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(D)
(2003), when there was no “professional/ client” relationship between the claimant and a state
employee; and (3) whether the State may be liable for the “negligent care, custody, or control” of a
person under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (2003) when it administers preadmission screening of a nursing home patient as required by federal statute. The Claims
Commission held that the claimant’s action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations because the State was not a governmental entity and also that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals reversed on the statute of limitations issue and remanded for further proceedings on the actions formedicalmalpractice and negligent care, custody, and control. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude: (1) that the complaint was timely filed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(g) because the State is a “governmental entity”; (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for medical malpractice because there was no “professional/client” relationship between a state employee and the claimant; and (3) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the State’s “negligent care, custody and control” when it is based on the State administered pre-admission screening of a nursing home patient as required by federal statute. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in part and reverse in part.

This case is an appeal from an order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues, as he did at trial, that this case involves genuine issues of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate for this action. For the following reasons, we affirm.