APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this appeal, Husband seeks to be relieved from his obligation to pay alimony in futuro to his former wife. In support of his request, Husband asserts that his former wife’s cohabitation with another man terminated his obligation since Wife was being supported by that third person and was in no need of alimony. The trial court denied Husband’s petition finding Wife was not living with a third person, had rebutted presumption that she does not need the alimony, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to warrant modification of the initial award of alimony. We affirm those holdings. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife.
 

In this workers' compensation case, the employer, McKee Foods Corporation, has appealed the trial court's award of 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole to the employee, Eva Mae Jefferies. The trial court's award of benefits was based on a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fifth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ("AMA Guidelines"), which was in effect at the time of trial. The employer's appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to a decision by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. The employer contends in this Court that the trial court should have applied a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guidelines because the Fourth Edition was the edition in effect when the employee reached maximum medical improvement. Thus, the sole question for this Court is whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits using a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fifth Edition of the AMA Guidelines. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we find that in determining the extent of the employee's vocational disability, the trial court should have used a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guidelines. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is an arbitration case. The plaintiff borrower executed a note in favor of the defendant bank. The note included an arbitration clause, requiring all disputes between the "Borrower(s)" and "Note Holder" to be arbitrated. The term "Note Holder" is defined in the note as the "Lender or anyone who takes [the] Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under [the] Note." The bank transferred the note and the borrower began making payments to a third party. The borrower then filed this lawsuit against the bank and others, alleging fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm, holding that under the note, the bank is no longer a "Note Holder" and therefore does not have standing to invoke the arbitration clause.

This is a sales tax case. The plaintiff owns an aluminum sheet and foil manufacturing plant. Located in the plant are two multi-ton roll grinders. In 1987, the defendant commissioner of revenue took the position that the roll grinders and roll grinder supplies were exempt from sales tax, because the roll grinders constituted "industrial machinery," which were exempt. In 1995, however, the department of revenue conducted an audit of the plaintiff and changed its position, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance," which is an exception to the industrial machinery exemption. Accordingly, the plaintiff was assessed for sales tax on roll grinder supplies purchased between 1995 and 1998. The plaintiff paid the assessment under protest and filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to recover the sales tax paid on roll grinder supplies for the audit period. The trial court upheld the decision of the department of revenue, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance." From that order, the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the roll grinders fit within the "equipment used for maintenance" exception and that, consequently, roll grinder supplies are subject to sales tax.

The issue in this case is whether the defendant’s notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. We disagree. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal was tolled until the trial court issued its decision on the defendant’s post-trial motion to alter or amend. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the merits of the defendant’s appeal.

The defendant, Roger C. McAnally, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Henry County Circuit Court for especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; kidnapping, a Class C felony; three counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property over $500, a Class E felony; and sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, eight years for each aggravated robbery conviction, three years for the kidnapping conviction, and three years for each aggravated burglary conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to a one-year sentence for the sexual battery conviction, for an effective twenty-one-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and kidnapping violate his due process rights because his confinement of the victims was incidental to the robberies. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eddie DePriest, seeks appellate review of the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of habeas corpus relief. We discern no habeas corpus cause of action in the petition
and affirm.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, James Franklin Redden, of theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to eight years incarceration as a multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of a notice of appeal.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a). Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm.

This case involves a default judgment. The plaintiffs filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the defendant for intentional infliction of physical injuries. The defendant did not appear, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The circuit court set the case for trial. On the trial date, however, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, and the default judgment was reinstated. The defendant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have the default judgment set aside, based on excusable neglect. The defendant's lawyer attached his own affidavit, which explained that the lawyer was in the midst of closing his law office after thirty-eight years of practice and, in the confusion, failed to put the hearing date on his calendar. The motion to set aside was denied. The defendant now appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court to consider whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the plaintiffs' claims and to reweigh the pertinent factors in light of that finding.

The defendant, Preston Young, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of probation and imposition of a two-year sentence for his jury conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the record is insufficient for our statutorily mandated de novo review of the sentence, we affirm.

The petitioner, Earl E. Haynes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to his felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Plaintiffs, horse-drawn carriage operators, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a provision of one section of an ordinance adopted by theMemphis City Council. The trial court elided the provision as an unlawful delegation of the City’s police power and enforced the remainder of the ordinance. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of elision. Defendants cross-appeal, asserting the trial court erred by finding the elided portion unconstitutional. We affirm.

We granted this appeal to define "nursing services" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1) and to determine whether the caretaking services that an injured employee's mother provides are nursing services for which the Workers' Compensation Law mandates the employer compensate her. The trial court found that the mother had failed to carry her burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded that the plain meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 contemplates only professional nursing services ordered by the attending physician, and that the mother is not a professional nurse providing professional nursing services. The employee appealed, arguing that the statute provides compensation for a broader range of caretaking services. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision, and oral argument was heard by the full Court. We hold that in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1), "nursing services" refers to the services of a professional nurse. Because the mother providing caretaking services here is not a professional nurse, the Workers' Compensation Law does not require the employer to compensate the mother for her services. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's denial of compensation for her services. The question of whether the Workers' Compensation Law should provide compensation when a family member provides care for an injured worker is an issue that must be addressed by the Legislature.

Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment to defendant physician based on the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, William J. Parker, Jr., was indicted for driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. A jury acquitted him of the DUI charge, but found him guilty of driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of six months, with sixty days to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation. In this appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: 1) whether the State’s failure to provide him with a copy of his driving record constitutes a violation of his due process rights; 2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a sworn affidavit; and 3) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive.  We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the affidavit into evidence. Because we are unable to conclude that the error was harmless, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which finds reversible error in this case due to the erroneous admission into evidence of Mr. Birdwell’s affidavit. While I agree that admission of the affidavit was error, under the particularly unique facts of this case, I conclude that it is harmless error.

The petitioner, Monroe Brown, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jason C. Polston, of reckless aggravated assault.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years in the workhouse, suspended except for 60 days to serve on weekends, a $500.00 fine, and 200 hours of community service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s statement made in a telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement prior to trial; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the defenses of necessity and duress; (5) the trial court erred bydenying the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion; and (6) the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve sixty days in jail. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement to the Defendant prior to trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Therefore, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

This is a child custody dispute. The mother and father entered into a permanent parenting plan naming the mother the primary residential parent of their daughter. Under the plan, the father had supervised visitation because the mother was concerned about sexual abuse by the father. The father later sought to modify the parenting plan to allow for unsupervised visitation. The mother then filed a notice that she intended to move to Florida with the daughter, which the father opposed. The trial court granted the father's petition for unsupervised visitation and denied the mother's request to relocate to Florida with the child. The mother and daughter then left for a scheduled trip to Florida, with the understanding that they would return for the father's scheduled visitation. The mother remained in Florida with the daughter for six weeks, asserting that she, the mother, was too ill to travel. The father was granted an emergency change of custody. The father then retrieved the daughter through a private investigator, coordinating with Florida officials. Upon return to Tennessee, the trial court found the mother in criminal contempt for interfering with the father's visitation and for moving to Florida. The father was named the primary residential parent and the mother was granted supervised visitation. The mother was also required to pay the father for the cost of the private investigator. The mother appeals the denial of her request to move to Florida with the child, the award of unsupervised visitation to the father, the finding of contempt, the change of custody, the requirement that her visitation be supervised, and the requirement that she pay the private investigator's fee. We affirm.

Mother appeals termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, that she failed to remedy the persistent conditions that prevented her child's return, and that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. The record contains numerous extraneous documents that do not pertain to the petition to terminate parental rights or the issues raised on appeal. The parties and the clerk have a responsibility to abridge the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 8A(c). Failure to abridge the record may result in a reduction of the juvenile court clerk's fee for the cost of preparing and transmitting the record. Tenn. R. App. P. 40(g).

This litigation arises out of a two-vehicle collision in Hawkins County. Teresa A. Martin ("the plaintiff") and her husband sued the driver of the other vehicle, Johnny L. Drinnon ("the defendant"), seeking damages and charging him with common law and statutory acts of negligence. The defendant answered and filed a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict, finding the parties equally at fault. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff appeals, raising, in effect, three issues. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, James Clark, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the appeal is dismissed.