APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Trial Court awarded plaintiff Judgment against defendants. On appeal defendants sought to reverse Judgment of the Trial Court. No transcript of evidence was filed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that thePetitioner has failed to establish a ground for which post-conviction relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff Mosley, a motorcycle patrolman, who was seriously injured in an on-duty motorcycle accident. Applying comparative fault principles the trial judge held Metro 75% at fault and Mr. Mosley 25% at fault for his injuries. Finding that Plaintiff has failed to establish cause in-fact between the alleged defect in the helmet and the injuries to Plaintiff, we reverse the action of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted on June 18, 1997 for especially aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, robbery, aggravated burglary and attempted rape. After a direct appeal to this Court, his robbery conviction was reversed. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed this decision. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his remaining convictions. The trial court denied this petition. The petitioner now appeals the trial court's decision. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Dan Bill Johnson, sought habeas corpus relief, asserting that his five-year robbery sentence had expired. Although not granting the relief sought by the petitioner, the trial court determined that his life sentence had expired and identified the date at which he began serving his robbery sentence, with the Department of Correction then to determine his release date. Both the petitioner and the State appealed. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is to be returned to custody.

The instant appeal was stayed in 1999 by this Court's order upon suggestion of bankruptcy. The stay has been lifted, and the case proceeds on Amelia Swafford's appeal from the trial court's order in favor of the defendants Bobby and Betty Johnson and Old Hickory Engineering & Machine Co., Inc. ("OHEMCO"). We reverse the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrance Lowdermilk, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations and does not establish that the petitioner is alternatively entitled to relief by a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of a mother to her two teenage sons on the grounds of abandonment, failure to comply with the permanency plan, and failure to remedy the conditions that led to the children being removed from her custody. After thoroughly examining the record, we agree with the trial court that all those grounds have been proved by clear and convincing evidence and that it is in the best interest of the children that the mother's parental rights be terminated. We also find that the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the mother, but that her own lack of honest effort rendered that assistance ineffective. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

The initial judgment declared that Standifer Lane was a public road for one-tenth mile only. Sixteen (16) months after the judgment was entered, the County filed a Rule 62.02 motion alleging that "one-tenth mile" was a mistake because all concerned had agreed upon two-tenths mile. The judgment was amended to provide that Standifer Lane is a public road for a distance of 950 feet or to an existing driveway. The Rule 62.02 motion is untimely.

Linda Ottinger and Marion Ottinger (“Plaintiffs”) are the paternal grandparents of H.O. (“the Child”). The Child’s father died in 2000. Plaintiffs sought visitation with the Child. This visitation was opposed by the Child’s mother, Shelly Evans Ottinger (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs filed a petition to obtain grandparent visitation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. After trial, the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the Child has had a significant existing relationship with the Plaintiffs and the loss of that relationship presents the danger of direct and substantial harm to the Child. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs visitation. Defendant appeals. We reverse.
 

I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize what the majority opinion expressly states, i.e., that the Defendant in the instant case did not challenge the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2001 & Supp. 2003). I continue to have some doubt that the deprivation of a relationship with grandparents can form the basis for the type of substantial harm contemplated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). See Dugan v. Myers, C/A No. E2001-00281-COA-R3-JV, 2001 WL 1117514, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed September 24, 2001), no perm. app. requested (Susano, J., concurring). However, since that issue is not before us in this case, we do not need to reach it.

Sherri Dyer Kendall (“Plaintiff”) sought treatment for bipolar disorder from a psychiatrist, Lane Cook, M.D. (“Defendant”). Defendant prescribed Topamax for Plaintiff. Less than one week later, Plaintiff began to experience loss of vision, severe headache, and severe vomiting. Plaintiff was diagnosed with acute angle closure glaucoma and underwent several surgical procedures to control or correct the problem. When Defendant prescribed Topamax to Plaintiff, it was unknown in the medical community that a potential side effect of Topamax was acute angle closure glaucoma. That acute angle closure glaucoma was a potential side effect was discovered later by the medical community, and Plaintiff1 sued Defendant2 for medical malpractice. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof at trial, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a zoning case. The principal issue is whether a rezoning amendment must explicitly designate the maximum density approved with reference to ancillary documentation.

This case involves an order for child support for three children of three different mothers. The Juvenile Court of Hardeman County consolidated the three matters into one cause. The trial court ordered Father to pay the child support amount for three children under the Child Support Guidelines and divided the amount equally into thirds. The State of Tennessee Department of Human Services filed this appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that the judgments entered are void. He contends that he was on parole when the current offenses were committed; therefore, the concurrent sentences that he received are illegal. We conclude that in order to receive relief, the fact that the petitioner was on parole when he pled guilty must be proved by satisfactory proof contained in the record or proceedings underlying the convictions sought to be set aside. We reverse the trial court’s summary dismissal and remand for appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine whether the record of the underlying convictions or proceedings contained satisfactory proof that the petitioner was on parole at the time he committed second degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon.

The Defendant, Andre Baldwin, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve a life sentence of imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding the evidence legally sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lessors, who are descendants of the original lessor, filed suit against the Gatlinburg Sportsman's Club, Inc., to declare that the real estate lease had been breached by the Club due to its failure to build a clubhouse as required by the lease. The Club argued that it built a clubhouse that satisfied the lease for the lease did not contain specifications for the type or size of clubhouse. It further argued that it was not in breach for the lessors had extended the deadline indefinitely to build a more substantial clubhouse. The Club also argued that the lessors' claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations, equitable estoppel, waiver and laches and that the lessors' violated the Club's right of first refusal to purchase the property by not selling the property as the decedent's will directed and for making transfers of partial interests in the property amongst the beneficiaries and descendants of the original lessor. The trial court ruled that the parties mutually suspended the deadline by which the Club was to build a clubhouse, that the Club failed to build a clubhouse, that the Club was in material breach and, therefore, the lease was terminated. We reverse in part finding that the parties did not mutually suspend the obligation or deadline to build a clubhouse, that the completion date for the clubhouse was June 30, 1990, and that the lessors did not file suit until May 5, 2000; therefore, the lessors are barred by the six-year statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's ruling that the lessors did not violate the Club's right of first refusal to purchase the property, finding that the inter-family transfers did not violate the Club's right of first refusal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bernard Keys, of aggravated burglary and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifteen years in prison for the aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction, and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his case and prepare properly for trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This case arises from an automobile accident in which Ms. Lowe was injured by an uninsured motorist. Ms. Lowe and her husband filed suit against the motorist and were awarded a total of $25,000 in damages, which they sought to have satisfied by Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Company under the terms of their uninsured motorist insurance policy. Tennessee Farmer's refused to pay the claim, asserting that Ms. Lowe had already signed a complete release in exchange for a settlement in excess of $5,000. In the ensuing litigation, the trial court granted Tennessee Farmer's motion for summary judgment, finding that Ms. Lowe had, indeed, signed a release as part of a settlement with Tennessee Farmer's. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Randall Watson, pled guilty to second degree murder. He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. After considering the Defendant’s petition as presented and also as a petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court dismissed the Defendant’s pleading. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves the construction of a will. Lloyd A. Button, a widower (“the Deceased”), executed his last will and testament on April 1, 2002, while hospitalized at Parkwest Hospital in Knoxville. Under the heading “Conditional Bequest to Patricia Albright,” the Deceased left Ms. Albright his Loudon County residence, one of his automobiles, and “all . . . tangible personal property,” except the property mentioned in a specific bequest in the will. The Deceased died one week later, on April 8, 2002, having never left the hospital.1 Ms. Albright sued the personal representatives of the Deceased’s estate (“the Personal Representatives”) seeking to establish her entitlement to the property left to her in the will. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to Ms. Albright. The Personal Representatives, who are the Deceased’s son2 and Shirley Reno, a residuary beneficiary under the will, appeal. We reverse and dismiss Ms. Albright’s complaint.
 

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Harold David Haney, Sr., was convicted of violation of a motor vehicle habitual offender ("MVHO") order and DUI, second offense. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the MVHO violation and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In addition, he was fined a total of $1100 and his driver's license was revoked for two years. On appeal, he argues that the State failed to establish venue. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

While I concur with the majority to reverse the decision of the Trial Court and to dismiss Ms. Albright’s Complaint, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s decision to take judicial notice of certain facts. I agree completely with the majority’s discussion of what the law is as to summary judgment, interpretation of a will, conditional bequests, and judicial notice. However, I cannot agree with the majority that this Court can take judicial notice that e]ssentially all of the services recited as conditions in the Deceased’s will are services that would be rendered by a hospital such as Parkwest for individuals admitted to the hospital on an inpatient bases.” While I suspect that such is true, I cannot say that such a “fact” is “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Tenn. R. Evid. 201(b). This being so, I cannot agree that this is a “fact” which is appropriate for judicial notice.

The petitioner, Randall Mills, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

In this action which originated as a post-conviction proceeding seeking the grant of both a delayed appeal and a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Ben Thomas Dowlen appeals. We affirm the lower court's ruling on the sentencing issue raised in the delayed appeal, and we likewise affirm the lower court's denial of post-conviction relief.