APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Dee W. Thompson, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of three counts of aggravated rape. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility of prior testimony, and the qualification of a witness to testify as an expert. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This cause is a civil suit for damages against Gary and Cynthia Mann resulting from Cynthia Mann's embezzlement of funds totaling $550,000.00 from the law firm of Marks, Shell, and Maness. The trial court found Mr. and Mrs. Mann jointly and severably liable for the loss. Mr. Mann appeals. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frank Sumner, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the procedures for returning a formerly disabled police officer to work. After the Employee Benefit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County determined that the former officer was no longer disabled, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department directed him to report to a 13-week training class. Fearing that he could lose both his disability pension and his job if he failed the training class, the officer filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department lacked the authority to require him to complete the training class before returning him to work. The trial court determined that requiring the officer to complete the training class before returning him to active duty was not inconsistent with Nashville's charter or ordinances. The officer perfected this appeal. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Department has the authority to require the officer to complete the training before returning him to active duty.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of automobile burglary and one count of theft under $500. The Washington County Criminal Court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years of incarceration as a Range II multiple offender. During the same hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation from numerous prior convictions and ordered the defendant to serve an effective three-year sentence on those cases. The guilty plea cases and the revocation cases were consolidated on appeal. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) upon revoking his probation for the prior convictions, the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his original sentences in confinement; and (2) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing regarding his new convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted in 1998 of a series of felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years and six months. He was released on parole in 1999, and his parole was revoked in 2002, resulting in his reincarceration. Subsequently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his five-year-six-month sentence had expired. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition; and, following our review, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal raises the validity of an ordinance passed by the City of Memphis annexing a portion of Shelby County. Appellants contend that Appellees violated the Open Meetings Act when such ordinance was passed. All parties filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted Appellees’ motion. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The petitioner, Charles William Jones, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the definition of "knowingly" as applied to second degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Unmarried couple in their forties decide to have children. Due to the woman's concern that she may be too old to produce viable eggs, the couple engaged the services of an in vitro fertilization clinic and signed contracts required by the clinic, following which the clinic obtained eggs from an anonymous female donor, which were fertilized with the man's sperm and then implanted in the woman who carried them full term resulting in the birth of triplets. Thereafter, the couple separated and the woman filed for custody. The man answered and asserted that the woman is not the mother or a legal parent of the children because she was merely a gestational surrogate who has no genetic tie to the children. The man further asserted that the children have no mother because the egg donor waived her parental rights. The trial court held that the woman is the mother of the children, awarded joint custody to the couple and primary custody to the woman. The man appealed. We affirm, finding that the woman is a legal parent and the mother of the children based on the intent of the parties.

This appeal involves competing claims for breach of contract. J.W. Gibson d/b/a J.W. Gibson Company ("Defendant"), entered into an oral contract with Pratt Masonry Company ("Pratt Masonry") for Pratt Masonry to furnish masonry work on a house. When the work was completed, Defendant refused to pay, claiming the masonry work was so defective that all the bricks had to be removed and replaced. Pratt Masonry filed suit seeking payment for the work performed under the oral contract. Defendant counterclaimed for damages incurred in having to remove and replace the bricks. The Trial Court concluded Pratt Masonry breached the contract by performing  substandard masonry work, but Defendant failed to prove it was necessary to remove and replace all the bricks. Both parties appeal. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Marjorie Delapp, Mary Sherrod, and Elsie Caton ("Plaintiffs") sued their brother, Arthur David Pratt ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant exercised undue influence over their mother, Mary Armstrong Pratt ("the Deceased") to induce the Deceased to make a will in Defendant's favor. After a jury trial, judgment was entered holding the Deceased was competent to make the will, that a confidential relationship existed between Defendant and the Deceased, and that the will was not the last will and testament of the Deceased. Defendant appeals claiming, in part, that the Trial Court erred in allowing testimony regarding his alleged racial prejudice to be introduced and in failing to grant a mistrial after reference was made to his alleged sexual misconduct. Defendant also argues there is no material evidence to support the jury's verdicts of confidential relationship and undue influence and that the Trial Court erred in denying his objection to the entry of judgment. We affirm

The defendant, Jeffery Bowers, appeals his misdemeanor speeding convictions in the Fayette County Circuit Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his request for time to obtain an attorney and, therefore, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the rights of a survivor in a joint bank account. During her lifetime, the decedent sold certain real property, put the proceeds in a separate bank account, and executed a will leaving half of the proceeds to her niece. The bank account in which the proceeds were deposited was a joint account between the decedent and her brother. The brother had power of attorney over the decedent's affairs and was the named executor in the her will. After the decedent died, the decedent's will was admitted to probate. The brother, as executor, filed a petition asking for instructions as to the proper disposition of the money in the joint bank account. The trial court held that, when the funds were placed in the joint bank account, the bequest to the niece was adeemed and the funds were no longer a part of the decedent's estate. Therefore, the trial court determined that the brother, as the joint account holder with a right of survivorship, was entitled to all of the proceeds. The named beneficiary now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the bank account was a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship.

The Defendant, Michael Ward, II, was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree murder, aggravated spousal rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises five issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his five convictions; (2) whether double jeopardy bars multiple convictions that all require proof of the element of serious bodily injury; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant's prior bad acts; (4) whether the Defendant was prejudiced by the State's failure to provide him with discovery items; and (5) whether the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mandrall Porter, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After a review of the record, this court determines that petitioner's claims must fail. Petitioner has failed to present any evidence that his sentence has expired or that his conviction for especially aggravated robbery is void. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, William Osepczuk, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced to confinement for twenty-five years. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel had been ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this timely appeal resulted. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Campbell County jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence, third offense. On appeal, the defendant contends the state failed to establish venue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Darian Nigel Sparks, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to robbery and the attempted sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, Class C felonies. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received consecutive sentences of eight years for each offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentences and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On February 28, 2002, the defendant, Richard A. Siters, pled guilty to four counts of attempted  rape, a Class C felony; one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony; and one count of attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years, suspended, and placed him on intensive supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. We disagree and affirm the revocation.

The Defendant, Jon Brewbaker, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue on appeal is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of the "knowing" mens rea for attempted second degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Danny Williamson, pled guilty in the Cocke County Criminal Court to possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court held that the need for deterrence warranted the defendant's serving his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. We affirm the defendant's sentence but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Defendant, Jonathan W. Susman, pled guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial judge and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The question is whether there were sufficient specific and articulable facts to justify a police officer detaining the Defendant in order for him to perform field sobriety tests. We conclude that there were, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

An inmate who was convicted and sentenced for passing worthless checks filed suit against six officers of the court for conspiracy, violation of his constitutional rights, and various derelictions of duty. The plaintiff asked the trial court to sanction the defendants by impeachment and/or disbarment. He also asked for $33 million in monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.