APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Sullivan County jury convicted the defendant, Terry Byington, of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective four-year sentence in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction; (2) the arresting officer improperly presented expert testimony regarding field sobriety tests; (3) the trial court erred in ruling that the state could question the defendant regarding a prior perjury conviction more than ten years old; (4) the trial judge erred in refusing to recuse herself; and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father over Child. Only Mother appeals the Juvenile Court’s decision. Specifically, the Juvenile Court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment, persistent conditions, and noncompliance with the permanency plan. In addition, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to transfer the case and have the issue presented to a jury. Finally, Mother asserts the trial court judge erred when he did not recuse himself. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

This case arises from the termination of parental rights of Mother and Father. Only Mother has appealed the decision of the trial court, terminating her parental rights on the grounds that (1) she abandoned Child by failing to visit, (2) she abandoned Child by failing to provide more than token support, and (3) the conditions which led to Child’s removal still persist. Mother appeals arguing that the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services failed to carry its burden of proof for these grounds. In addition, Mother argues that the Department of Children’s Services failed to prove that such termination of parental rights is in the best interest of Child. Finally, Mother argues the trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed the rebuttal testimony of a witness in violation of the sequestration rule. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Richard Lafayette Sumner, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Cocke County Circuit Court for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of aggravated arson. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for each murder and twenty-five years for the aggravated arson, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his insanity defense. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree murder. We also hold, though, that the convictions for the premeditated and felony murders in counts one and three should be merged pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause. We affirm the convictions, but vacate the judgments as to counts one and three and remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment reflecting a merger of those two counts.

The Defendant, Raymond Douglas Myers, Sr., was found guilty by a jury of three counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated arson, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court merged the convictions for felony murder and conspiracy to commit murder into the three first degree murder convictions. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole for each murder conviction, and a consecutive twenty-four year sentence for the aggravated arson conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that Tennessee's first degree murder sentencing statute is unconstitutional, and that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury regarding the State's burden of proof. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children, though only Mother appeals the decision of the Juvenile Court. After conducting a hearing, the lower court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the bases of persistent conditions, noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment. On appeal, Mother challenges each of the three grounds given for termination. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marco Polo Patten, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts by the Defendant; 2) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict; 3) whether the prosecutor made improper statements during his opening and closing statements; 4) whether cumulative errors prevented a fair trial; 5) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lloyd Earl Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Williams argues that: (1) his six drug convictions are void because he was tried and sentenced in absentia and (2) his class B felony sentences are illegal because the indictments do not specify that the amount of cocaine sold or possessed was 0.5 grams or more. Finding these issues without merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court excluded parol evidence and awarded Defendant summary judgment. We reverse.
 

The Defendant, John A. Lee, was convicted after a bench trial of one count of child abuse of a child under six years old, a Class D felony. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve two years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue raised in this direct appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Tennessee buyer, filed complaint in Shelby County, Tennessee circuit court against South Carolina seller for fraudulent, unlawful, and tortious conduct in connection with contract for purchase of antique soda dispensers. Seller filed motion to dismiss, alleging as grounds lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, and trial court granted motion on both grounds. Buyer appeals trial court’s finding that there were insufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction of seller. We reverse and remand.
 

This case involves an antenuptial agreement. Prior to their marriage, the husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement which stated that each party waived his or her interest in any property acquired after the marriage in the individual spouse’s name. After a nearly twenty-year marriage, the wife filed for divorce. During the divorce proceedings, the wife argued that the antenuptial agreement should not affect the trial court’s division of property acquired during the marriage. The trial court enforced the antenuptial agreement, awarding all property held in the husband’s name to the husband, regardless of whether it would otherwise have been classified as marital property. The wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the wife waived her interest in the property under the antenuptial agreement and that the evidence does not preponderate against either the enforceability of the agreement or the trial court’s division of property.
 

Assignee appeals the judgment of the trial court holding it to be bound to a reclamation of rights provision in the contract between its assignor and a grantor of copyright interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Claud E. Simonton, went to trial initially in November 2002, on charges of driving under the influence (DUI) third offense, and violation of the implied consent law. The jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. On April 2, 2003, the defendant was retried and convicted by the jury of third offense DUI. The jury assessed a $1,200 fine. The trial judge found that the defendant had violated the implied consent law. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve his eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence in jail with release eligibility at 75% service. On appeal the defendant raises three issues. First, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for DUI. Second, the defendant maintains the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after the arresting officer referred to “seizing” the defendant’s vehicle. Finally, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in ordering incarceration for 75% of the sentence imposed. We have examined each issue and determined that the judgment of the trial court must be AFFIRMED.

Appellant seeks relief, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, from final order setting child support obligations. Finding no extraordinary circumstances, extreme hardship, or excusable neglect, we affirm.
 

Land owner filed complaint alleging trespass and seeking the removal of structures and signs erected by appellants encroaching upon his property. Owner further sought injunction    prohibiting appellants from continued, unauthorized use of roads running across his property. The trial court found that appellants had an easement for use of one of two roads. The trial court’s final order granted owner’s request for attorney’s fees. Both parties raise issues on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
 

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the post-divorce move by a primary residential parent from Clarksville to Knoxville. Upon receiving notice of the planned move, the non-residential parent petitioned the Chancery Court for Montgomery County to prevent the move or to change custody. The trial court conducted a bench trial and denied the petition. On this appeal, the non-residential parent asserts that the court applied the wrong relocation standards because it mistakenly concluded that the parents had not been spending substantially equal amounts of time with their children. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the parents had not spent substantially equal time with the children, and therefore, we affirm the judgment.

The appellant, Marcin Piotr Mikolajczak, pled nolo contendere to a charge of rape. As part of the plea agreement the appellant was sentenced as a standard offender for a Class B felony with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to serve eight years with the Department of Correction at 100% as a violent offender, without probation, split confinement or other alternative sentencing. The appellant now appeals alleging that the trial court erred in not granting alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was stopped for failing to use a turn signal when making a left-hand turn. The officer obtained consent to search her person, vehicle, and motel room. Upon searching her motel room, the officer found cocaine. The defendant filed a motion to suppress that the trial court denied. The defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of cocaine greater than .5 grams. The defendant reserved a certified question as to whether her consent was valid under the federal and state constitutions. We conclude that the defendant’s consent was voluntarily given and that the evidence was properly admitted at trial. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I am unable to join with my colleagues in concluding that the defendant’s consent “was obtained during a period of lawful detention.” Finding the search unreasonable under Fourth Amendment protections, I would suppress the evidence.

In this appeal a father seeks review of the juvenile court's refusal to modify his child support obligation. We affirm.

This appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's action, re-filed after the expiration of the initial statutory period of limitation. We affirm the trial court and deny Appellant's Motion for Transfer pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116.

This case involves Rule 11 sanctions. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit challenging the practice of serving meat and drink at political fund raisers, alleging that the practice violates Article X, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had previously filed similar lawsuits against other defendants upon the same constitutional grounds, and that these prior lawsuits had been dismissed. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure. This motion was denied. The defendants appealed, and this Court reversed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court imposed as a sanction a screening mechanism whereby any complaint filed by the plaintiff within the next two years must be reviewed by a special master to ensure that it is not legally frivolous or duplicative. The plaintiff now appeals that order, claiming that the sanction imposed violates his constitutional rights. We affirm, concluding that the sanction imposed is reasonable and does not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a twelve-year-old child. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of her uncle and aunt because she was chronically absent from school. The uncle and aunt later moved to Marion County. After the uncle and aunt decided that they no longer desired to have custody of the child, the Marion County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of the Department of Children's Services. Approximately fifteen months later, the Department filed a petition in the Marion County Juvenile Court to terminate the biological parents' parental rights. The juvenile court granted the termination petition after overruling the mother's objection that the petition should not have been filed in Marion County. The child's mother has appealed. We have determined that the order must be reversed because venue for this termination proceeding does not lie in Marion County.