APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted of theft of property valued over $1,000. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with one year of incarceration and the remainder to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and raises issues regarding the length and manner of service of her sentence. We remand to delete the reference to the Department of Correction but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition. The petitioner had pled guilty to rape of a child under age thirteen in exchange for a sentence of fifteen years at 100%. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request to call two witnesses and by denying his request to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony of those witnesses. The post-conviction court also excluded certain medical records of the victim. After thorough review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case to the post-conviction court for a new hearing. At the new hearing, the post-conviction court should admit the testimony of the petitioner’s two witnesses and the victim’s medical records. Should the court exclude certain portions of the testimony, offers of proof shall be allowed in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103.

Defendant, Clifton Brown, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder of John Maupin, one count of premeditated first degree murder of John Maupin, one count of aggravated burglary of Ricky Howard's home, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping of John Maupin. Prior to the case going to the jury, the State asked for and received a nolle prosequi as to the charge of premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first degree felony murder, and found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless homicide. Defendant waived a sentencing hearing and agreed to be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, three years for the aggravated burglary conviction and two years for the reckless homicide conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for all three convictions. In his brief, however, Defendant limits his argument on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, and Defendant does not present any argument to support his contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for reckless homicide and aggravated burglary. Defendant has thus waived a review of the issues pertaining to his aggravated burglary and reckless homicide convictions. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 10(b). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm all three judgments of the trial court.

I agree this case must be remanded to address both deficiency and prejudice relating to ineffective assistance of counsel. I write separately to elaborate on my concerns, especially relating to deficiency.

Wife appeals trial court’s ruling on remand that former husband did not dissipate substantial marital assets through extramarital relationship, specifically asserting that the trial court failed to properly consider or apply the two-prong test set forth by the appellate court for determining whether dissipation has occurred. We affirm.
 

This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors regarding the use of a county road in rural Humphreys County. After one of the landowners began to use the road to cross the neighboring landowners' property, the neighboring landowners erected barricades in the road and later filed a trespass action in the Chancery Court for Humphreys County. The landowners who desired to use the road counterclaimed to establish their right of way along the road. Following a bench trial, the trial court sided with the landowners desiring to use the road. On this appeal, the landowners who desire to prevent the use of the road take issue with the trial court's refusal to consider parol evidence regarding the meaning of the references to the road in the deeds. We affirm the trial court's decision that the references to the road in the deeds are not ambiguous, as well as its decision to admit extrinsic evidence to determine the location of the road. We have also determined that the evidence fully supports the trial court's decision regarding the location and dimensions of the road.

Defendant, Joseph Rushing, was indicted for one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of count one, rape of a child. The State entered a nolle prosequi as to count two, aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-three years imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing Defendant's statements to the police to be introduced at trial; (2) the sentence imposed on Defendant was excessive; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction for rape of a child; and (4) Defendant's conviction and sentence violated principles of fundamental fairness. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, William F. Cartwright, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Putnam County Criminal Court for possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a standard offender to concurrent sentences of nine years for possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and eleven months, twenty-nine days for simple possession of cocaine. However, the trial court ordered these convictions merged. The petitioner contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, (2) that the trial court erred in not requiring the state to elect which offense it was prosecuting, and (3) that his convictions for possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine and for simple possession of cocaine violate double jeopardy. We hold that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not err by not requiring the state to elect between offenses with regard to his cocaine convictions. We also hold that although the trial court ordered the cocaine convictions to be merged, it should have entered only one judgment of conviction and noted the merger of the counts in that judgment. We vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment of conviction.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendants, George A. Vance and Vincent Vance, of aggravated gambling promotion for operating twenty-nine Free Spin machines in Bristol. The trial court sentenced Defendant George A. Vance to two years of supervised probation followed by four years of unsupervised probation and ordered him to make restitution in the amount of $130,521.00. The court sentenced Defendant Vincent Vance to one year of supervised probation followed by one year of unsupervised probation. On appeal, the Defendants contend that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions because there was no evidence that they knowingly engaged in a gambling enterprise and the Free Spin machines were not principally designed as gambling devices; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the Defendants from introducing the testimony of a patent attorney concerning the issuance of a patent on the Free Spin machine; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the Defendants from introducing evidence concerning comparable products, games and promotions similar to the play on the Free Spin machines. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal concerns a challenge to the Commissioner's franchise and excise tax assessment. On cross-motions for summary judgment the chancellor found for the Commissioner. We affirm.

Petitioner, Elizabeth Allison, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which she alleged that her judgment of conviction was void because the length of her sentence exceeded the range of  sentence for a Range I offender. Relying upon the supreme court’s decision in McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn. 2000), the trial court granted Petitioner habeas corpus relief. The State now appeals and argues that the trial court erred in granting Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a through review of this matter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, dismiss the petition, and remand this matter for reinstatement of the judgment of conviction and sentence previously imposed.

This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding stock options that were part of the marital estate. The Circuit Court for Davidson County approved a marital dissolution agreement in which the husband agreed to transfer one-half of his employee stock options to the wife as part of the division of the martial estate. After the husband's employer and the employer's brokerage firm declined to transfer the stock options to the wife, she orally requested the husband to exercise the options on her behalf. The value of the employer's stock fell after the husband did not exercise the options. The wife sought to hold the husband in contempt or to modify the divorce decree. The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt but found that he had impermissibly impeded the division of the martial estate. Accordingly, the court awarded the wife $59,759.25, the stock options' before-tax value had they been exercised on the day the divorce decree was entered. In addition, the court ordered the husband to immediately sell the options originally awarded to the wife and to pay her the proceeds as a credit against the judgment. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees, as well as prejudgment interest. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly concluded that the husband unreasonably impeded the wife's acquisition of the value of the stock options. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by valuing the stock options as of the time of the divorce rather than the time the wife and the husband orally agreed to exercise the options and that the court erred by requiring the husband to exercise his options to pay the judgment. We have also determined that the court erred by awarding the wife prejudgment interest but properly awarded the wife her attorney's fees.

Defendant, Mario McNeal, was convicted by a jury of five counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to ten years confinement for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and three years confinement for his aggravated assault conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the entire record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Cherie Mae Phillips, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received a sentence of three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Chris E. Hixson, pled guilty to two counts of theft and three counts of sale of cocaine, all Class C felonies. He was sentenced to two concurrent four-year terms for the theft offenses, and to three concurrent four-year terms for the cocaine offenses, these latter terms to be served consecutively to the terms for the theft offenses, for an effective sentence of eight years. All of these sentences were ordered to be served on community corrections. The Defendant was subsequently convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced to serve three years on community corrections, consecutive to the sentences imposed for the theft offenses. The effective sentence of eight years was thus unchanged. Subsequent to the burglary conviction, the Defendant violated the terms of his release and was ordered to serve two years day-for-day in confinement, after which he was to be released back into community corrections. It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals, arguing that the two years of continuous confinement constitutes an illegal sentence. The State concedes that the sentence is illegal. We agree. The trial court's judgment is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court.

The petitioner directly appeals the dismissal of his petition of writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the habeas court summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. If the habeas corpus court finds the sentence to be illegal, the court must then remand the case to the Rutherford County Criminal Court, where the convictions occurred. On remand to the original convicting court, the petitioner's guilty plea may be withdrawn if concurrent sentencing was a condition of his plea agreement.

Consumer brought products liability suit under theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty for property damage arising out of a fire caused when the consumer's son placed a pillow on top of a halogen torchiere lamp supplied by defendant Sun Lighting, Inc. and sold by defendant The Home Depot, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants and dismissed the lawsuit. The consumer appeals. Because we find the joint summary judgment motions were properly granted, we affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymond Rutter, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this pro se appeal, the petitioner contends that he should be granted habeas corpus relief because his judgment of conviction for criminal impersonation of a licensed professional is void. The state contends that the trial court properly dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder of his wife. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and alleges the following errors: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the admission of hearsay testimony and failure to give a curative instruction; (3) the admission of expert opinion that the death was a result of homicidal violence when cause was undetermined; (4) cumulative errors required a new trial; and (5) improper sentencing. After review, we conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

This appeal involves a dispute among the members of a general partnership. In 1997, a group of the partners sued one of the partners in the Chancery Court for Davidson County for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted a judgment for the defendant partner in 2000. In 2001, the same group of partners filed a similar suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The defendant partner moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. The trial court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and then granted judgment for the defendant partner on the ground that the 1997 chancery court judgment barred the second state court suit. The plaintiff partners have appealed. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff in this suit to collect on a promissory note. Appellant does not appeal the grant of judgment, but appeals the trial court's certification of that judgment as a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court.

Plaintiff filed medical malpractice action against clinic, treating nurse, and supervising physician for injuries suffered as a result of alleged negligent chemotherapy treatment. Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that registered nurse was not qualified as an expert on the issue of medical causation, and further noting that the deposition testimony of lone expert physician failed to establish that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
 

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Jeffrey R. Dickens, was convicted of criminal attempt to commit unlawful photographing in violation of privacy as proscribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-605 (2003), a class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to six months in the Rutherford County Jail, which was suspended after service of eight days periodic confinement. On appeal, Dickens argues that his conviction cannot stand because an attempt to commit a violation of this section is not an indictable offense. Alternatively, he contends that the proof is insufficient to constitute a "substantial step" toward the commission of the attempted crime. After review, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, to be served on probation after service of eighty days' incarceration. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.