APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Fredrick L. Tucker, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his rape of a child conviction, for which he received a twenty-one-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The defendant, James Howard Harmon, Jr., appeals his Blount County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, theft of property valued at $500 or less, arson, and abuse of a corpse, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement of April 10, 2012, and by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce action concerning enforcement of the trial court’s order distributing the parties’ marital property, the trial court ultimately awarded a judgment to the wife in the amount of $206,868.67. The court also ordered that the wife would be entitled to a certain portion of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence. The court dismissed the wife’s contempt claims and declined to award interest or attorney’s fees. The husband has appealed. Having discerned two relatively minor errors in the judgment, we modify the amount awarded to the wife to increase it by $18,525.24, enlarging the trial court’s award to the wife to the total of $225,393.91 rather than $206,868.67. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that seven grounds had been established: abandonment for failure to support; abandonment for failure to visit; abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; persistence of conditions; mental incompetence; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also found that termination was in the child’s best interest for many reasons, including the mother’s failure to provide a safe home, maintain regular visitation, pay child support, and resolve her legal, mental health, and substance abuse issues. The mother contends the trial court incorrectly calculated the period relevant to the ground of abandonment, erred by admitting her mental health records into evidence in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-122, and that the evidence failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. Following a thorough review of the record, we have determined that four of the seven grounds for termination as found by the trial court were established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was clearly and convincingly in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Tennessee Supreme Court entered an order vacating our previous judgment in this matter solely with respect to the division of the marital estate and remanding for our further review consistent with its order. We find upon further review that the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate as it did. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court on this one issue and remand for a new and equitable division of the marital estate.

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“trial court”) entered an order of protection against Nigel Reid II (“Respondent” or “Cross-Petitioner”) and in favor of Collette Jean Wallace (“Petitioner” or “Cross-Respondent”). Respondent appealed to this Court. Because Respondent’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, we dismiss the appeal.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, Keontis Dontrell Cunningham, of two counts of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on selfdefense.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Darnell Treshawn Wiggins1, of second degree murder, first degree felony murder, and kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its opening statement. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in admitting Officer Dalton’s testimony during the penalty phase, in denying his motion for mistrial, and in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ed Henry Loyde, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-five years. This Court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Ed Loyde, No. W2014-01055-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1598121 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 6, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 21, 2015). After unsuccessfully filing a petition for post-conviction relief, Ed Loyde v. State No. W2018-01740-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 918602 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 25, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 22, 2020), the Petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas corpus court summarily dismissed. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

In a consolidated trial of Case No. 18-04092 and Case No. 18-04093, a Shelby County jury convicted Will Vaughn (“Defendant”) of fifteen counts of Class C felony facilitation of attempted second degree murder, fifteen counts of Class C felony employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor facilitation of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years for each of the thirty felony counts and to eleven months and
twenty-nine days for each count of facilitation of reckless endangerment counts. The trial court aligned some convictions concurrently and others consecutively in each case. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it was imposing an effective thirty-year sentence in Case No. 18-04092 and an effective thirty-year sentence in Case No. 18-04093 and ordered the two sentences to be run consecutively for a total effective sentence of sixty years. The “special conditions” section of the thirty-two judgment forms signed by the trial court state that the total effective sentence is fifty-four years. Also, the judgment forms for some of the counts do not match the consecutive/concurrent alignment announced by the trial court. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the convictions and consecutive sentencing but remand for trial court resentencing in two counts and for entry of the proper judgments.

The Appellant, Jody Alan Hughes, was convicted in the Bradley County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder; kidnapping, a Class C felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of life plus fourteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his “numerous” requests to represent himself; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to comment about the codefendants’ exposure to prison sentences during counsel’s opening statement; (4) the trial court erred in its wording of a curative instruction to the jury; (5) the trial court erred by limiting a codefendant’s cross-examination about a false statement the codefendant made in a previous criminal case; (6) the trial court erred by limiting a detective’s testimony regarding the codefendants’ inconsistent statements; and (7) the trial court erred by not allowing testimony about a codefendant’s pretrial statement to impeach the codefendant. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, David Yost, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a car accident involving an employee of the State of Tennessee, Irene Howard (“Claimant”) sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The claim was denied by the Division of Claims and Risk Management (the “DCRM”), and Claimant thereafter appealed to the Claims Commission (the “Commission”). Because Claimant failed to appeal the DCRM’s decision within ninety days, however, the Commission concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the appeal. We affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The petition was filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of three minor children.  The petition listed seven grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights.  After a final hearing on the petition, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failing to visit; (2) persistence of conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to parent; and (5) severe child abuse.  We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The defendant, James McClain, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault and witness coercion, claiming that the trial court erred by permitting him to represent himself at trial, by permitting the State to proceed on an amended indictment, and by imposing consecutive sentences. Because the record establishes that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, that the indictment was not amended, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his child on the grounds of (1) persistence of conditions, (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility, (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and (4) abandonment by wanton disregard. The trial court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Although we reverse three of the termination grounds, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports a finding of abandonment by wanton disregard. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the termination of the father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

The Petitioner, James Black, was convicted of two counts each of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder and was sentenced to a concurrent life sentence by the trial court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from trial counsel’s legal use of prescribed opioids during his trial, specifically asserting that 1) the prescribed opioids caused him to perform deficiently at trial; 2) that trial counsel’s offering of the Petitioner’s criminal history tainted the jury; and 3) that trial counsel’s use of prescribed opioids combined with his severe back pain created a conflict of interest. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff. After two hearings, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of one of the defendants involved in the underlying case. Because there is no written order evidencing how the operative claims against the subject defendant were resolved, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court’s refusal to enforce a forum selection clause contained in a stock bonus transfer agreement in this action arising out of the termination of the plaintiff’s employment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, citing the forum selection clause, which specified New York as the sole venue for litigating claims. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Zachary Gale Rattler, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury and received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce, child custody case, Appellant/Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, seeking equal parenting time. Appellee/Mother opposed the petition. The trial court held that there had been a material change of circumstance and awarded Father additional parenting time, but not equal parenting time. On appeal, Father asserts that the trial court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a). Although we leave undisturbed the portion of the trial court’s order concerning a material change of circumstance, the trial court’s failure to make best interest findings in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 precludes any meaningful appellate review of that question. Accordingly, we vacate the order and remand for entry of an order that includes the required findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Relying on an inapplicable statute, the plaintiff asked the court to order a limited liability company to produce records for his inspection.  Claiming that the plaintiff had never been a member, the LLC denied that he was entitled to access its records.  After a bench trial, the court found that the plaintiff was a member and entitled to inspect and copy the records.  So the court ordered the LLC to allow the inspection and to pay the plaintiff’s costs and attorney’s fees incurred in filing suit.  The evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that the plaintiff was a member at formation of the LLC.  But because the relief was sought under an inapplicable statute, we vacate the inspection order and the award of attorney’s fees. 

Members of a nonprofit corporation sought to compel production of election records from the election of the corporation’s board of directors. The trial court ordered production of the records pursuant to a protective order. This Court granted the Rule 10 appeal to determine whether production of the election ballots is required under the Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation Act, whether the members have a privacy right with respect to their votes, and whether the trial court’s protective order protects that privacy right. We hold that production of the ballots is required under the statute, members have a limited privacy right with respect to their votes, and the protective order protects that right.