APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted of one count of burglary. He contends on appeal that 1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, 2) no proper foundation was laid for opinion testimony by certain witnesses, 3) the warrantless search of the vehicle was improper, and 4) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Craig Quevedo, pled guilty to thirty counts of rape and twenty-four counts of incest and pled nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape of a child, nine counts of rape and one count of aggravated rape in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of ninety-two years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence was excessive and contrary to public policy. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Petitioner, Letivias D. Prince, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and contends (1) that his counsel failed to develop a reasonable trial strategy or defenses for Petitioner; (2) that his counsel failed to fully investigate or adequately prepare the witnesses for trial; (3) that his counsel failed to allow Petitioner to testify at trial; and (4) that his counsel failed to ask for a continuance to investigate certain exculpatory evidence presented by the State at the time of trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, the ex-husband challenges the trial court's order denying his post-divorce petition to modify alimony and finding him in "technical contempt." We find that the proof is inadequate to establish willful efforts to defeat alimony obligations, that his change of employment was not voluntary and that a substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred, justifying some relief from the alimony obligation. The trial court did not err in holding the ex-husband to be in contempt. We reverse the judgment in part, affirm the judgment in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff's action for libel against defendants was dismissed on grounds the action was time-barred. We affirm.

The Trial Judge refused to onerate an individual associated with defendant corporation with an obligation of the corporation which had been discharged in bankruptcy. On appeal, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Corey Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Darrell Watkins, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Dywand Carlos Pettway, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction for the aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of a Schedule II controlled substance conviction, to be served consecutively. In this appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction and (2) that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Crawley, Sr., pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law stems from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of a police officer stopping the Defendant's automobile. Because we find that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant, we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. This case is remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.

Because the record confirms that the appellant did not perfect an appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court within ten days of that decision, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the late attempted appeal.

We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights when a parent is imprisoned for at least ten years due to a criminal act and the child is under the age of eight when the sentence is imposed, also requires a showing of substantial harm to the child before a parent's rights may be terminated. Because we hold that a parent does not have standing to file a petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(6), we lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this case and vacate the judgments of the lower courts.

The Appellant, David I. Tucker, appeals the dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Cannon County Circuit Court.

The Defendant, Walter R. Smith, Jr., was convicted by a jury of five counts of child rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentences. We affirm the Defendant's five convictions for child rape. The trial judge erred by failing to state on the record the facts that support the imposition of consecutive sentences. However, the record clearly shows that consecutive sentencing was proper. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant's sentences.

Defendant, Martin Stuart Hammock, was originally convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial. On appeal, this Court found that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to support a conviction for first degree murder. Accordingly, we modified the judgment to reflect a conviction of second degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. State v. Martin Stuart Hammock, No. M2000-00334-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 12, 2001), no perm. to app. filed. Following a new sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years. Defendant appeals. After a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Rodney Laron Covington, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Covington received a twenty-year sentence for rape of a child and ten-year sentences for each aggravated sexual battery conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, he presents three issues for our review: (1) whether testimony by a nurse practitioner violated the holding of State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1993); (2) whether the State's recitation of the facts supporting the charge of rape of a child was "specific enough to ensure that the jury would reach a unanimous decision" and "sufficiently corresponded to the State's proof;" and (3) whether the proof established that the offense of rape of a child occurred after July 1, 1992, as required for 100% service of the sentence imposed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523(b). After review of the record, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Shamain Johnson, appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Finding that denial of the petition was appropriate, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Christopher Robert Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of possession with intent to deliver over 300 grams of cocaine, a class A felony. Following this conviction, he was sentenced to twenty-one years imprisonment. Smith appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior criminal conduct. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff homeowners sued Defendant pest control operators for negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty relative to the issuance by the Defendants of a wood destroying insect infestation inspection report pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-21-201 to 206. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Because civil liability is limited by section 62-21-202 and Plaintiffs allege no damages caused by the presence of wood-destroying insects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Anthony Darrell Hines, convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to death for a 1985 homicide, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel were ineffective at his 1986 trial and 1989 resentencing hearing, that women were excluded from both juries, and that imposition of the death penalty violates his rights under the federal and state constitutions. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the denial.

The narrow question presented by this appeal is whether Tennessee recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation by nondisclosure. While the Sears family’s complaint faces a daunting battle on other fronts, I would not extinguish it at this stage of the proceeding by holding as a matter of law that a professional person cannot supply the false information required by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) by silence.

 

Upon his plea of guilty, the Defendant was convicted of DUI. In this appeal, he attempts to present two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). Because we conclude that this appeal does not properly present certified questions of law, we dismiss the appeal.

Following a bench trial appellant, Jason White, was found guilty of D.U.I. Second Offense in violation of T.C.A. 55-11-401. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with incarceration for forty-five days followed by probation for the balance of the sentence. The appellant appeals, contending that the evidence was not sufficient for a D.U.I. Second Offense conviction. After a review of the record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Emery Wells, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence, with the sentence being suspended after service of ninety days in jail. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging violation of the following conditions: (1) failure to report to his probation officer; (2) failure to obey the laws of this state; and (3) failure to report a new arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Wells' suspended sentence and ordered his eight-year sentence to be served with community corrections, after service of an additional ninety-day period of jail confinement. Wells concedes that the violations occurred, but he argues that the revocation did not "aid the interest of both the public and the [Appellant]," as it will likely result in the loss of his employment.

These consolidated claims against the State of Tennessee ("State") arise out of an automobile accident which resulted in the death of James R. Madison and personal injury to Mary E. Madison, Kenneth R. Madison, and Wilma J. Madison (collectively referred to as "Claimants"). The State filed a motion for summary judgment which the Claims Commission ("Commission") granted based primarily on Claimants' failure to file a timely response. The Commission later set aside its order granting the State's summary judgment motion and ordered Claimants to file a response to that motion no later than March 19, 2003. Claimants filed their response to the motion for summary judgment on March 18, 2003. On May 14, 2003, apparently acting under the misapprehension that Claimants still had not responded to the motion for summary judgment, the Commission dismissed the claims based on Claimants' violation of its previous order directing them to respond. We vacate the dismissal of these claims and remand for further proceedings.