APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an action to terminate parental rights filed by the prospective adoptive parents of a child. The child’s father asserts that the chancery court erred in terminating his parental rights on the basis that he abandoned his child for the four-month period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). To compute the four-month period, the chancery court used the date on which the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) filed a petition in juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights. CASA’s petition was later dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court’s termination of parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and found an additional ground for abandonment as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii) specifies that parental rights may be terminated if the father “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child.” We granted permission to appeal. We hold that the commencement of the four-month period of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) is properly computed from the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed in chancery court, not from the filing date of the earlier juvenile court petition. We further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in terminating the father’s parental rights based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

The defendant, Mona Ray Cloud, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) Act, a Class E felony; and criminal impersonation, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received four-year, one-year, and six-month sentences, respectively, with the one-year and six-month sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the four-year sentence for an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that she should have received alternative sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This direct appeal of right for first degree murder for which the defendant received a sentence of life without parole raises five issues of alleged error: (1) sufficiency of evidence; (2) failure to suppress the defendant's statements; (3) improper admission of photographs; (4) improper testimony of experts at the penalty phase of trial; and (5) improper admission of evidence concerning a prior conviction of the defendant. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction. The issue concerning admissibility of the defendant's statement is waived by the defendant's failure to include the suppression hearing in the appellate record. We conclude that the remaining issues were properly decided by the trial court, and we, therefore, affirm the conviction.

The appellant, Paul Edward Pettibone, Jr., pled guilty to the offense of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C Felony. He was sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial judge ordered the appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration, but asserted that if the appellant successfully completed an addiction treatment program known as Lifeline Therapeutic Community, he could apply to the court to suspend the rest of his sentence.¹ In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant either an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement. After a review of this case, we conclude that the evidence did not support the grant of an alternative sentence or a term of probation after a period of confinement and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Charles Lawuary, appeals from the trial court's order revoking Defendant's community corrections sentence and requiring him to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Eugene Parks, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief from robbery-related convictions. He contends that he did not voluntarily enter guilty pleas because he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the pleas. He also claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys did not investigate the case adequately. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petitions.

The appellant, Claude W. Cheeks, was convicted by a jury in the Hamilton County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant appealed and on July 22, 2002, this court reversed his convictions, finding that the appellant had met his burden of establishing his insanity at the time of the offenses. The State filed an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The supreme court granted the State's application for the sole purpose of remanding the case to this court for reconsideration in light of its opinion in State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002). Upon reconsideration, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, serving an effective twenty-year sentence on three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Willie Ira Poteat, Jr., was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine for resale and criminal conspiracy to sell more than 26 grams of cocaine. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence taken during the execution of a search warrant, which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges against him, reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law regarding the trial court's ruling on the suppression issue. We now address the Defendant's appeal based upon this certified question of law.

The petitioner, John Haws Burrell, has been convicted of twelve counts of sexual battery, three counts of rape, and two counts of coercion of a witness for which he is serving an effective twenty-four-year sentence. See State v. John Haws Burrell, No. 03C01-9404-CR-00157, 1997 WL 53455 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Feb. 11, 1997). The petitioner brings the instant appeal of the lower court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We find that the lower court properly summarily dismissed the petition because several of the alleged bases for relief in the petition are not proper grounds for habeas relief and the remaining allegations lack merit.