APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following the defendant's guilty pleas to the offenses of theft over $1,000 and burglary, both Class D felonies, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent three-year terms in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant posits that minimum, two-year terms of probation, Community Corrections, or split confinement are more appropriate measures. We disagree, however, and affirm.

The petitioner, Michael Russo, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Robert Miller, who represented himself at trial, was convicted of vandalism over $500 and criminal trespass. After the trial, the defendant was appointed counsel. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of two years and thirty days, respectively, with all but ten days suspended, to be served in community corrections. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel; (2) that the trial court erred by the omission of a jury instruction; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient. Because the defendant was denied the assistance of counsel at trial, the judgments of conviction are reversed and the causes are remanded for a new trial.

The defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven years for a Class B felony of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, instead of the presumptive minimum sentence of eight years. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to run consecutive to a sentence in another county. Absent a sentencing hearing transcript, we conclude the record is inadequate for appellate review, and we must presume the sentences imposed for the Class B felony are correct. Moreover, we note the judgment forms reflect the defendant was sentenced to eleven years on two additional Class C felony convictions of selling less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance. These sentences exceed the statutory range of punishment prescribed for Class C felonies and are illegal. We affirm the judgment from the trial court as related to the defendant's Class B felony convictions and remand the defendant's two Class C felony convictions for correction or for resentencing within the proper statutory range of punishment.

The petitioner, Richard Leonard Mendoza, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and that his guilty pleas were involuntary. Additionally, he insists that the post-conviction court erroneously denied funding for expert psychological services at the post-conviction level. After a thorough review of the record, we are unpersuaded that the post-conviction court's rulings, findings and conclusion are anything other than proper, and we affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Garcia Flores Isidoro, filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied without a hearing as being untimely filed. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Guadalupe Arroyo, entered guilty pleas to two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant on each count to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentences and in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the convictions of vehicular homicide; however, finding error in the trial court's sentencing determinations, we remand for resentencing.

The Defendant appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Rhea Jackson, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, robbery, misdemeanor theft, attempted rape, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of thirty-four years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises eight issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony concerning fingerprints; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony about the victim's response to a photographic line-up; (4) whether the Defendant was entitled to a mistrial due to statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (6) whether the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process under State v. Anthony; (7) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning lesser-included offenses; and (8) whether the Defendant's sentences are excessive. Because the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on all of the lesser-included offenses of the indicted offenses of robbery and aggravated rape, we reverse and remand for retrial the Defendant's convictions of robbery and rape. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Connie Parsons, pled guilty to two counts of criminal responsibility for facilitation of rape of a child and was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On September 17, 2001, the petitioner filed pro se in the Davidson County Circuit Court a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial court impermissibly interfered in the plea negotiations and, thus, her convictions were void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Consuela P. Carter, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of full probation for her conviction for possessing with intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to five years, with probation after serving nine months. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Johnnie C. Weems, pled nolo contendere to three separate counts of Class C felony vehicular homicide, was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years on each count to run concurrently, and was denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, he contends the sentences are excessive and the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, David L. Groom, pled guilty to driving under the influence, reserving a certified question of law. On appeal, the defendant contends, pursuant to the certified question of law, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from an unlawful arrest or seizure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Buren E. Laney, convicted on his guilty plea to the offense of violation of an habitual traffic offender order, appeals from the lower court's imposition of a six-year incarcerative sentence. Because we disagree with Laney, a career offender, that the sentence imposed was improper, we affirm.

The Defendant, Boyd L. Jones, III, pled guilty to possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal three related certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified questions of law stem from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress. The central issue in this appeal is whether law enforcement officers violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they entered his residence without a search warrant and detained him until they obtained written consent to search from the lessee of the residence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant challenges the revocation of his probation by the Sumner County Criminal Court. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted of violation of an habitual motor vehicle offender order, a Class E felony, and sentenced to two years as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. He argues on appeal that the trial court improperly set his sentence at the maximum by failing to give adequate weight to applicable mitigating factors and erred in denying his request for full probation or other alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Homer Frank Beavers, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard Range I offender to a total effective sentence of five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant's request for probation and the appellant appealed to this court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The post-conviction court granted each of the petitioners post-conviction relief on the grounds that the state had violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose an exculpatory FBI laboratory report and an exculpatory witness statement. In this appeal of right, the state contends (1) that Harper's petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the petitioners to amend their petitions and allege new grounds after a remand from this court; (3) that the trial court erred by determining that the state suppressed the FBI laboratory reports and a witness statement; and (4) that Hutchison received the effective assistance of counsel at trial, an alternative ground for relief asserted by Hutchison. In response to the state's appeal, the petitioners assert that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the affidavit of a juror which would demonstrate that the FBI lab reports would have created reasonable doubt. The judgment is affirmed.