APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Mario C. Estrada, appeals the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court imposing a sentence of twelve years incarceration in the Department of Correction. The sentence arose from guilty pleas by Estrada to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. The indictment returned against Estrada charged him with one count of aggravated arson, eight counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. In this appeal, Estrada raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by ordering that his sentence be served in total confinement. After review, we find that plain error dictates that the convictions be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings because aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder.

The petitioner, Reginol L. Walters, was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated rape and, while his direct appeal was pending, filed a petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-403 requesting forensic analysis of DNA evidence. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, as well as a petition to reconsider, concluding that the petitioner could not proceed with his petition while his direct appeal was pending. Following our review, we conclude that the applicable statute does not prohibit the petitioner from proceeding simultaneously with a direct appeal and a petition for analysis of DNA evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of the petition.

The petitioner, Michael Anthony Scruggs, pled guilty to forgery and theft under $500. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of six years for the forgery and eleven months, twenty-nine days, for the theft. No appeal was taken. Later, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the petitioner had failed to prove that his appointed counsel fell below the required level of competency. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his effective ten-year community corrections sentence with a requirement of 160 days of jail time after pleading guilty to violating a habitual motor vehicle offender order, driving under the influence - 4th offense, and resisting arrest. The defendant filed no transcripts of the guilty plea submission hearing or sentencing hearing. These hearings are essential for appellate review. Therefore, we must presume that the trial court is correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Dennis J. Hughes appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims on appeal that the lower court erred in (1) denying his claim that his constitutional rights were abridged by the state's failure to disclose evidence against him prior to trial as part of the bill of particulars, and (2) ruling that he could not impeach the prosecutor from the conviction proceedings with the prosecutor's own alleged prior bad acts. Because we are unpersuaded of reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

The Appellant, James Mario Starnes, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Starnes pled guilty to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, Starnes received concurrent sentences of ten years, nine months for attempted second degree murder and twenty-five years for especially aggravated robbery. Starnes now appeals his especially aggravated robbery conviction, contending that the evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt for that offense. Because the error complained of was waived as a matter of law by Starnes’ plea of guilty, this issue is not reviewable upon direct appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 

The defendant appeals her sentence of three years imprisonment for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. The defendant argues she is a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. The record supports the defendant's assertion that she is entitled to an alternative sentence. The defendant is sentenced to three years in split confinement, with thirty (30) days incarceration and the remainder on supervised probation. We remand this judgment to determine if the defendant continues to hold full-time employment. If the defendant is employed full-time, she is to serve her thirty (30) days in periodic confinement.

The petitioner, Thomas J. McKee, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed (1) to request a mental evaluation for him; (2) to make a contemporaneous objection to the state's improper closing argument; and (3) to object to the inclusion of the phrase "moral certainty" in the jury's instruction on reasonable doubt. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Charles E. Jones, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a weapon. For these convictions, the trial court classified the defendant as a Range I standard offender and ordered him to serve an aggregate one year sentence, consisting of concurrent sentences of one year for his possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for his possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and thirty days for his unlawful possession of a weapon conviction. The state agreed to suspend the two latter sentences, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve four years of probation and one year of incarceration, which was to be suspended after the defendant served ninety days in the county jail. The defendant now appeals his sentence, alleging (1) that the trial court erroneously modified his plea agreement with the state after it had been submitted to the trial court for approval, (2) that the trial court improperly denied his request to serve the entirety of his sentence on probation, and (3) that the trial court improperly weighed and applied various enhancement and mitigating factors. After reviewing the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and therefore affirm the defendant's sentence.