APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Two cars collided at a four-way stop. One driver filed a personal injury action against the other. At trial, the two sides presented conflicting descriptions of the accident. The jury found the defendant driver was not at fault. And the trial court, as thirteenth juror, approved the jury verdict. Because the jury verdict is supported by material evidence, we affirm.

The Defendant, Amanda Dawn Freeman, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of probation for her aggravated burglary, theft, and drug-related convictions, for which she received an effective five-year sentence on probation. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Frederick Robinson, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal requires us to interpret provisions in the Prompt Pay Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 66-34-101 to -704, regarding retainage withheld on construction projects. The Prompt Pay Act requires the party withholding retainage—a percentage of total payment withheld as incentive for satisfactory completion of work—to deposit the funds into a separate, interest-bearing escrow account. Failure to do so results in a penalty of $300 per day. In this case, both parties agree the subcontractor’s retainage was not placed into an interest-bearing escrow account, and the retainage was not timely remitted to the subcontractor. Three years after completing its work on the contract, the subcontractor sued the contractor for unpaid retainage plus amounts due under the Prompt Pay Act. The contractor soon tendered the retainage; consequently, only the statutory penalty is at issue in this appeal. Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-34-104(c) states that, for persons required to deposit retainage into a separate interest-bearing escrow account, the penalty is assessed “per day for each and every day” retainage is not so deposited. Consonant with the statute’s language, its objective, the wrong the Prompt Pay Act seeks to prevent, and the purpose it seeks to accomplish, we hold that the $300 per day penalty is assessed each day retainage is not deposited in a statutorily-compliant escrow account. Consequently, while the subcontractor’s claim for the statutory penalty is subject to the one-year statute of limitations, if the subcontractor can establish that the contractor was required to deposit the retainage into an escrow account, the subcontractor is not precluded from recovering the penalty assessed each day during the period commencing 365 days before the complaint was filed. Accordingly, we reverse in part the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the contractor and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Loring Justice (“Plaintiff”), individually and as next friend of N.N./N.J. (“the Child”) sued Vey Michael Nordquist, Ph.D. (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) over Defendant’s actions in connection with paternity litigation to which Plaintiff was a party. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, but never filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Before time for appeal expired, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint as he was entitled to do under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 given that Defendant never filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint. However, the Trial Court never ruled on Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The order appealed from is not a final judgment, meaning we lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

James H., II (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child, James H., III (“the Child”). In April 2017, Ashley P. (“Mother”) and Trinity P. (“Stepfather”) filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights in the Weakley County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). Following a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights on two grounds of abandonment due to Father’s willful failure to visit the Child and willful failure to support the Child prior to Father’s incarceration. The Trial Court further found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antonio Robinson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, facilitation of aggravated assault, and criminally negligent homicide in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-402, 39-11-403, 39-13-102, and 39-13-212. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Willie Austin Davis, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, based on his entering the property of a Nashville church from which he had been banned. On appeal, the pro se Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial due to the trial judge’s failure to disclose his relationships with former and current members of the church and others. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

To collect on its judgment, a judgment creditor served a garnishment on a bank. The garnishee bank initially responded that it held funds belonging to the judgment debtor, a limited liability company. Later, the bank responded “no accounts found.” The bank had two deposit accounts purportedly belonging to a different entity that shared the same name, address, and principal as the judgment debtor. The bank also had an escrow account of which the judgment debtor was a beneficiary. The judgment creditor argued that these three accounts were subject to the garnishment. The trial court disagreed. We affirm. 

The Defendant, Byron Sidney Doss, was convicted after a bench trial of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor, and aggravated assault involving strangulation, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(A)(iv), -13-302. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years, suspended to time served plus five years on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessively long five-year sentence. After our review, we affirm and remand the case for the entry of corrected judgment forms.

The plaintiffs in this action are operators of businesses that collect and transport municipal solid waste. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants, a company that operates a landfill and the county that is a partial owner of the landfill, alleging violations of certain statutes regulating solid waste disposal and landfill operations. Upon a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based upon, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ lack of standing and the court’s determination that the statutes did not create a private right of action. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.

Defendant, Cedrick Leroy Shelton, was convicted by a jury of simple possession of marijuana, possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, and improper display of a license plate. Defendant also pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective fourteen-year sentence, as a Range II multiple offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; that the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts; and that his sentence was excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment forms for counts seven and eight to reflect that Defendant pled guilty to those counts rather than being found guilty by a jury. Additionally, the judgment form in count eight should reflect that it is merged with count seven.

This is a case for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant prohibiting commercial use of lots in a residentially restricted neighborhood. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs nominal damages in the sum of $500 against one defendant and denied the plaintiffs’ requests for specific equitable performance and injunctive relief and for punitive damages. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Generally at issue in this litigation is the propriety of a foreclosure. The trial court held that summary judgment should be entered in the appellee’s favor due to, among other things, the appellant’s lack of standing. The appellant’s principal brief only raises issues connected to the trial court’s determination on standing, although even these issues have now been disclaimed by the appellant on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Paul Steven Murphy, of rape and incest. The trial court ordered the Appellant to serve concurrent sentences of ten years for the rape conviction and four years for the incest conviction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.  

This is a negligence case that was dismissed in the Tennessee Claims Commission for several articulated reasons, including that Tennessee’s recreational use statute barred the plaintiffs’ claims. For the specific reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

The Petitioner, Jared Scott Aguilar, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s determination that his coram nobis petition, wherein he challenged his multiple child pornography convictions, failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the coram nobis court erred by finding that he had not presented newly discovered evidence entitling him to relief, specifically, evidence that the search warrant affidavit was deficient due to the investigating officer’s allegedly untrue statement therein that he discovered three child pornography files in the Petitioner’s shared computer folder, that the detective who performed a forensic examination of the Petitioner’s laptop allegedly committed perjury at trial by stating that he found the incriminating files in the Petitioner’s shared folder, and that the investigating officer had undisclosed contact with the Petitioner’s wife. Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief because the Petitioner is merely presenting “repackaged claims” that have been previously determined and which do not state a cognizable claim for relief in the coram nobis context.  

This appeal involves review of a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. The trial court determined that the Tennessee Public Participation Act was not applicable and denied the motion, finding that the defendant’s activity was not protected. The defendant now appeals, contending that the underlying matter involves the exercise of her right to free speech and her right to petition. We agree and find that the defendant engaged in protected activity in the filing of a Title IX complaint. Because we find that the defendant’s appeal is limited to that part of the trial court’s judgment relating to the allegations in plaintiff’s lawsuit concerning defendant’s Title IX complaint, we reverse in part the trial court’s cited basis for denial and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the Tennessee Public Participation Act. 

Grandparents sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a father to their two children on the statutory ground of abandonment. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the children by failure to visit or support them during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare. And the court ruled that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Because Mother proved that her failure to visit was not willful and her support under the circumstances was not “token,” we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare and that termination is in the children’s best interests. So we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.    

This is an appeal of a health care liability case. Although the matters presented for our review were taken under advisement following oral argument, we hereby dismiss the appeal with prejudice pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

This case involves a pro se complaint to quiet title filed by several plaintiffs challenging a deed that was executed over twenty years ago. This is the second appeal in this matter. After the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed in 2016, only one plaintiff/appellant appealed to this Court. The remaining plaintiffs did not participate in the first appeal. The matter was remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the appellant died at some point. After a second order of dismissal was entered containing the requisite findings, the instant appeal was filed by counsel purportedly on behalf of the original plaintiffs. We conclude that the appeal must be dismissed because the plaintiffs who did not participate in the first appeal are bound by the first order of dismissal, which became final as to them when they did not appeal. Also, the sole appellant from the first appeal has died, and the attorney who filed the notice of appeal has admittedly never communicated with the appellant or anyone acting on behalf of his estate. As such, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

The Defendant, George H. Person, pled guilty to two counts of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), two counts of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, and a violation of the light law. The Defendant’s sentencing took place after an amendment to the statute that was the basis of his MVHO conviction went into effect, so that the Defendant’s conduct was no longer criminalized and, concomitantly, triggered no penalty. The trial court ruled that the Defendant was entitled to the lesser penalty of the amended statute under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112, and the State appeals. We conclude that the savings statute applies and that the Legislature’s act of removing punishment for the offense constitutes a lesser penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this action for breach of an insurance policy, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company upon finding that, pursuant to an occupancy clause, the insurance policy had become “automatically void” when the plaintiff homeowner had vacated the insured residence and had allowed other individuals to occupy the insured residence without obtaining the insurance company’s written consent. The trial court subsequently certified its summary judgment order as final, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, determining that although the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, the insurance company would be allowed to pursue a counter-complaint it had filed against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this action involving a collision between an automobile and a bull that escaped its enclosure and entered the roadway, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, who had maintained a leasehold interest in the property from which the bull escaped. The trial court determined that no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs had failed to show that the defendant owned the bull in question and because the defendant had terminated the lease before the accident occurred. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.