APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, indicted on counts of especially aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, theft over $1,000.00, and evading arrest, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated robbery and theft over $1,000.00. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years. There was no appeal. Later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and the trial court granted a delayed appeal. The issues presented for our review are as follows: (1) whether the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a direct appeal or by failing to timely file a motion to reduce the sentence; (3) whether the trial court properly modified an illegal sentence; and (4) whether the sentence imposed was excessive. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Darren A. Dewalt, appeals as of right from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence to be served in the Shelby County Correction Center. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation based upon an unidentified and unsubstantiated laboratory report indicating that Defendant had used drugs in violation of his probation. Based upon a review of the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to attempted second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. He appeals his sentence, arguing he should have received the minimum sentence of eight years with alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Randolph Scott Jennings appeals from his Hamilton County conviction of aggravated robbery. He was found guilty by a jury of his peers and sentenced by the trial court to a seventeen-year, Range II term in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he alleges error in the trial court's (1) denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a "showup" identification and admission of the subsequent in-court identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime, (2) denial of motions to compel production of clothing the defendant wore at the time of his arrest, or alternatively, to dismiss the charged based upon the state's inability to produce the clothing, and (3) application of enhancement factors, imposition of a Range II sentence, and order of consecutive sentencing. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

The defendant, Colin Reed Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of carjacking (Class B felony), robbery (Class C felony), aggravated assault (Class C felony), resisting arrest (Class B misdemeanor), violation of driver's license law (Class B misdemeanor), evading arrest (Class A misdemeanor), evading arrest (Class D felony), and assault (Class A misdemeanor). Following his convictions, the trial court merged some convictions and imposed an effective sentence of 32 years as a multiple offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he claims his carjacking conviction is infirm because the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Javonni Jones, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as being barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant pled guilty to delivery of cocaine under .5 grams. The trial court imposed a Range II eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals her sentence, arguing it was excessive and she should have received alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mark E. Conner, was convicted by a jury of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues four issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of witnesses Sherri Conner, the Defendant's wife and former co-defendant, and Gloria Whitehead, the Defendant's mother-in-law, (3) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to require the State to provide the Defendant with any statement, arrest history, and prior convictions of the State's witnesses, and (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to exclude the State's photographs and the Defendant's request to introduce at trial the remaining photographs that were provided to the Defendant during discovery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Giles County jury convicted the defendant, Timothy Maurice Reynolds, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years as a Range II multiple offender. On direct appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery; (2) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel, during cross-examination and closing arguments, from referring to the United States Attorney General's comments on eyewitness identification; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding the defendant to be a Range II multiple offender. We affirm the conviction; however, because essential exhibits relating to sentencing are missing from the record without fault of the parties, we remand for resentencing.

The petitioner, James E. Jackson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis and post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder. In regard to the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the petitioner claims that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. In regard to the petition for post-conviction relief, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to call certain witnesses to testify and did not investigate and present a diminished capacity defense. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petitions.

The Appellant, Paul Hayes, appeals his convictions by a Shelby County jury for aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated robbery. In this appeal as of right, Hayes raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from addressing the jury during entry of the plea; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying Hayes' motion for a mistrial following a detective's testimony that Hayes was a suspect in uncharged similar crimes; (3) whether the trial court committed plain error by limiting the scope of cross-examination of a co-defendant testifying for the State; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support the convictions; and (5) whether the cumulative effect of all errors amounted to a denial of due process of law. After a review of the record, we hold that Hayes' issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action, the Trial Court awarded custody of the parties' minor child to the father, and the mother has appealed.

The appellant, Ann Marie Thornton Kelly, was indicted by the Giles County Grand Jury on twenty counts relating to incidents involving the sexual abuse of her children. She was ultimately convicted of two counts of rape of a child, three counts of criminal responsibility for rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of criminal responsibility for aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the State concedes that the appellant was not competent to stand trial. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of a van owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits and deposition testimony stating that the driver was operating the van without their permission and that the driver was not their employee. Despite the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. We hold that an owner's offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot overcome the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a).

This appeal involves a medical malpractice case arising out of the emergency treatment of an intoxicated driver who sustained catastrophic injuries in a single-vehicle accident. The driver's conservator filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that the negligence of the driver's healthcare providers at Vanderbilt University Medical Center caused him to suffer irreversible brain injury that left him in a persistent vegetative state. A jury returned a verdict for the driver, assessing his damages at $7,366,000 and allocating seventy percent of the fault to Vanderbilt and thirty percent of the fault to the driver. Thereafter, the trial court determined as a matter of law that the driver's damages had been caused by a separate injury for which Vanderbilt was entirely responsible. Accordingly, the trial court set aside the jury's allocation of fault and entered a judgment holding Vanderbilt one hundred percent at fault for the entire amount of the driver's damages. We have determined that the judgment must be vacated and that Vanderbilt is entitled to a new trial because of the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors in excluding the testimony of three of Vanderbilt's witnesses as well as evidence of the driver's alcohol-related conduct.

The petitioners, brothers, were tried and convicted, jointly, of first degree murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property. They filed petitions for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. After careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Hodges, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life without parole and twenty-five years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The Defendant subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder; by the State's employment of inconsistent theories of guilt at his and his co-defendant's separate trials; and by the denial of his right to testify. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing: (1) his "best interest" plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in representing him at sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Ricky Lee Netherton, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Cumberland County of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to twenty-four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent (100%). Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.