APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was originally convicted of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery and received an effective life sentence. He now contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial. We conclude otherwise and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James L. Carrethers appeals his second-degree murder conviction. He was found guilty of that offense by a Davidson County Jury. He is presently serving an eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction for the crime. In this direct appeal, he claims that the evidence does not sufficiently support the conviction and that the lower court erred in denying a motion to suppress his inculpatory, pretrial statements. Because we are unconvinced of error in either respect, we affirm.

The Appellant, Michael George Medina, appeals his conviction by a Smith County jury finding him guilty of first-degree murder. On appeal, Medina challenges (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, as it relates to the element of premeditation, and (2) the trial court's ruling which he asserts interfered with the defense's order of proof, thus, "forcing a premature election on defendant's right to testify." After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Clayton Eugene Turner, brings this appeal from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, incest, and assault. He argues two issues in this appeal: (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and (2) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's post-conviction request for the appointment of experts in the fields of DNA analysis and the transmission of infectious diseases. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jonathan Thornton, was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and one count of theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two years and 11 months and 29 days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and (3) that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. Because the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence, the defendant's sentence is modified to a sentence of split confinement with nine months to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation.

The petitioner, Natasha W. Cornett, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for our review are (1) whether the petitioner properly waived her right to a jury trial at sentencing; (2) whether her guilty pleas to three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $1,000 were knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (3) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Charles WilliamYoung, was convicted in a jury trial of the offense of theft over $500. He was sentenced to one year and six months and ordered to serve 60 days of incarceration, to pay a $500 fine and restitution of $800. The appellant's probation was revoked for the first time in 1997, but he was again placed on probation for 18 months. Two years later his probation was again revoked and the appellant was ordered to serve his original sentence with 94 days of jail credit. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, or in the alternative, a writ of habeas corpus and alleged inter alia that a number of alleged constitutional errors occurred at both probation revocation hearings. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition.

We hold that the Post-Conviction Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-201, et seq., does not provide a cause of action for a collateral attack on a probation revocation proceeding. Moreover, the appellant's allegations, taken as true, would at most render the results of the probation revocation proceedings voidable, not void, and therefore the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the appellant. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

The appellant, Christopher Robert Smith, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Davidson County of conspiracy to possess with the intent to manufacture, deliver or sell 300 grams or more of any substance containing cocaine, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fifty thousand dollar ($50,000) fine. On appeal, the appellant complains that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury found the defendants, Marthias S. Phillips and Lanard Keith Armstrong, guilty of facilitation of first-degree murder, criminal attempt to facilitate especially aggravated kidnapping, and criminal attempt to facilitate especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced both defendants to serve 4-year sentences for their criminal attempt to facilitate especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, 4-year sentences for their criminal attempt to facilitate especially aggravated robbery convictions, and 20-year sentences for their facilitation of first-degree murder convictions. The trial court sentenced both defendants as Range I offenders and ordered them to serve their 4-year sentences for criminal attempt to facilitate especially aggravated kidnapping concurrently to their 20-year sentences for facilitation of first-degree murder. The court then ordered them to serve their 4-year sentences for criminal attempt to facilitate especially aggravated robbery consecutively to their concurrent 20-year sentences, resulting in an effective sentence of 24 years. The defendants now bring the instant appeal. Defendant Armstrong and Defendant Phillips both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions, the propriety of the trial court's jury instructions, and the effectiveness of their trial counsel. Defendant Armstrong additionally challenges the propriety of his sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable law, we find that none of these allegations merit relief.