APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the Defendant, James Corey Edmiston, of attempted second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, vandalism and resisting arrest. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted murder conviction. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to ten years for the attempted murder; twenty-four years for the especially aggravated robbery; ten years for the especially aggravated burglary; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. The trial court ordered the felony sentences to run consecutively to each other, with the misdemeanor sentences to run concurrently with the attempted murder sentence, for an effective sentence of forty-four years. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the attempted second degree murder conviction, and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, James Dewey Jensen, Jr., of a seventh offense of driving under the influence, theft of identity, and violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. The sole issue presented by the defendant in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the vehicle stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jason Allen Mobley, appeals as of right from the Henry County Circuit Court's revoking his eight-year probation. The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously revoked his probation without sufficient proof that he was using drugs. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Joe L. Jones, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Weakley County Circuit Court. After a trial by jury, Jones was convicted of casual exchange, a class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, Jones received a split confinement sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served in the county jail followed by probation. The trial court also imposed a $500 fine. On appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of continuous confinement and that the fine was excessive. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Quawn L. Lillard, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. On appeal, he insists that the convicting evidence is not legally sufficient to support his convictions, and he claims that the trial court should not have admitted the identification testimony of one of the victims. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of driving after being declared an habitual motor vehicle offender and one count each of "third or subsequent" offense DUI, child endangerment, and vehicular assault, and it was agreed the trial court would determine the sentences. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of five years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days in incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him. We conclude the defendant was indicted for fourth offense DUI, a Class E felony; he pled guilty to the offense as charged in the indictment, yet the plea erroneously referred to the non-existent enhancement classification of "third or subsequent" offense DUI rather than fourth offense DUI; and the defendant was erroneously sentenced for a misdemeanor based upon this non-existent enhancement classification. Because the defendant's guilty plea and sentence for this offense were erroneous and his pleas to all other offenses were part of his agreement to plead guilty, we vacate all judgments of conviction and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

A Williamson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Felix M. Leach, for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In a negotiated plea agreement dated June 19, 2001, the defendant pled guilty as a Range II, multiple offender to each of the three counts of the indictment. The plea agreement specified that the three sentences would run concurrently and that all remaining sentencing issues would be determined by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the other two counts, and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to a previous sentence that he was on probation for at the time. The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the ten-year sentence for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine was excessive; and (2) whether the three sentences should be concurrent or consecutive to the sentence for which he was on probation at the time. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jerry W. Souder, pled nolo contendere to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals as of right, alleging that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence, specifically probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kevin Wilkins, filed his petition for post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court on December 6, 2001. The State filed a response moving the trial court to dismiss the petition because it was filed after the statute of limitations had expired. Without a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the State's request and dismissed the petition on the basis that it was filed past the one-year limitation set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a hearing.

Petitioner, Kenneth Smith, appeals pro se the trial court's dismissal of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which he also filed pro se. The record on appeal does not contain the transcript of the proceedings below. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Petitioner's court-appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw or that Petitioner waived the assistance of counsel on appeal. Pursuant to our holding in Drummer v. State, 6 S.W.3d 520 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999), the judgment of the trial court is vacated and this case is remanded for the trial court to reinstate the order dismissing the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. If Petitioner is still indigent, counsel appointed to represent Petitioner at the post-conviction hearing shall continue to represent Petitioner on appeal and the case shall proceed pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Defendant, Opal Gause, entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive three-year terms, for an effective sentence of six years. The sentences were suspended, and Defendant was placed on probation for the length of his original sentences. A violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging Defendant had failed to meet the conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, Defendant's probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve his original sentence with credit for time served pre-trial. Defendant now challenges the revocation of his probation. Following a review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The appellant, John Briggs, a pharmacist, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to sixteen counts of unlawfully dispensing a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with all but eight years to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying full probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.