APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Chad Daniel Easterly, pled guilty to kidnapping and evading arrest. The plea agreement included an effective eight year sentence as a Range I standard offender. The Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his convictions were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Giovanny Morpeau, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Wilson County Criminal Court. On November 2, 2001, the Appellant was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery. At the Appellant's initial appearance in the general sessions court on November 6, 2001, he was found indigent, bail was set at $50,000, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 19, 2001. On November 29, 2001, the Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from confinement upon grounds that his continued confinement beyond ten days, without being afforded a preliminary hearing, violated Rule 5(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 On November 30, 2001, the Appellant’s habeas corpus petition was denied. On December 10, 2001, the Appellant filed notice of appeal. On December 19, 2001, the Appellant's preliminary hearing was conducted in the general sessions court at which time he was bound over to the next term of the grand jury. During the January 2002 session of the Wilson County Criminal Court, the Appellant was indicted by the grand jury on one count of aggravated robbery.

The Henry County Grand Jury indicted the fifteen-year-old Defendant for first degree murder. The Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of the charged offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that his insanity defense was established by clear and convincing evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of conviction, modify the judgment to “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,” and remand for further proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 33-7-303.

Given the present state of the law, I respectfully disagree with the result reached in the majority opinion. I believe that it was the jury’s prerogative to discredit some or all of the defendant’s experts’ testimony and to conclude that their testimony did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to Class D felony forgery and Class D felony theft for an agreed effective six-year sentence with the issue of alternative sentencing to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the defendant contests the denial of community corrections. We affirm.

This case arises from commercial property leases. The defendants operated a late night dance club on premises leased from the plaintiff. The plaintiff landlord unilaterally terminated the leases, changed the locks, and filed suit to recover for damage to the premises. While several pretrial motions were pending, the trial court scheduled the final hearing. The trial court found that the defendant tenants had a week-to-week oral lease and that the tenants violated the lease by engaging in illegal activity on the premises. On appeal, the defendant tenants argue that they were not given sufficient notice prior to the final hearing. We affirm, because the record does not show that the issues raised on appeal were presented to the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of Class D felony theft over $1,000 and was sentenced to the community corrections program for an effective period of three years. The trial court subsequently revoked his community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of four years on each count as a Range I standard offender, for an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the proof was insufficient to revoke his community corrections sentence; and (2) the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for facilitation of aggravated rape, facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, raising three claims: (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; (2) that his guilty plea was involuntary; and (3) that the indictment was fatally defective. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant of burglary and theft under $500. He received consecutive sentences of 10 years as a Range III offender and 11 months and 29 days, respectively. The defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the state to present a property receipt into evidence in lieu of coins found in the defendant's possession; (3) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a will contest coupled with a suit to construe the same will. The trial court granted summary judgment to the proponent on the will contest and summary judgment to the contestants on the will construction issues. We hold that the issues cannot be resolved on summary judgment and reverse the trial court.

The defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of sale of schedule II narcotics for agreed concurrent sentences of four years for each count, with the issue of alternative sentencing to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to four years incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends he should have received alternative sentencing. We affirm.

The petitioner, Michael O. Brown, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief. In his post-conviction petition, he challenged his 1996 conviction of selling cocaine by alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because the record supports the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm.

I agree with the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with its view of the trial court’s limiting the issues raised by the petitioner. The majority opinion states that the record reflects that the petitioner abandoned issues that were not mentioned at the beginning of the hearing. The majority concludes that the trial court’s request that his attorney define the issues in contention, the attorney’s response, and the state’s objection for lack of notice justified the trial court’s sustaining the state’s objection regarding the Jencks Act issue. I view neither the record nor the trial court’s discretion  to authorize the trial court’s actions regarding this issue.

The petitioner appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, contending that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; (2) the post-conviction court erred by refusing to admit the affidavit of a deceased potential defense witness into evidence at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing; and (3) the post-conviction court and post-conviction counsel erred by their failure to comply with provisions of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and Supreme Court Rule 28. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

Elizabeth Ann Baker ("Plaintiff") is a school teacher. Plaintiff sued Steve Shepard, the principal of her school, and Sheila Pryor, another teacher. Plaintiff also sued Merrol Hyde, the director of Sumner County Schools, and Jeff Helbig, the school system's assistant director. Plaintiff claimed the four defendants ("Defendants") were liable for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. In addition to her Answer, Pryor filed a Counter-Complaint against Plaintiff for slander. All four Defendants filed Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) Motions to Dismiss. The Trial Court granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss but did not address Pryor's pending Counter-Complaint. Plaintiff appeals. Because the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment under Tenn. R. App. P. 3, we dismiss and remand.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Shannon Lee Wood, was convicted of the July 4, 1999 aggravated child abuse of his eighteen-month-old stepdaughter, for which he received a 20-year sentence as a violent offender. Now on appeal, the defendant's sole issue is whether the convicting evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. It is, and we affirm.

This appeal arises from two detainer warrants issued on behalf of appellee Gallatin Housing
Authority (hereinafter, "GHA"), in the General Sessions Court for Sumner County against the
appellants, public housing tenants. The cases were consolidated when appellants appealed to the Circuit Court of Sumner County. The Circuit Court entered an order restoring possession of the properties to GHA, finding that the termination of the leases was based on the appellants' theft of cable services, a lease violation that was not eligible for certain grievance procedures that might otherwise be necessary for the termination of a public housing lease. After appealing the Circuit Court's decision, appellants obtained a stay which allowed them to remain in possession of the properties while their case was pending. Shortly thereafter, appellants entered into new leases with GHA. These new leases contained no terms reserving GHA's right to evict appellants in the event that their appeal failed. We find that the new leases extinguished GHA’s right to evict the appellants for their breach of the prior lease. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this cause with instructions to vacate its order restoring possession to GHA, and to dismiss GHA's cause against the appellants.

This case involves a juvenile's appeal from an adjudication of delinquency. The jury found that the juvenile was guilty of disorderly conduct as a result of his actions at the Tipton County School Board building. The jury also found the juvenile guilty of assault and resisting arrest due to his actions in the Juvenile Court of Tipton County. We affirm the jury's verdict.

The defendant, Gregory W. Gurley, pursues an appeal of a certified question of law in the wake of his guilty plea and resulting conviction of second-offense driving under the influence (DUI). In his reservation of a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of an intoximeter test; he posits that the test results are inadmissible because the officer who administered the test failed to comply with the "20-minute" requirement for breath-alcohol testing that was established in State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). Because the record supports the trial court's denial of the suppression motion, we affirm.

The trial court placed the defendant on probation for eight years. As a condition of probation, the defendant was required to complete a one-year drug rehabilitation program. When the defendant violated his probation by failing to complete the program and failing to report to his probation officer upon his discharge from the program, the State filed a probation violation report with the court. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.