APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for full probation, I write separately to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in not imposing some form of alternative sentencing such as split confinement. Additionally, if the trial court had abused its discretion in not imposing some form of alternative sentencing, I disagree with the majority’s decision to impose a sentence of split-confinement and conclude that the appropriate remedy would be to remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing especially in light of the majority’s finding that the trial court abused its discretion in by not considering the Strong R Assessment.

The petitioner, Darius Jones, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, John Calvin Murray, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his “Motion for Rule 36 Clerical Mistakes” and denial of his motion to reconsider, which he argues should be liberally construed as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that he was not awarded all the credits for time served in the community corrections program to which he was entitled. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we dismiss the appeal. 

This appeal arose from a personal injury action. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a statement of material facts in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. The plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment but failed to respond to the separate statement of material facts. As a result of the plaintiff’s failure to respond to the statement of material facts, the Trial Court deemed those facts as stated by the defendant as admitted and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant upon its determination that the defendant had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A preferred service employee appealed the termination of his employment. After failing to obtain relief at the Step I or Step II reviews, the employee requested a Step III hearing before the Board of Appeals. At the conclusion of the employee’s proof, the state agency moved for an involuntary dismissal. The Board of Appeals found the employee had failed to present sufficient evidence to show a right to relief. The Board dismissed the appeal and upheld the dismissal decision. The employee sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no basis to reverse or modify the Board’s decision, we also affirm.  

An inmate filed a complaint alleging theft against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction and against the prison Warden. The Commissioner and the Warden moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motion. We have determined that the trial court failed to provide reasons for the dismissal of the complaint. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand.

A collecting bank sued the drawer of a check, claiming that the drawer stopped payment on the check with fraudulent intent. The general sessions court, as well as the circuit court on de novo appeal, ruled in favor of the drawer. The bank argues that, because it was a holder in due course, the drawer was still liable on the check despite the stop-payment order. And it seeks an award of interest, court costs, attorney’s fees, and treble damages from the drawer, contending that the proof showed the drawer acted with fraudulent intent. We affirm the dismissal of the claim based on the drawer’s alleged fraudulent intent, but we vacate the dismissal of any claim based on the drawer’s obligation on the check.

The Defendant, Michael Broyles, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of four counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(a)(2) (2018). The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and imposed the sentences concurrently. The court ordered split confinement consisting of ninety days’ jail service followed by probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the animal cruelty statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in denying judicial diversion, (4) the court erred in imposing a sentence involving confinement, and (5) the court erred in imposing fines and restitution without making the appropriate factual findings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff employee appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on her claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. We affirm, as modified, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. 

This appeal concerns a real estate transaction that fell through. The Estate of Katherine N. Mounger (“the Estate”), as well as executors Katherine M. Lasater and E. Jay Mounger (“Defendants,” collectively), seek reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) whereby they were ordered to return $150,000 in earnest money to Nelson E. Bowers, II (“Plaintiff”), successor in interest to would-be purchaser of the property at issue, McKenzie Loudon Properties, LLC (“MLP”). Defendants appeal to this Court, arguing, among other things, that MLP first materially breached the contract for sale (“the Agreement”) by failing to perform a title examination and failing to notify it of a defect in title stemming from oral claims of ownership made by Charles Mounger. However, we find, as did the Trial Court, that the Estate had actual notice of the defect in title. Further, it was the Estate, rather than MLP, that materially breached the Agreement by failing to provide marketable title. Aside from an award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees incurred on an earlier appeal in this matter which Plaintiff did not request from this Court in that earlier appeal, which we reverse, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for an award to Plaintiff of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on this appeal as requested.

After the trial court found that a scrivener’s error mistakenly listed the incorrect grantee on a warranty deed, it reformed the deed to list the correct grantee. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a denial of relief pursuant to a common law writ of certiorari arising out of a dependency and neglect case brought by Father against Mother in the juvenile court. The Guardian ad Litem appointed in the dependency and neglect case filed a motion to compel Mother to release copies of her mental health records, arguing that she is entitled to them under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-411. In turn, Mother objected, arguing that her records are privileged, that she had not waived her privilege, and that the Guardian ad Litem was not otherwise entitled to the records. The juvenile court issued an order compelling Mother to release copies of her mental health records to the Guardian ad Litem. Mother thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the circuit court, seeking review of the juvenile court’s interlocutory order. The circuit court found the juvenile court’s actions proper under the writ of certiorari standard and granted Mother no relief. For the reasons contained herein, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and find that Mother is entitled to the relief sought under the common law writ of certiorari.

This case involves an alleged breach of a lease following the destruction of the building on the leased premises by the November 2016 Gatlinburg wildfires. The original lessor had entered into a lease in 2009 with the lessee, a company that had utilized the building primarily as a storage facility for its restaurants during the lease term. The lessor died in 2017. Acting in her own capacity and as personal representative of her mother’s estate, the lessor’s daughter filed a complaint in July 2019, alleging that the lessee had breached the lease by failing to utilize fire insurance proceeds to restore the building. The plaintiff requested that she be awarded a judgment for either the fair market value of the leased premises or the amount of the fire insurance proceeds. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court found that the lease required the lessee to utilize fire insurance proceeds to make repairs only in the event that those repairs could be made within ten working days, which was undisputedly impossible following the fire. The trial court also found that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-7-102(b), the lessee’s covenant to leave the leased premises in good repair did not obligate the lessee to restore the building absent fault, negligence, or an express agreement to the contrary. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. The petition was filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The trial court granted the petition, finding multiple grounds for termination were established and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The Defendant, Vernon Lee Ivey, pled guilty in the Campbell County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property valued over $2,500, a Class D felony; burglary, a Class D felony; two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $2,500, a Class E felony; one count of automobile burglary, a Class E felony; and four counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by misclassifying him as a career offender for the Class D and E felonies, by imposing an excessive sentence, and by ordering a sentence of confinement rather than probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentences as imposed by the trial court.

Tyler Ward Enix, Defendant, was indicted for three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of carjacking. The trial court dismissed the kidnapping and carjacking counts at the State’s request. After a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of felony murder. The jury found Defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery. After the jury deadlocked on a sentence for first degree murder, the trial court imposed a life sentence. After a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence for especially aggravated robbery. The trial court denied a motion for new trial and this appeal followed. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) the State made improper statements during closing argument; (3) the State made improper statements during opening statements; (4) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting multiple photographs of the victim’s body; (6) the trial court erred by denying a motion for change of venue; (7) the trial court erred in refusing to give a definition of passion to the jury; and (8) cumulative errors After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The Defendant, William Alan Ladd, appeals his convictions for aggravated sexual battery and sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, for which he received an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior statement by the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arose from an order of the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determining that the decedent’s purported will did not meet the statutory requirements for proper execution of a last will and testament and that the decedent’s estate would therefore be probated as an intestate administration. The decedent’s surviving spouse had first attempted to probate the will via common form probate,1 alleging that the purported will met the statutory requirements for a holographic will. However, upon the decedent’s son’s motion to contest the proffered will in common form, the trial court determined that the purported will did not meet the statutory requirements of a holographic will pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-105. The trial court further instructed that the decedent’s estate would proceed as an intestate estate.

A property owner shot and injured a trespassing dog. The dog’s owner, a family member, and an unrelated party posted negative comments about the property owner during his campaign for public office. After losing the election, the property owner and his wife sued the three individuals for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The defendants filed a countercomplaint seeking damages for trespass to chattels, conversion, negligence, and trespass. The trial court dismissed all claims. The court also issued a restraining order enjoining the parties from making public comments about each other. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the property owner was a public figure when the allegedly defamatory statements were published. But because we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleged actual malice, we reverse the dismissal of the defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims. We further conclude that the countercomplaint stated a cause of action for trespass to chattels, conversion, negligence, and trespass. So we reverse the dismissal of those counterclaims. We also vacate the restraining order.

This case involves a divorce action and several motions for contempt. Prior to the final hearing, the wife filed multiple motions for civil and criminal contempt against the husband. At the final hearing, the trial court resolved the divorce-related issues and found the husband in civil contempt on eight counts. The husband only appealed the trial court’s contempt ruling. We affirm the trial court’s decision, award the wife attorney’s fees on appeal, and remand.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Defendant, Bobby Joe Patrick, of two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of sixty-seven years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts that should have been excluded pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on “generic evidence.” After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal arises from the modification of a parenting plan in a post-divorce action, upon a petition filed by the minor child’s mother. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that there was a material change of circumstances under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) and 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) and that modification of the parenting schedule and of primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order.  

The Defendant, Demon L. Adkins, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possessing contraband in a penal institution, and he received an effective fifteen-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his convictions are invalid because the indictment erroneously stated the incorrect mens rea and because the verdict forms and jury instructions conflated the crime of possessing contraband in a penal institution and introducing contraband into a penal institution. He also asserts that the savings statute operates to entitle him to a lesser punishment. We conclude that he is not entitled to reversal of his convictions but that the savings statute applies to provide a lesser penalty. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed, the sentences are reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing. 

The Defendant, Thomas Byrd, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to sell/deliver within 1000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony; possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance (marijuana), possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance (Alprazolam), and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance (oxycodone), all Class A misdemeanors; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his person and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the felony convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A father filed a petition to modify his monthly child support payments. Due to several delays, the trial court did not resolve the father’s petition for approximately four years. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court drastically reduced the father’s monthly support obligation and ordered the modification effective as of the last day of the modification hearing. The father appeals the trial court’s decision not to make the modification retroactive to the date the petition to modify was filed. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.