APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I am unable to join with the majority in affirming dismissal of the petition upon grounds that it was time-barred.

The petitioner, El Paso Pitts, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and argues that the trial court erred by allowing his trial counsel to be present during the evidentiary hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In 1992, pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell a Schedule I controlled substance, received an eight-year sentence, and was granted full probation. In 1998, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Tennessee Department of Correction subsequently placed the Defendant in the special alternative incarceration unit program, and upon the Defendant's successful completion of the boot camp program, released the Defendant on supervision. A warrant was issued on September 6, 2000, alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of his release. The trial court revoked the Defendant's release and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that because more than eight calendar years had passed from the date of his original sentence on July 10, 1992 to the date of the violation of probation warrant that was filed on September 6, 2000, the original eight-year probated sentence had expired. We conclude that because the service of the Defendant's eight-year sentence began on April 3, 1998, when his probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve the sentence, the sentence had not expired, and the September 6 warrant was thus timely. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, the Defendant filed a post-conviction petition, and the trial court denied relief. However, on post-conviction appeal, this Court determined that the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and therefore reversed the trial court's decision, vacated the Defendant's conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. The Defendant was tried a second time in 2000 before a Shelby County jury, and on this occasion, the jury found the Defendant guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction, and (2) that he was improperly sentenced. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict and thus affirm the Defendant's conviction. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant and therefore we remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of DUI. After stipulating to two prior DUI convictions, he was sentenced for third offense DUI to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served in the county jail. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant was driving while intoxicated as charged in the indictment. Furthermore, the trial court permissibly ordered the defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-two (22) years as a Range I standard offender. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Although the defendant put on proof that he was acting in self-defense or that any irrational actions were the result of adequate provocation by the victim, both issues are questions for the jury and were resolved in favor of the State. The defendant failed to make an argument or cite to authority in support of his assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defendant's right to bear arms. In addition, there is no record of the defendant's request for such an instruction or the trial court's denial of such request. Therefore, the issue is waived. After a de novo review, we conclude that the trial court followed the correct sentencing procedure and applied the correct statutory enhancing and mitigating factors in sentencing the defendant to twenty-two (22) years. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Sylvester Ford, was tried by jury and found guilty of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I offender. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The defendant now brings this appeal, alleging that he should receive a new trial because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the state to elect which acts the jury should consider to support the defendant's indicted offenses. The defendant subsequently filed a writ of error coram nobis, and the trial court denied the defendant's petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed and did not allege information that would warrant a new trial. After reviewing the record, we find that the defendant's direct appeal claim has merit and warrants a new trial, and, therefore, we need not address the merits of the defendant's coram nobis petition.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the defendant stipulated to the violation at the revocation hearing. Furthermore, the defendant had actual notice of an alleged violation based on two positive drug screens. Therefore, the court properly found a probation violation on that basis. Finally, the defendant's failure to pay court costs and restitution as ordered by the court was not due to an inability to pay but was a willful refusal to pay. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.