APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jenny Bea Huffstetler, pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, one count of misdemeanor assault, and one count of theft under $500. For these offenses, the Defendant received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender. Her sentence was suspended and she was placed on intensive probation. Following a hearing on allegations that the Defendant had violated the terms of her probation, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve nine months in jail and the balance of her sentence on community corrections. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I fully concur in the majority decision but feel compelled to write separately to respond to the dissent’s characterization of the majority’s decision in State v. Workman, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001), as a “hastily considered decision – one brought on by the pressures of extraordinary circumstances – and it cannot be justified as a logical or natural progression of the law.” To the contrary, from even a cursory reading it is clear that the majority decision in Workman resulted from a principled application of established law to the facts of a particular case. The dissent’s claim that the majority opinion in Workman is not founded in logic or prior law is easily dispelled by simply considering the language of the opinion itself, rather than the dissent’s hyperbole. In concluding that consideration of Workman’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis was not foreclosed by the statute of limitations, the majority meticulously applied the due process balancing test outlined in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992), Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000), and Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). In so holding, we stated as follows: As in Burford, to determine whether due process requires tolling in this case, we must consider the governmental interests involved and the private interests affected by the official action. In this case, as in Burford, the governmental interest in asserting the statute of limitations is the prevention of stale and groundless claims. The private interest involved here is the petitioner’s opportunity to have a hearing on the grounds of newly discovered evidence which may have resulted in a different verdict if heard by the jury at trial. If the procedural time bar is applied, Workman will be put to death without being given any opportunity to have the merits of his claim evaluated by a court of this State.

After a juvenile court transferred the petitioner's case, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the petitioner on one count of first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the petitioner stood convicted of this offense and for this conviction received a life sentence. Thereafter he unsuccessfully sought relief through a direct appeal. See State v. Mario Hawkins, No. 01C01-9701-CR-00014, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 685, at *2, *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 2, 1998). Subsequently, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel. Counsel filed an amended petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After conducting a hearing on this matter, the trial court denied the petitioner the relief requested. Through this appeal the petitioner continues to assert that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the petitioner's mental health and utilize this information as a defense to the first degree murder charge. However, after reviewing this assertion, we find it to lack merit. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction petition.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to first offense DUI, for which he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration, suspended after service of forty-eight hours; and to driving with a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license, for which he was sentenced to six months incarceration, suspended after service of forty-eight hours. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently. The Defendant was subsequently arrested for probation violation, and the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether the Defendant's probation should be revoked. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentences in custody. The Defendant appeals this decision, arguing that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated his probation and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his full sentence in custody. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing to support revocation of the Defendant's probation and that the trial court did not err by ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in custody. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and to three counts of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years incarceration for the drug conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently, but consecutive to a prior sentence. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that he was improperly sentenced. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the petitioner, Blake Edward Hallum, of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the petitioner to serve consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for his felony murder conviction and 17 years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. The petitioner appealed his convictions to this Court, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Richard Bruce Halfacre, No. 01C01-9703-CR-00083, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1117, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 29, 1998). The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, and the trial court denied his petition after a hearing on the merits. The petitioner now appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because a state's trial witness testified at the post-conviction hearing and contradicted her trial testimony, invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and/or pleaded lack of memory in response to questions about the truthfulness of her trial testimony. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find that the petitioner's claim does not merit relief.

The Defendant, Arthur J. Holmes, pled guilty to three counts of theft under $500, class A misdemeanors; two counts of theft over $500, class E felonies; six counts of forgery, class D and E felonies; and four counts of identity theft, class D felonies. The Defendant's plea agreement provided for an effective ten year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. After a hearing on the manner in which the Defendant would serve his sentence, the trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Bobby Gene Goodson, appeals as of right his Sullivan County Criminal Court conviction in case number S42,000 for driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) he has a constitutional right to travel, and (3) the trial court erred in denying his request to dismiss his trial attorney and reappoint counsel. The defendant also appeals his remaining two convictions in S42,000 for violation of the registration law and violation of the seat belt law, both Class C misdemeanors, and his conviction in case number S43,579 for driving on a suspended license. As to the defendant's appeal of his conviction for driving on a suspended license in case number S42,000, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. With regard to the remaining convictions, the defendant's appeal is dismissed because the judgments of conviction are not in the record on appeal.

The Appellant, Shawn M. Brooks, appeals from the judgment of the Wilson County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In May of 1996, Brooks pled guilty to sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and received a split confinement sentence of eight years with one year to be served in confinement followed by seven years supervised probation. Again, in May of 1999, Brooks pled guilty to sale of a counterfeit controlled substance and received a two-year suspended sentence to be served consecutively to the 1996 sentence.

On April 10, 2001, a probation violation warrant was issued for only the1996 sentence based upon a new arrest in DeKalb County for numerous offenses. At the probation violation hearing, Brooks admitted guilt, which resulted in the revocation of his sentence and the reinstatement of his original eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Thirty days later, an amended order was entered by the trial court revoking Brooks' 1999 two-year suspended sentence on the same grounds. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to revocation. After review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Brooks' 1996 conviction. However, with regard to revocation of the 1999 sentence, we find that the proceedings failed to afford fundamental due process protections. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the trial court's amended order revoking Brooks' two-year suspended sentence for sale of a counterfeit controlled substance.

The defendant, Stanley R. Fine, pled guilty to the offenses of burglary and aggravated burglary. His plea agreement provided that he would serve a four year sentence for the aggravated burglary, with one year to be served in the county jail and the balance of three years to be served in the community corrections program. With respect to the burglary charge, the plea agreement included an agreed sentence of four years to be served in the community corrections program consecutive to the sentence for aggravated burglary, resulting in an effective sentence of eight years. Following the defendant's violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence, the trial court revoked the defendant's community corrections status and ordered that the remainder of his sentence be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals the trial court's ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence. He raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury regarding the definition of "physical control" of a vehicle. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Barry F. Braden, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of six counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was ordered to serve consecutive ten year sentences for counts one, two, four, five and six, to be served concurrently with a ten-year sentence in count three, for an effective sentence of fifty years. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences, presenting the following issues for review: (1) whether the prosecutor’s inquiry on cross-examination and comments during closing argument on Defendant’s failure to submit fingerprints and his failure to take a polygraph examination constituted reversible error; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a witness’s extraneous statement at trial; (4) whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences for five of Defendant’s six convictions; and (5) whether the trial court erred by failing to sever the offenses for
trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellants, Joel Wayne Jackson and Joel Keith Russell, were each convicted in the Hardin County Circuit Court of one count of possessing more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. They were each sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the sentences to be served on supervised probation after serving ninety days in confinement. On appeal, Jackson challenges the correctness of his sentence and Russell contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

A Franklin County jury convicted the defendant of reckless driving. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. The defendant also claims that the trial court's jury instruction for reckless driving was in error. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.