APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Derrian Hill, was indicted with Co-Defendant, Miranda Barley, for aggravated kidnapping in count one and aggravated robbery in count two. Defendant then filed a Motion to Suppress the victim’s pretrial identification of Defendant, and the trial court denied the motion. Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant as charged on both counts, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of eight years’ incarceration with a one hundred percent release eligibility for count one and twelve years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility for count two. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress the victim’s pretrial identification of Defendant. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his McNairy County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a post-divorce action, in which the father filed a petition for contempt against the mother, alleging that the mother failed to pay her portion of the child’s medical expenses pursuant to the permanent parenting plan. The Trial Court denied the father’s request that the mother be held in contempt but awarded the father a judgment for the mother’s portion of the child’s medical expenses. The Trial Court declined to award attorney’s fees to the father and ordered that the mother be permitted to make installment payments to the father. We vacate the Trial Court’s order permitting the installment payments as being premature. We further modify the judgment against Mother to $38,759.11 upon our determination that the amount paid by the father to Mountain Management and Denials Management was only $1,781.76. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all other aspects.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Johnson, filed for habeas corpus relief from his convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and the accompanying total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. The Petitioner alleges that the judgments are void because he was never indicted for the offenses of which he was convicted and that the trial court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to try him or enter any judgment in his case. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Dontel Morgan, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty pleas and that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered.  Upon our review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Tharcisse John Nkurunziza, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four years to be served as ten months in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant claims that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. The State acknowledges that the trial court misapplied two of the three enhancement factors but contends that the record justifies the sentence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, the defendant, Antoine Adams, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the consecutive alignment of his sentences.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing two of the defendants. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between all of the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment

The petitioner, Melvin Hopkins, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Desiree Petty, pleaded guilty to burning personal property or land, facilitation to commit felony arson, and multiple misdemeanor offenses. The trial court sentenced her to four years of incarceration, suspended in lieu of service of twelve years of probation, and $150 monthly restitution payments. In 2010, the trial court found that she had violated her probation and extended her probation for two years. In October 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant based on allegations that she had failed to appear, failed a drug screen, and missed monthly restitution payments. At a hearing, the Defendant conceded that she failed the drug test. The trial court then, sua sponte, revisited the Defendant’s restitution and ordered her to pay an increased amount of monthly restitution. It also revoked her probation, required her to serve ninety days in jail, and returned her to probation, adding an additional year. The Defendant appeals. After review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the trial court’s judgment.

This is a consolidated appeal from judgments entered upon two post-divorce petitions filed by the mother, seeking to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan to require the father to pay an upward deviation in child support to fund private school tuition at Baylor School in Chattanooga (“Baylor”), first for the parties’ eldest of three children in one petition and then for the parties’ middle child in the second petition. The father filed an answer objecting to the expense of Baylor tuition given the parties’ respective financial situations. He also filed a counter-petition alleging that the mother had violated the joint decision-making provision in the permanent parenting plan by unilaterally enrolling the eldest child at Baylor. Although both parties sought essentially equal coparenting time, the father also requested modification of the permanent parenting plan to designate him as the primary residential parent. Each party requested sole educational decision-making authority. Following a bench trial as to the first petition, the trial court, inter alia, approved the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the prior order; maintained the mother as the primary residential parent; maintained joint decision-making authority; found that although the mother had unilaterally enrolled the eldest child at Baylor, it was in the child’s best interest to remain at the school; and found that an upward deviation in the father’s child support obligation was appropriate to fund sixty percent of the Baylor tuition for the eldest child. During a subsequent bench trial on the mother’s second petition, the Baylor financial aid director, who had testified during the first trial concerning typical financial aid awards, testified that neither of the children at issue had been awarded financial aid for the upcoming year. The trial court sua sponte amended its prior order to reduce the upward deviation in the father’s child support obligation to fifty percent of the Baylor tuition for the eldest child and to eliminate the father’s responsibility for any extracurricular expenses at Baylor. The trial court entered a separate judgment dismissing the mother’s petition as to the middle child but including a provision that the mother would be allowed to enroll the middle child at Baylor or another private school provided that the father was not 1 Upon the appellant’s motions, this Court entered an order on August 18, 2020, consolidating the appellant’s appeal in case number E2020-00712-COA-R3-CV with this appeal. 04/30/2021 - 2 - responsible for any portion of the tuition. The trial court incorporated its rulings into a modified permanent parenting plan that included a prohibition against enrollment of the third child in private school absent agreement of the parties or a subsequent court order. The father has appealed both judgments. Having determined that the upward deviation in child support for the eldest child should be capped at no more than fifty percent of the 2020-2021 Baylor tuition amount testified to at the time of trial, we modify the deviation to equal the lesser of (a) $13,200.00 annually or (b) fifty percent of the current annual Baylor tuition each year for the eldest child after deduction of proceeds from scholarships, grants, stipends, or other cost-reducing programs received by or on behalf of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects and deny the father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

Plaintiff filed suit for damages alleging that she had been injured when the headstone at her deceased brother’s grave fell on her and broke bones in her hand. After Defendant, the installer of the headstone, moved for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. On appeal, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing Plaintiff’s claim which is based on Defendant’s alleged negligence in installing the headstone.

Tommy Taylor, Defendant, was sentenced in Case No. RD 10835 to one year in split confinement followed by service of the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Defendant violated the rules of the institution where he was confined by being involved in two violent incidents with another inmate and one violent incident with a guard. The State moved to revoke Defendant’s community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lynn Frank Bristol, Defendant, was indicted by the Coffee County Grand Jury for “sexual battery and rape of a child” for incidents involving his step-daughter. Nearly three years later, and three days prior to trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to reflect a charge of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and to amend the dates encompassed in the indictment in both Count One and Count Two. Defendant objected to the amendment and asked for a continuance. The trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment and denied a continuance. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count Two. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent. Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment; (2) that the trial court erred by denying a continuance; (3) that the trial court improperly relied on State v. Qualls, 482 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2016), for a variety of reasons, including failing to give an enhanced unanimity instruction; (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and (5) that the sentence is excessive. Because we determine that the trial court erred by failing to submit the complete written charge to the jury, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c), the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant, Aaron Evan Perry, was convicted by a jury of three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card of an amount of $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105(a)(1), -118(b). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to time served. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that a Belk department store loss prevention manager acted as an agent of the State when he seized the Defendant’s identification card and credit card, that the police conducted a pretextual traffic stop of the Defendant to investigate the Belk incident, and that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not justified as a search incident to arrest or inventory search; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by admitting information generated by a hand-held credit card scanner without an adequate foundation; and (4) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card instead of fraudulent use of a credit card. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions and that reversible error occurred when the trial court mistakenly instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card. As a result, we remand the case for the entry of amended judgments reflecting the new conviction offenses of attempted theft, a Class B misdemeanor. In addition, in the interest of judicial economy, we modify the sentence in each count to reflect concurrent sentences of six months and apply to the Defendant’s two years of jail credit to satisfy his sentences.

The defendant, Carlos Dewatherdo Ferguson, Jr., appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the State’s duty to preserve evidence; and the trial court erred by imposing a mid-range sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Kevion McDonald, Defendant, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both counts as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-one years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Defendant initiated this appeal, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly admitted a photographic lineup into evidence; (2) committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of premeditation; and (3) improperly sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years in incarceration for attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with the definition of premeditation, an element of the offense of attempted first degree murder. However, we find the error harmless because the proof of premeditation was overwhelming. As a result, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This case concerns a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from a final judgment in a suit for dissolution of a business partnership. The trial court found grounds for dissolving the partnership and ordered the parties to liquidate the partnership’s assets. Each party would be liable for his or her pro-rata share of any outstanding debt. Before any accounting was filed, the defendant began representing herself, and at the instruction of the court, she informed the clerk and opposing counsel of her address. Soon thereafter, Defendant moved to a different address but never informed the clerk or opposing counsel of the change of her address. Consequently, the defendant did not receive notice of the plaintiff’s motion to adopt his proposed final accounting or the order granting such motion. The final order awarded the plaintiff a judgment against the defendant for her share of the outstanding debts that plaintiff had paid. When the defendant discovered the judgment against her, she filed a motion for relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The trial court denied the motion, finding there was no “mistake” because plaintiff’s counsel sent notice to the defendant’s last known address. This appeal followed. We affirm.

In 2020, the Defendant, Rickey Benson, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jimmie Liddell, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; and one count of solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2018) (solicitation of a person under eighteen years of age). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 110 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. She challenges the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This case involves claims brought under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, along with other related claims. After a two-day trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them treble damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants appealed. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Javier Alexander Rivas (“Defendant Rivas”) and Hayden S. Fryer (“Defendant Fryer”) (or collectively “the Defendants”) were each convicted by a Davidson County jury for first degree felony murder, first degree premediated murder, attempted aggravated burglary, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, burglary of an automobile, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, for which the trial court sentenced both Defendant Rivas and Defendant Fryer to a total effective sentence of life plus fifty-two years. On appeal, Defendant Rivas argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of offenses; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Fryer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted aggravated burglary. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Damon Johnson, of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, argues the trial court improperly commented on his right not to testify, and asserts the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Adam Moates, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.