APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Courtney Anderson, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury on multiple counts of theft of property, forgery, and one count of misdemeanor possession of a handgun. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Anderson pled guilty to a reduced number of the charged offenses and was sentenced to an extended term in the Department of Correction. The resulting convictions reflect Class C, D and E grade felony offenses. The trial court found Anderson to be a career offender for all convictions and ordered consecutive sentences. In this appeal, Anderson contends that the effective sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. After review, we find that Anderson's designation as a career offender for the Class C felony convictions was in error. Furthermore, we are unable to reconcile the effective sentence pronounced by the trial court with the sentences reflected by the judgment of conviction documents presented on appeal. Accordingly, we remand for clarification or correction of the sentence imposed and for resentencing on the Class C felony convictions.

The Defendant, Luke B. Cole, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in the shooting death of David Burson. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, violent offender to twenty years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling admissible certain photographs of the victim; that the trial court erred in admitting certain rebuttal evidence submitted by the State; and that his sentence is excessive. Finding no reversible error in the Defendant’s trial, we affirm his conviction. Finding that the trial court erred
in sentencing the Defendant, we modify his sentence to seventeen years.

The defendant and his four co-defendants were indicted for the aggravated robbery of a convenience store in Memphis. He was convicted of this offense, while a co-defendant was convicted for robbery. The defendant was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appealed his conviction, asserting as the single assignment of error that the verdicts were inconsistent, and, therefore, his conviction could not stand. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Robert A. Cummins, was convicted of first degree felony murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to any lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder. Because the trial court erred by not charging the jury with the lesser included offenses of felony murder, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Jerry Ray Simpson of driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred by failing to strike an alternate juror for cause due to his employment as a police officer in an adjacent jurisdiction. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Lawrence Douglas, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of attempted first degree murder, both Class A felonies. He was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction at 100% and a concurrent sentence of twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, as a Range I, standard offender, for an effective sentence of twenty years. The defendant challenges: (1) the ruling of the trial court excluding testimony of the defendant's grandmother concerning his childhood and (2) his sentences. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgments in order that the appropriate classes of the convictions may be indicated on the judgments.

The defendant was convicted of second degree murder for a shooting which occurred during a birthday outing at a nightclub and was sentenced to confinement for twenty years. He appealed, raising as issues, that the trial court erred: (1) in not correctly instructing the jury as to reasonable doubt; (2) in admitting proof of another bad act of the defendant; (3) in not allowing impeachment with prior convictions of a prosecution witness; (4) in allowing proof as to a prior consistent statement; and (5) in requiring the defendant to show his teeth to the jury. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of conviction of the trial court.

The petitioner, currently represented by the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, was originally convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. The petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1998). After the filing of a post-conviction relief petition, the post-conviction court granted the state's request to disqualify the Post-Conviction Defender since a member of the Post-Conviction Defender Commission was related to the victim of the crime. In this interlocutory appeal, the petitioner argues: (1) there is no conflict of interest; and (2) if a conflict exists, it can be waived. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that (1) there is no actual conflict, and (2) any alleged impropriety may be waived by the petitioner after full disclosure. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The sole issue in this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence of unlawful sexual penetration of the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing hearing following his trial in which he was convicted of second degree murder. Specifically, he argues that trial counsel should have presented evidence of his youth and mental condition. The petitioner appealed after being denied relief by the post-conviction court. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant takes issue with the trial court's imposition of split confinement for her conviction of theft over $10,000. Based upon our review, we affirm the sentence imposed.

This is apparently a case of first impression. The appellant, W. Jess Waltman, filed a petition in the trial court seeking to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Gloria Eleanor Franklin ("the decedent"). The will, dated "July 7 93," directs that the appellant and his wife, Terry Waltman, are to receive the decedent's estate "in case I die on my way to & from Jersey." The trial court held that the will was not eligible for probate because it was a conditional will and the specified condition or contingency, i.e., Ms. Franklin's demise "on the way to & from Jersey," had not occurred. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to eighteen years as a violent offender. He appealed, presenting as his single issue the claim that the evidence at trial was not sufficient for the finding of guilt. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of aggravated sexual battery by a Shelby County jury. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect his right to be tried within one hundred eighty days under the Interstate Compact on Detainers. The petition was denied by the post-conviction court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Ricky R. Bowen, is charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The state was granted an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order dismissing the second "count" of the indictment by which the defendant was subjected to enhanced minimum sentencing as a second time offender. The issue presented is whether a conviction for the first DUI offense must precede the commission of the second offense before a defendant may be convicted of DUI, second offense. We hold that the conviction must only precede the second conviction, not the second offense.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the included offense of simple assault in two counts and the jury assessed fines of $5,000 for each count. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 11 months and 29 days on each count to run concurrently. The sentence was suspended except for 12 days to be served consecutively or six consecutive weekends. The fines were remitted to $500 for each count. In this direct appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the jury and court erred in finding Defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, in two counts of simple assault based upon the sufficiency of evidence. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's two convictions for simple assault. Thus, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Mario Lambert, appeals as of right from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He asserts that his sentence is illegal because the trial court was without authority to sentence him as a Range I, standard offender with a release eligibility of thirty percent for the offense of second degree murder. We hold that the trial court was without authority to sentence the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender with a thirty percent release eligibility for the offense of second degree murder. Therefore, based on our review of the record on appeal, it appears that the sentence imposed is an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we remand this case to the criminal court of Shelby County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Stephen Michael Ware, pled guilty to driving under the influence (third offense), driving on a revoked license (second offense), felony evading arrest, resisting arrest and felony failure to appear. The plea agreement provided for consecutive sentences of one year each for felony evading arrest and felony failure to appear. All other sentences were to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of two years. The trial court ordered a sentence of split confinement, consisting of 270 days in jail, two years of house arrest, on one felony and a consecutive sentence of two years' house arrest for the second felony. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court imposed sentences in contravention of the plea agreement and contends that the jail sentence of 270 days, day-for-day, is excessive. The felony evading arrest sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in conformance with the plea agreement

At the conclusion of a probation revocation hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve six (6) years at thirty percent (30%) in the Department of Correction for the sale of cocaine. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to sentence him in accordance with the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the revocation of Defendant's probation and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Defendant confined per his original sentence. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Hershell Lee Kinnaird, was convicted by a jury in 1989 of accessory before the fact to first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the former conviction and to a concurrent ten year term for the latter conviction. The Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Kinnaird, 823 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In this post-conviction proceeding the Defendant contends that the State violated his constitutional rights by withholding exculpatory evidence; that the post-conviction court erred by not granting his motion for state-funded experts; that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and that the trial court committed several instances of plain error violating his right to a fair trial and/or due process. Finding the Defendant's allegations to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days in the Coffee County jail with Defendant to serve 90 days before being released to probation for the offense of simple possession of a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, plus a fine of $1,000. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts: (1) That the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sentence the Defendant to judicial diversion provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313; (2) Whether the trial court properly weighed the mitigating factors presented by Defendant in the sentencing hearing?; and (3) Whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence? After a review of the entire record, briefs of parties, oral arguments and applicable law, we find the trial court
abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion and remand for a judgment of judicial diversion.  Thus, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and remanded.