APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was indicted for attempted especially aggravated robbery, and a Shelby County jury subsequently convicted the defendant as charged. In this appeal, the defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the conviction.

The Defendant, Ralph Phillips, appeals as of right from the sentence imposed by the trial court, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his request for community corrections. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Daniel L. Scott, entered a best interest guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of animal fighting, one count of cruelty to animals, and one count of keeping unvaccinated dogs. The trial court sentenced the appellant to incarceration in the Shelby County workhouse for one year for the animal fighting conviction, six months for the animal cruelty conviction, and thirty days for the keeping unvaccinated dogs conviction. The trial court further ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. The appellant requested probation, which request the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Anthony E. Brasfield, appeals from the dismissal by the Weakley County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Brasfield asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to preserve in his direct appeal the issues of (1) the trial court's suppression of his confession to the police and (2) the trial court's failure to charge misdemeanor escape as a lesser-included offense of felony escape. With regard to the first issue, we find that although trial counsel was deficient, no prejudice resulted. With regard to Brasfield's second issue, we find that misdemeanor escape is not a lesser-included offense of felony escape; therefore, no error occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Margo Ellis, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit Court's judgment revoking her sentence of community corrections. Following revocation, Ellis' three-year sentence was ordered to be served in the Department of Correction. At the time of Ellis' indictment and on the date her guilty plea was entered, the trial judge who presided at Ellis' revocation hearing was employed as an assistant district attorney in the same office that prosecuted Ellis. On appeal, Ellis raises one issue for our review: Whether "the trial court erred by neglecting to disqualify himself from presiding over [her] revocation hearing." After review, we find no error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant, Bobby J. Armstrong, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Armstrong's convictions stem from his guilty pleas to two counts of felony murder and two resulting consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, Armstrong raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing to determine Armstrong's mental condition. After review, we find Armstrong's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and that he received effective assistance of counsel. As such, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

The Defendant, Jimmy Wardel Glenn, was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to deliver over .5 grams of cocaine. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after a comment made by the State during its opening statement and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee as to whether the trial court erred in granting the Appellee/Defendant's motion to award program credits toward his release date from the Department of Corrections. After docketing of this case on May 8, 2001, for disposition of the State's appeal, the State filed a motion to consider post-judgment fact pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedures 14(a). After a review of the motion and the attached affidavit in support of the motion, we granted the State's motion. After a review of the entire record, and the motion for post-judgment of fact, we find that the Defendant has been released from the Department of Corrections and, thus, this appeal is dismissed.

A Cocke County grand jury indicted the petitioner on four counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. On November 28, 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to all six counts. Following a sentencing hearing, he received twelve years on each aggravated robbery and six years on each aggravated assault. The trial court then ran some of the sentences consecutively resulting in an effective sentence of thirty years as a Range I, standard offender. On direct appeal this Court modified the sentence to twenty-four years. State v. Gregory Scott Caudill, No. 03C01-9510-CC-00338, 1997 WL 7009 at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, January 9, 1997). The petitioner's application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied. Thereafter, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging errors made with regard to his plea. Counsel was appointed to assist him; an amended petition was filed; and the trial court conducted a hearing thereon. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. Through this appeal the petitioner avers that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his plea. More particularly, he alleges that the trial court did not advise him of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties that he could potentially receive. After reviewing the record, we find that the petitioner's specific claim lacks merit. However, through its brief the State observes that constitutionally mandated advice concerning the petitioner's confrontation rights was not provided by the trial court in its colloquy at the time of the petitioner's plea. Therefore, the State requests that this Court remand the case for a hearing to determine if this omission was harmless. We agree and remand the matter for this purpose.

The defendant appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court conviction and sentence for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and 29 days, with a six-month period of confinement, 45 days of which had to be served in continuous confinement. After the six-month confinement period, the defendant would serve the balance of the sentence on supervised probation. The trial court approved a $1,200 fine recommended by the jury. In this direct appeal, the defendant complains that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court committed reversible error in the guilt phase by allowing the jury to be informed that the defendant previously had been convicted of DUI, and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a conforming judgment.

The Petitioner pled guilty to first degree felony murder and to forgery, receiving concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and one year's incarceration, respectively. The Petitioner subsequently petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals this decision. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his pleas of guilty, causing him to enter his pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation was not deficient and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Defendant, Wheatley Jamar Graham, III, was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon in commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-four (24) years incarceration as a Range I offender for two counts of attempted first degree murder, 4.5 years incarceration for three counts of aggravated assault and 1.9 years for possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently, but merged two counts of aggravated assault with the two counts of attempted first degree murder. In this appeal as of right Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict Defendant of attempted first degree murder in counts 3 and 4 of the indictment; (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence that Defendant refused to permit law enforcement officers to obtain a "hand swab" from him; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not dismissing Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in counts 7 and 8 instead of merging these convictions with counts 3 and 4, attempted first degree murder, as being in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. We conclude that the evidence in this record supports Defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling Defendant's refusal for hand swabs was admissible and the trial court's merging of the two counts of aggravated assault with the attempted first degree murder conviction was not double jeopardy. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brian Bottoms, Sr., and Amy Bottoms have appealed from the judgment of the Juvenile
Court, terminating their parental rights in respect to Brian Scott Bottoms, aged 7, Israel Vaughn
Bottoms, aged 5, and Elijah Keane Bottoms, aged 2, and placing them in the legal guardianship
of AGAPE with the right to place them for adoption.

This is a post-divorce custody proceeding. Jean Kelly Fisher Wallace (“mother”) was
granted a divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby County from Richard Edward Wallace
(“father”) in May, 1992. Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ minor child, Caroline. In
April, 1995, father filed a petition to change legal custody from mother to father. Following a
bench trial, the court denied the relief sought by father and permitted custody to remain with
mother. The court delayed its decision for six months, principally to allow mother the
opportunity to make changes in two aspects of her life: (1) the neighborhood in which she and
the minor child had been living for slightly over a year and (2) her ongoing association and
relationship with her boyfriend. The trial court felt both aspects were detrimental to the welfare
of the parties’ child.

The captioned executors filed this suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of 88
year old Leslie H. Little, deceased, who lost his life in a motor vehicle collision at the
intersection of North Main Street and Colloredo Boulevard in Shelbyville, Bedford County,
Tennessee. Movement of traffic through the intersection was controlled by the multicolored
lights of an ordinary traffic control signal.
Several

The Defendant, Damien Marcess Jackson, was indicted for first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. A jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder and two counts of attempted second degree murder. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty-five years for the murder and twelve years for each of the attempted murders, all to run consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress; the trial court's refusal to order the State to disclose the identity of a confidential informant; the sufficiency of the evidence; and the length and manner of service of his sentences. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

I concur in the conclusion that paragraph 17 of the lease was not triggered by the sale from the lessors to MDHA. I am also of the opinion that the critical sentence beginning with “All damages awarded for such taking . . .” refers to a partial taking, because the damages are described later in the sentence as “compensation for diminution in value to the leasehold or to the fee of the property herein leased.” A taking of the whole would not diminish the value of the leasehold or the fee; it would extinguish the leasehold and the fee and replace them with a monetary award.

The petitioner, Anthony P. Jones, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated sexual battery and received consecutive sentences of ten years for each count for a total effective sentence of thirty years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing. The post-conviction court denied his petition. Consequently, the petitioner presents the following issue for our review: whether the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff, Sheila Faye Hagen McCall Barnett (Wife), and defendant, Ronald Edward Barnett, Sr. (Husband), were divorced by decree entered January 9, 1997. Husband appeals and presents issues concerning property division, alimony, and attorney’s fees.

Defendant First Capital Home Improvements appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Sara J. Malone and Jerry H. Malone in this breach of contract action. We affirm.

We concur with the results of the presiding judge’s opinion because we believe that the holding of Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956) controls the outcome of this case. The Harpeth Valley Utility District has been operating since 1959 under the aegis of the Utilities Law of 1937 [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-82-101, -804 (1992 & Supp. 1997)] providing water and sewerage disposal services to areas of Davidson, Williamson, and Cheatham Counties. As such, it is a governmental entity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-82-301(a)(1) (Supp. 1997); First
Suburban Util. Dist. v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 132-34, 146 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1941). Unless specifically provided otherwise, a city’s zoning power does not extend to state government instrumentalities located within its borders. See Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. at 583-84, 292 S.W.2d at 780-81.