| Ron M Artin v. Blount County , Tennessee
E2000-01138-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals and contends the trial court erred in finding the employee to be 1 percent disabled because no expert medical proof established permanency of the disability. We sustain the contention of the employer and reverse the award of permanent disability. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court Reversed. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, JR., JUSTICE, and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Michael K. Atkins, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant Blount County, Tennessee Kevin Shepherd, Maryville, Tennessee, for the Appellee Ron Martin MEMORANDUM OPINION Background Facts Plaintiff, Ron Martin (Martin) was employed by the Blount County Sheriff's Department as a criminal investigator on June 16, 1993. That day, Martin, in the course and scope of his employment, investigated a fire scene at Pope's Plant Farm. There is no 1 indication that Martin had any health problems prior to this time. While investigating the fire scene, Martin became ill. He also found evidence that Malathion and other pesticides were present in the building at the time of the fire. Martin returned to work the next day but went home after becoming sick at work. Martin first sought treatment from his family physician, Dr. Kim Cline. Later, Martin was seen by Dr. Marek Pienkowski, an immunologist. In the course of his treatment, Martin was also seen by Drs. Hargrove, Porter and Warwick, though no proof was submitted regarding either the treatment provided or the opinions formed by these physicians. An independent medical examination was performed by Dr. Arnold Hudson, Jr., a pulmonologist On November 8, 1993, according to Dr. Pienkowski, Martin reached maximum medical improvement. Martin returned to work with the only restriction being that "it is absolutely essential that he avoid all chemical exposure." This prevented Martin from resuming his duties as an arson investigator. For approximately one year, Martin remained with the Blount County Sheriff's department primarily performing clerical duties. From January 1995 through July 1997, Martin worked in various positions with the Blount County Court Clerk's office. Martin was employed by Blount County for almost four years after he reached maximum medical improvement before he was placed on disability retirement. From the date of exposure, Martin complained of joint pain, lethargy, and fatigue. These symptoms caused Martin to be unable to perform the light clerical duties he was assigned upon his return to the Sheriff's Department and resulted in him being placed in the Court Clerk's office. Despite being moved to another position, Martin remained unable to perform the tasks assigned to him. The parties stipulated the June 16, 1993 injury was compensable and agreed upon the appropriate compensation rate. No outstanding medical bills were left unpaid, nor were there any issues regarding the payment or non-payment of temporary total disability benefits. The only issue at trial was whether Martin suffers from a permanent vocational disability. As proof on this issue, the depositions of three physicians, Drs. Cline, Pienkowski, and Hudson, and two vocational experts, Drs. Nadolsky and Caldwell, were submitted, and the testimony of Martin and Dale Gorley, chief of detectives of the Blount County Sheriff's Department was heard. The trial court found that Martin suffers from a 1% total vocational disability. Blount County appeals this finding. Standard of Review The extent of vocational disability is a question of fact to be determined from all of the evidence, including lay and expert testimony. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999); Worthington v. Modine Mfg. Co., 798 S.W.2d 232, 234 2
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Originating Judge:W. Dale Young, Circuit Court Judge |
Blount County | Workers Compensation Panel | 12/03/01 | |
| Patricia Ann Wolfe, Bette L. Roberts, Patricia Pelton, Odie L. Mann, Boyd Stubblefield, and Richard G. Ray vs. The University of Tennessee and the University of Tennessee Space Institute - Concurring
01A01-9611-CH-00514
I concur with the results of the Court’s opinion. Based on my independent review of the evidence both in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, I have determined that the six plaintiffs have not produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the reasons given by the University of Tennessee Space Institute for the adverse employment actions taken against each of the plaintiffs were pretextual or that the employment actions were taken for prohibited reasons.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
|
Court of Appeals | 12/03/01 | ||
| Southern Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc., v. Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc., et. al.
01A01-9607-CH-00345
Defendant Ashland Healthcare Center, Inc. (Ashland), appeals the judgment entered against it in this breach of contract action. The contract at issue was between Plaintiff/Appellee Southern Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. (Southern Rehab), andOakmont Healthcare Center (Oakmont). In imposing liability against Ashland, the trial court ruled that Pete Prins, the administrator of Oakmont and an employee of third-party defendant Monarch Nursing Homes, Inc. (Monarch), had the authority to bind Ashland to the contract between Southern Rehab and Oakmont. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse the judgment against Ashland and remand for further proceedings.
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Chancellor Leonard W. Martin |
Cheatham County | Court of Appeals | 12/03/01 | |
| Steven Ray Norfleet v. J. W. Goad Construction, Inc.,
M2001-00425-WC-R3-CV
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employer and its insurer contend (1) the action is time barred, (2) the claim is barred by the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice, (3) the award of benefits is excessive, (4) the award of bad faith sanctions is erroneous, and (5) the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees for the collection of unpaid medical expenses. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of attorney fees against the employer should be vacated, and the judgment otherwise affirmed.1 Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed as Modified. JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., and HAMILTON V. GAYDEN, JR, SP. J., joined. D. Brett Burrow and Gordon C. Aulgur, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, J. W. Goad Construction, Inc., Sue Goad, Executrix for the estate of Jackie W. Goad, deceased, and Maryland Casualty Company. Thomas R. Meeks and Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Steven Ray Norfleet. MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Because the Ru le 59 motio n has no t been add ressed by the trial c ourt, the appeal may be premature. However, because the injury occurred more than eight years ago, we have elec ted to add ress the m erits of the appeal. This case needs to be finally resolved. This civil action was commenced on October 1, 1996 following voluntary dismissal of a timely filed complaint on August 14, 1995. No issue was raised in the answer to the second complaint as to its timeliness. Following a trial on the merits on July 31, 2, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on 63 percent to the body as a whole, discretionary costs, bad faith penalties, temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses. The judgment was filed on October 3, 2. On November 14, 2, the trial court awarded attorney fees of $19,5. pursuant to 5-6-24(b)(2).2 Although the defendant had filed a timely Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion, the award of attorney fees appears from the record to be unrelated to that motion. On February 26, 21, the trial court ordered the appellants to provide medical treatment for the appellee, pending appeal. So did a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. At the time of the trial, the injured employee or claimant was 45 years old. He was injured on April 1, 1993, when he fell from a scaffold. The treating physician, Dr. Steven McLaughlin treated him for multiple injuries, including an elbow injury, a shoulder injury and carpal tunnel syndrome, all causally related to the fall, as well as a knee injury occurring during rehabilitation. Permanent impairment ratings of 5 percent to the elbow, 1 percent to the shoulder and 1 percent to the wrist were estimated by the doctor. The claimant has not returned to work for the same employer. Relying largely on the testimony of Dr. McLaughlin, the trial court awarded, inter alia, permanent partial disability benefits based on 63 percent to the body as a whole and temporary total disability benefits for 51 2/7th weeks. Appellate review of findings of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court that had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. 2 (2) In addition to any attorney fees provided for pursuant to the provisions of _ 5 -6-22 6, a co urt ma y award attorney fees and reasonable costs to include reaso nable and nece ssary court repo rter expenses a nd exp ert witness fees for depo sitions and trials incurred when the employer fails to furnish appropriate med ical, surgica l and dental treatment or care, medicine, medical and surgical supplies, crutches, artificial me mbe rs and other a ppa ratus to an employee provided for pursuant to a settlement or judgment under this chapter. -2-
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Originating Judge:Carol Catalano, Chancellor |
Montgomery County | Workers Compensation Panel | 12/03/01 | |
| Knox County Education Association v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
E2000-01019-COA-R3-CV
This is an action brought by the Knox County Education Association seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Knox County Board of Education and its then-superintendent, Allen Morgan. The trial court found that provisions of a private act granting tenure to principals employed in the Knox County School System were repealed and superseded by the enactment in 1992 of a public act, the Education Improvement Act, and that the private act, to the extent that it conflicts with the general law, violates Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court further found that Knox County principals are not members of the bargaining unit represented by the Knox County Education Association as to the subjects of performance, accountability, and contract renewal. The Knox County Education Association appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred in finding that provisions of the private act were repealed by the Education Improvement Act and (2) the trial court erred in concluding that school principals are not members of the bargaining unit as to the subjects of performance, accountability, and contract renewal. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Chancellor John F. Weaver |
Knox County | Court of Appeals | 12/02/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. John D. Pass
E2000-02266-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for aggravated assault. The imposition of a six (6)-month jail term pursuant to a sentence of five (5) years in split confinement is appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Originating Judge:Judge Richard R. Baumgartner |
Knox County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/30/01 | |
| Raymond Mueller v. Denise Mueller
M2001-00098-COA-R3-CV
In this appeal of a divorce decree, the husband argues that the rehabilitative alimony awarded to the wife is excessive, and that his visitation schedule unnecessarily limits the time he can spend with his son. We affirm the award of rehabilitative alimony, but reduce its duration to three years. We also remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of the visitation schedule.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Jeffrey S. Bivins |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 11/30/01 | |
| Roger M. Gardner v. State of Tennessee
E2000-02270-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner, Roger M. Gardner, appeals the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Sullivan County jury found the petitioner guilty of attempted aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to serve eight years as a Range II multiple offender. The petitioner challenged his conviction on direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his conviction. State v. Roger Morris Gardner, No. 03C01-9712-CR-00524, 1999 WL 486847, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville July 13, 1999). Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, and denial of statutory rights. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we find that none of these allegations merit relief and therefore affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Originating Judge:Judge Phyllis H. Miller |
Sullivan County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/30/01 | |
| Karmen Lane v. Richard Lane
M2000-01135-COA-R3-CV
This appeal challenges an award of child support which did not include private school tuition of the minor daughter, a division of property that did not take into account alleged dissipation of assets by the husband, a child support award that did not deviate upwards from the Guidelines because of lack of visitation, and a finding of criminal contempt. Also at issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony in futuro rather than rehabilitative alimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to all issues except to hold that pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines, private school tuition is an "extraordinary educational expense" which husband obligor must pay.
Authoring Judge: Judge John A. Turnbull
Originating Judge:Muriel Robinson |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/30/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Ronald Cox
W2000-02238-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant, Ronald Cox, was found guilty of robbery following a jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court. In this appeal, he raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its answers to questions submitted to the trial court during jury deliberations. Defendant is not entitled to relief on the first and third issues. However, under the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001), we hold that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to include the lesser-included offense of theft in the charge to the jury. Therefore, we reverse Defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph B. Dailey |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Lewis A. Forbess
W2001-00202-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant, Lewis A. Forbess, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated rape, theft of property between $10,000.00 and $60,000.00, aggravated burglary, and possession of a weapon in a penal facility. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences as follows: Offense Term Range
The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier burglary sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the sentences are excessive. The judgments are affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph H. Walker, III |
Tipton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Darrow Lynn Williams
W2001-01825-CCA-R3-CD
Defendant appeals his conviction of second degree murder following a jury trial. He presents three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain hearsay testimony; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to rule on defendant's objection to a question asked by the prosecuting attorney. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Originating Judge:Judge Joseph H. Walker, III |
Tipton County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State v. Bobby Godsey
E1997-00207-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:R. Jerry Beck |
Sullivan County | Supreme Court | 11/29/01 | |
| State v. Stephen Bart Wood
M2001-00872-COA-R3-CD
The General Sessions Court of Davidson County found the defendant guilty of thirty-six violations of an order of protection and ordered him to serve ten days for each violation. Each sentence was to be served consecutively and day-for-day. The defendant appealed to the Criminal Court and that court affirmed. We find that the Criminal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, that the sentence should be vacated, and the cause remanded to the General Sessions Court for a review of the sentence for excessiveness in accordance with the guidelines we adopt in this opinion.
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Originating Judge:Steve R. Dozier |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State v. Bobby Godsey
E1997-00207-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Originating Judge:R. Jerry Beck |
Sullivan County | Supreme Court | 11/29/01 | |
| In Re: Kiersten Cierra Burchette
E2010-02132-COA-R3-JV
This lawsuit involves whether custody of Kiersten Cierra Burchette (the "Child") should be changed from Carey A. Bible ("Mother") to Chadwick J. Burchette ("Father"). Father filed an emergency petition seeking custody. Father claimed, among other things, that the Child was being sexually abused by Mother's boyfriend. Although the emergency petition eventually was dismissed, the Juvenile Court did designate Father as the Child's primary residential parent. The Juvenile Court, however, specifically reserved ruling on who should pay certain medical expenses as well as a bill for the deposition of Father's private investigator. The Juvenile Court also reserved ruling on all child support issues. Mother appeals. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.
Authoring Judge: D. Michael Swiney, J.
Originating Judge:A. Benjamin Strand, Jr., Judge |
Cocke County | Court of Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. A Tract of Land Known as 141 Belle Forest Circle, et al.
M2000-01827-CCA-R3-CD
The appellant, Westminster Realty Company, appeals an order entered by the Davidson County Criminal Court denying its claim to an interest in the proceeds from the sale of property pursuant to forfeiture proceedings. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Originating Judge:Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| Bernice Rothstein, et al. v. Orange Grove Center, Inc., et al.
E1999-00900-SC-R11-CV
We granted appeal to determine 1) whether the defendants are entitled to a new trial based upon their claim that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence from four different sources, and 2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for consortium damages and, if so, the proper remedy for that error. We hold that the four evidentiary issues are without merit. The defendants therefore are not entitled to a new trial. We further hold, pursuant to our decisions in Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999), Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2000), and Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Hospital Authority, 54 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2001), that the plaintiffs may maintain a claim for loss of filial consortium. We remand this case for a trial on the issue of incidental damages, limited to loss of consortium.
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Originating Judge:W. Neil Thomas, III |
Hamilton County | Supreme Court | 11/29/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Galgalo B. Halake
M2000-00146-CCA-R3-CD
A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Galgalo B. Halake, for first-degree murder. The petit jury convicted him of that offense. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for new trial, but granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal by reducing the defendant's conviction to second-degree murder. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-two years of incarceration. The state appeals the trial court's reduction of the conviction to second-degree murder. The defendant appeals his conviction, challenging the admission of certain testimony, the trial court's failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the propriety of his sentence. We find that there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of guilt of first degree murder. However, because the trial court erred in allowing lay opinion testimony concerning blood spatters, we reverse the decision of the lower court and remand this case for a new trial.
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Originating Judge:Judge Walter C. Kurtz |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Robbie R. Bailey
E2001-00210-CCA-R3-CD
The Appellant, Robbie R. Bailey, was indicted by a Washington County Grand Jury for one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense, one count of driving on a revoked license, and two counts of vehicular assault. On December 1, 2000, Bailey pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault and one count of driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing on January 10, 2001, the trial court sentenced Bailey, as a range I standard offender, to the maximum term of four years on each count of vehicular assault and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction.
On appeal, Bailey raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the sentences imposed for vehicular assault were excessive; and (2) whether the trial court erred by denying Bailey's request for a non incarcerative alternative sentence. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Originating Judge:Judge Robert E. Cupp |
Washington County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| State of Tennessee v. Steven Lloyd Givens
M2001-00021-CCA-R3-CD
The Defendant, Steven Lloyd Givens, was convicted of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years as a Range I offender to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the Defendant's arrest, (2) denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the results of a show-up identification of the Defendant by the victim, (3) denying the Defendant's motion to amend the indictment, and (4) in sentencing the Defendant to the maximum sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Originating Judge:Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| Sidney McGlowan v. State of Tennessee
W2000-01925-CCA-R3-PC
The petitioner, Sidney McGlowan, filed for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner alleges that the court erred by dismissing his petition without appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Originating Judge:Judge Chris B. Craft |
Shelby County | Court of Criminal Appeals | 11/29/01 | |
| Charles Salsman vs. Texcor Indus.
W2001-00730-COA-R9-CV
This appeal arises out of a petition filed in Tennessee to enroll a Texas judgment. In this case, the plaintiffs filed a petition to enroll the foreign judgment. While this was pending, the defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer to assert a counterclaim. Three days later, before the trial court had ruled on the motion to amend, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, including a proposed order stating that no counterclaim had been pled. The trial court entered the proposed order. Subsequently, in response to the defendants' motion, the trial court vacated its earlier order of dismissal and granted the defendants' motion to amend to assert the counterclaim. In this interlocutory appeal, we affirm, holding under Rule 41.01(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure that the proposed counterclaim attached to the motion to amend is considered a "pleaded" counterclaim, thereby permitting the defendants to elect to proceed on the counterclaim despite the plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Karen R. Williams |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 11/28/01 | |
| CH-00-1455-1
CH-00-1455-1
Originating Judge:Walter L. Evans |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 11/28/01 | |
| Stacy Harris v. Thomas Hall
M2000-00784-COA-R3-CV
This case was transferred to a judge in another county for "binding mediation," and the mediating judge entered an order dismissing the lawsuit and enjoining plaintiff from certain actions, including further litigation. The original trial court later denied the plaintiff's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from orders, and the plaintiff appealed. We find the trial court had no authority to order the case to any alternative dispute resolution procedure other than one established in Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 31, that the mediating judge had no authority to dispose of the case and, consequently, all orders entered by that judge are void. We reverse the trial court's denial of Rule 60.02 relief, vacate orders entered in the court of the mediating judge, and remand for further proceedings.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Originating Judge:Jeffrey S. Bivins |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 11/28/01 |
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