APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Indicted for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated kidnapping, the defendant entered negotiated pleas of guilt to aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated kidnapping.  The remaining charges were dismissed. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to 12 years for the robbery, 25 years for each of the rapes, and 25 years for the kidnapping. The rape sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another and to the robbery sentence, for an effective sentence of 62 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that one of the aggravated rape convictions and the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction violate due process. He asserts that his sentences are excessive and should not have been ordered to be served consecutively. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Darryl A. Larkins, of two counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve an effective sentence of fifty-years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant of aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape; 2) whether the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were obtained contrary to Tennessee law in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); and 3) whether the Defendant was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and a fair and impartial jury, regardingthe aggravated burglary conviction. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing on the offense of attempted aggravated rape.

On April 30, 1996, the petitioner, Alan Hall, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and possession of burglary tools. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of life plus twelve years. Subsequently, on September 15, 1999, the trial court entered an order correcting the petitioner's judgment of conviction for especially aggravated robbery to reflect that the petitioner would serve one hundred percent (100%) of his sentence in confinement instead of thirty percent (30%) as was erroneously reflected on the original judgment. Within a year after the entry of the corrected judgment, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as being barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contests the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Judy K. Caruso, entered pleas of guilt to two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property over $1,000. As a part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to dismiss two charges of possession of stolen property and one charge of misdemeanor vandalism. The defendant negotiated concurrent sentences of four years on the burglary convictions and two years on the theft convictions. The trial court denied a request for probation, ordered a 200-day jail sentence to be served day for day, and required the balance of the four-year sentence to be served in a Community Corrections program. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that she should have been granted an alternative sentence involving immediate release. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner's conviction for rape was affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at his trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.