APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and unlawful use of an altered vehicle registration plate, a Class E felony. He received concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days and two years, respectively, to be served on probation. The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his request for judicial diversion. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner was originally convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced to thirty-seven years as a Range II offender. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged his indictment was void. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The SREE General Partnership was formed for the purpose of owning and managing motel property in Nashville, Tennessee. During the ownership period, the property deteriorated. The partners sued a co-partner for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that his negligent management of the property was what caused the deterioration and resulting economic loss. The trial court ruled for the defendant. We affirm.

Defendant was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury on the charge of rape of a child. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to sexual battery and received a two-year sentence. The issue of how his sentence should be served was submitted to the trial court. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that it is necessary to remand for a new sentencing hearing since the trial court relied upon the defendant's failure to make a public confession at a church in determining the sentence.

The petitioner appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, by which he sought to set aside his earlier guilty pleas. On appeal, the petitioner presses his claim that because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty pleas were not voluntary and knowing. Finding that the services of the petitioner's trial counsel were below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and that the petitioner was thereby prejudiced, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate the petitioner's convictions, and set aside the petitioner's guilty pleas without prejudice to further proceedings on the underlying charges.

The defendant was indicted by a Polk County Grand Jury for first degree murder. Following a two-day trial, he was found guilty of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-three years as a Range I, violent offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant does not challenge his conviction but contends only that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record, including the transcript of the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the defendant's issues concerning the length of his sentence are without merit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this dispute over a landscaping contract, the Circuit Court of Maury County held that the contractor breached the agreement. The defendant contends that the court rewrote the agreement. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After divorce, Husband was ordered to pay child support to Wife for care of his minor children. Husband was employed as a commercial truck driver by Company. Thereafter, Husband was diagnosed with seizure disorder that required medication to treat. As a result, Husband lost his commercial trucking license as mandated by Federal Regulations. Upon losing his job as a commercial truck driver, Husband accepted a warehouse position with Company for considerably less money. He petitioned the court for a reduction of child support commensurate with his lower salary. The trial court found that he was underemployed and denied the reduction. Husband appealed. Although he failed to submit a transcript or statement of the evidence in the record, the trial court's order contains stipulated facts. We reverse and remand for entry of order reducing child support.

The defendant, Charles Roy Cole, was charged with aggravated assault and rape of a child. He was acquitted on the first charge and convicted on the second. The trial court imposed a sentence of 20 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding admissions against interest. The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant pled guilty to several offenses in 1992, receiving an agreed effective sentence of twenty-four years. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied after a hearing. The Defendant filed a second post-conviction petition which the trial court summarily dismissed. The Defendant now appeals; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an action by a contractor to receive the balance due under a contract for the construction of two buildings. The owner counterclaimed for damages alleging lack of good workmanship. A principal issue concerned attorney fees, and whether a document purporting to be a contract was, in fact, a contract. We hold that the document proffered by the plaintiff was accepted as a contract by the defendant, and that the attorney fee provision is enforceable.

The defendant was convicted in the Cumberland County Criminal Court of aggravated sexual battery of a seven-year-old boy. Following the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed an appeal as of right to this court, raising three issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated sexual battery; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, based upon newly discovered evidence; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony. The Defendant was sentenced as an especially mitigated offender to two years and seven months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), driving while his alcohol concentration was .10% or more (DUI per se), and DUI, second offense. After a jury trial on DUI and DUI per se, the jury acquitted the defendant of DUI and was unable to reach a verdict on DUI per se. A second trial was held, and the jury convicted the defendant of DUI per se. The trial judge then found this conviction to be a second offense. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the defendant's retrial for DUI per se violated the principles of double jeopardy; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted the results of the breath test and related evidence; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of the arresting officer concerning his encounters with other motorists charged with DUI; (4) the trial court improperly considered a prior conviction for enhancement of the defendant's sentence; and (5) the trial judge erroneously failed to recuse himself. Upon review of the record, we reduce the defendant's conviction to DUI, first offense, remand for resentencing, and affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jacob Lee Davis, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, reckless endangerment, and carrying a weapon on school property. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and one year each for the reckless endangerment and carrying a weapon on school property convictions. The trial court ordered that the latter sentences be served concurrent to the sentence for life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain each of the convictions and argues that the trial court erred in failing to strike six potential jurors for cause. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the two sentences for which he was incarcerated were being served concurrently and that both had expired, resulting in his being held illegally by the Tennessee Department of Correction for the second sentence. However, the Court of Appeals, presented previously with this same issue by the petitioner, determined that the sentences were to be served consecutively. Thus, the second sentence has not expired. We reverse the order of the post-conviction court that the two sentences were served concurrently and that the second sentence has expired. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.

Defendant, charged with possession with intent to sell and/or deliver a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, filed a motion to suppress over 300 grams of cocaine, paraphernalia, and U.S. currency discovered during a search of his vehicle. The trial court, Dickson County, granted Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search impermissibly exceeded the scope of Defendant's consent. The State appealed. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over sixty-thousand dollars, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to the minimum eight-year sentence, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals from the revocation of his probation, contesting the trial court's jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.