APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

William Glenn Wiley was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Wiley was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and sentenced to twenty-five years for the robbery conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Wiley raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's reliance on two aggravating factors when imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; and (4) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the theory of self-defense. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

Doug Myers was convicted by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Myers, as a Range I standard offender, to six years incarceration in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Myers raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his aggravated assault conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning Myers' subsequent criminal conduct; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing Myers to six years incarceration. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant was convicted in two jury trials of six counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of sixty years for these crimes. The Defendant subsequently pled guilty to three additional counts of aggravated robbery, one additional count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. After an unsuccessful appeal of his second trial, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing the post-conviction court denied relief, which ruling the Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft of property over $1,000, and one count of conspiracy to commit theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of two years on each conviction, suspended, with the defendant placed on four years of probation, and ordered to pay $10,000 restitution at $225 per month for the duration of her probationary period. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for judicial diversion. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In February 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, setting out several claims as to the invalidity of his June 12, 1998, DUI guilty plea in the Greene County General Sessions Court. He had not appealed the plea of guilty but claimed that his post-conviction petition was timely because he had a "mental disability," which tolled the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The post-conviction court concluded that the petition was untimely and dismissed it. Finding that the allegations of "mental disability" are insufficient to toll the statute, we agree that the dismissal of the petition was proper. Further, we find that the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

In this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal, the defendant, an incumbent district attorney general, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss a presentment returned against him by the grand jury. He asserts that the General Assembly, in Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-6-112, vested the sole or exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute an incumbent district attorney general in the Attorney General and Reporter's office. After review, we disagree with the defendant and affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion.

The defendant pled guilty to four charges arising out of events in Carter County and thirteen charges arising out of events in Washington County. Other than a forgery charge in Carter County, the charges all stemmed from criminal acts occurring on March 12, 1999, when the defendant and a friend broke into two vehicles parked at a local night spot in Johnson City, stealing various pieces of sound equipment. When confronted by two security guards, the defendant knifed one guard and ran into the other with his car. A high-speed chase involving the defendant and officers of the Johnson City Police Department ensued. The chase, crisscrossing between Washington and Carter Counties, ended with the apprehension of the defendant, who was subsequently charged with, and pled guilty to: DUI; driving with a suspended license; aggravated assault of the two security guards; felony evading arrest (two counts); automobile burglary (two counts); theft under $500 (two counts); aggravated assault of two Johnson City police officers; and assault of another officer. According to a plea agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court denied probation and any community-based alternative to incarceration and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court appropriately sentenced him as to the manner of service of his sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On May 12, 1998, the petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to one count of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and to twenty-five years incarceration in the Department for the conspiracy conviction. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his convictions were based upon unlawful guilty pleas, that his convictions were based on a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that his plea counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and an amended petition was filed contending that the petitioner was misinformed about his release eligibility date. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.

The defendant appeals from his conviction for vehicular homicide, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to suppress the result of his blood alcohol test. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant now contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough examination of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over the workmanship of residential renovations. The interior designer hired by the owner to undertake the renovations withheld final payment to the contractor who performed the work because the owner was dissatisfied with the renovations. After the contractor obtained a judgment against the interior designer in the Williamson County General Sessions Court, the interior designer perfected an appeal to the Circuit Court for Williamson County and filed a counterclaim against the contractor. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the interior designer’s claims against the contractor and entered a judgment against the interior designer for the remaining balance of the construction contract. The interior designer has appealed. While the trial court erroneously concluded that the Contractor’s Licensing Act of 1976 prevented the interior designer from pursuing its claims against the contractor, we have concluded that the trial court reached the proper result. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.