APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the results and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with the view indicated in section VII of the majority opinion that the law is split regarding the need for supplemental post-trial instructions to be submitted in writing pursuant to Rule 30(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. I believe that the Rule and binding precedent require such to be in writing.

Jerry L. Cox appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of motions in which he raised various claims related to sentence calculation and sentence validity. In part, Cox seeks the benefit of various sentence credits for the sentence he is presently serving in the Department of Correction. He also alleges that one of his sentences is void or has expired. Because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of Cox's motions challenging his sentences, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of the offense of felony murder and received a life sentence. He raises the following two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; and (2) whether the trial court erred in disallowing certain expert testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Hamilton County jury of first degree murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the petitioner contends (1) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) he was denied the right to testify at trial and at sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The Hamilton County Criminal Court dismissed Charles Griffin's petition for post-conviction relief. Asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, he appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Marvin Matthews, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition is barred by the statute of limitations, among other reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Thomas J. Faulkner, Jr. stands convicted of four counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of theft over $1,000. He received his sentence at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Grainger County Circuit Court and is presently serving an effective 73-year sentence for these crimes. In this direct appeal, he raises numerous issues related to admission of evidence, release of a juror, sufficiency of the evidence, severance, jury instructions and sentencing. Upon review, we are unpersuaded of error and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and vehicular assault. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether both convictions can stand without violating his right to be protected against double jeopardy. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support convictions for DUI and vehicular assault, but that both convictions cannot stand without violating principles of double jeopardy. The conviction for DUI is, therefore, vacated. The remaining conviction for vehicular assault and the sentence imposed by the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Marvin D. Brown, a/k/a/ Melvin Leroy Taylor, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of theft of property, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to twelve years and ordered that it be served consecutive to a previously imposed sentence, for which parole had been revoked. In this appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him for theft but, rather, the proof supported a conviction of joyriding, a Class A misdemeanor. Based upon applicable law and a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.