APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was indicted on twelve counts of aggravated rape and six counts of statutory rape. He pled guilty to four counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony, with an agreed sentence of two years on each count, to be suspended upon service of thirty days. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, which ruling the defendant now appeals. The defendant also appeals the court's denial of his application for judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jonathan Trice, pled guilty in the Chester County Circuit Court to five counts of theft and was sentenced to a total of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant's sentence was then suspended, and the appellant was granted service in a community corrections program. Due to the appellant's failure to comply with the terms of community corrections, the trial court revoked the appellant's suspended sentence and ordered that the appellant serve his sentence in confinement as originally ordered. The appellant appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry Mitchel Watson, appeals his conviction and sentence for felony reckless endangerment in the Cumberland County Criminal Court. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his felony reckless endangerment conviction and that the trial court improperly sentenced him. Because the jury was erroneously instructed on felony reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, we reverse his conviction for that offense and remand the cause for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, Rickie Boyd, was convicted by a Shelby County, Tennessee jury of the offense of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 18 years incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal he maintains the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the lesser included offense of theft of property. We conclude that is was error to fail to instruct the jury with respect to theft of property. However, we also conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Charles Goode was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape, and was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years in the Department of Correction. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the actions of the judge in sentencing him to serve the maximum sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of introduction of drugs into a penal institution. Her plea agreement required her to serve two concurrent six-year sentences for the offenses, but left the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals this decision, arguing that the trial court erred by not ordering an alternative sentence. Because we conclude that the record in this case supports the denial of alternative sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his premeditated first degree murder conviction for which he received a life sentence, arguing: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of first degree murder; (2) he should have been granted a mistrial due to the prosecutor's improper statements during closing arguments; and (3) he was entitled to a special jury instruction regarding diminished capacity. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed a retaliatory discharge action based on dismissal from employment for filing a worker's compensation claim. The Trial Judge held the record established the dismissal was not retaliatory. We affirm.

We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court erred in finding Timothy L. Crabtree permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental and physical injuries sustained while working for Cutler-Hammer. Crabtree injured his back while working on a production line; then, during treatment for the back injury, he developed severe depression. The trial court found that Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effect of his mental and physical injuries. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel rejected this finding, concluding instead that Crabtree's mental disorder was not compensable because it was not connected to his back injury, which was compensable. On review, we conclude that Crabtree's mental disorder resulted from his physical injury. We hold, therefore, that Crabtree's mental disorder is compensable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Barry Marable, appeals from his convictions for aggravated burglary, felony reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, and misdemeanor theft, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of conviction except for the one for the evading arrest. We modify that conviction from a Class D felony to a Class E felony and remand the case for sentencing.

The appellant, Steven Lee Whitehead, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of three counts of rape. Pursuant to the appellant's convictions, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding at the appellant's trial evidence of other sexual behavior by the victim; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior false testimony by the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to either exclude DNA evidence or, in the alternative, grant the appellant a continuance of the trial date; (4) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence concerning the appellant's character; (5) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the appellant's convictions of rape; and (6) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of each count of rape. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court due to the court's failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery, and we remand these cases for a new trial.

The petitioner, Lawrence A. Strickland, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, which challenged his 1997 guilty-plea-based, Roane County conviction of aggravated sexual battery. Based upon our de novo review of matters of law, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the conviction court was void, although we reject the petitioner’s claim that the indictment is invalid. We reverse the judgment of the lower court and grant habeas corpus relief in the form of declaring the petitioner’s Roane County sentence void.  Because the conviction rests upon a guilty plea that, in turn, was premised upon the agreed sentence being valid, we vacate the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The conviction court shall afford the petitioner the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(4).

A Dickson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for rape, and the defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual battery. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was subsequently withdrawn. Almost two months later, the defendant filed a pro se motion alleging his motion for new trial was unilaterally and improperly withdrawn by counsel. Eventually, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for new trial since the defendant's original motion had been withdrawn, and no timely motion was pending. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court's jury charge authorized the jury to convict based on lack of consent, when "force or coercion" was alleged in the indictment. We conclude the motion for new trial was not properly before the trial court, thereby waiving this issue. Nevertheless, we have examined the issue for plain error and conclude defendant's allegation of error is totally without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Lincoln County jury of criminal responsibility for first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The defendant, James David Alder, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. He was sentenced as a Range III Persistent Offender to twenty (20) years for the attempted second degree murder, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for assault, and three (3) years for reckless endangerment. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the sentence ordered in a case for which the defendant was on bail at the time he committed the present offenses. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony concerning the extent of the victim's injuries, the length of her hospital stay and the number of surgeries she had; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless endangerment; and (3) the trial court failed to follow the sentencing guidelines and improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a review of the law and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury found Donald Lee Reid guilty of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, suspended after service of 15 days confinement, and a fine of $500.00. Reid challenges his conviction, his sentence, and his fine. He raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in not conducting a jury-out hearing on the defendant's motion in limine regarding the admissibility of the defendant's BAC test results; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the results of the BAC test into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; (4) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive; and (5) whether the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a fine of $500.00 since the defendant did not waive his right for the jury to assess the fine. After a careful review of the record, we remand for a jury to assess the fine but affirm in all other respects.