APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jackie F. Curry, appeals as of right his conviction for three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two (22) years for each count. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to a prior eight-year sentence for which the Defendant was on probation at the time of this incident. The Defendant raises the following three issues in this appeal: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated rape; 2) whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach him with two prior convictions for the sale of cocaine; and 3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

The Defendant, Lewis Woody, filed a notice of appeal which we construe to appeal the judgments of conviction for two forgeries resulting from a negotiated plea agreement, and he also included within the notice, an appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion to tax costs to the State and to "quash execution of garnishment." For the reasons set forth herein, we dismiss his appeal.

This appeal arises from the trial court's granting of a motion of summary judgment. The court ruled that Shop had violated an Agreement which incorporated in its entirety a previous lease of certain property. As a result, Owner was awarded the repair costs for certain repairs that Shop had been responsible for under the lease. Owner was also awarded attorney's fees and expenses. Shop appealed, arguing that certain material facts were in dispute and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Defendant, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals as of right his convictions for second degree murder, first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery in the Sullivan County Criminal Court. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction, and the jury sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three (23) years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The Defendant raises the following four issues in this appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge all applicable lesser-included offenses; 2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule; 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery; and 4) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the felony murder charge in Count II and the especially aggravated robbery charge in Count III of the indictment. The case is further remanded for sentencing on the second degree murder conviction in Count I of the indictment

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-10-601 to 55-10-617, the State of Tennessee filed a "petition and notice" to have the Appellant/Respondent, Ben Warren Miller, declared an Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender. The Appellant filed, in one pleading, an "Answer and Motion to Dismiss." In the answer, the Appellant admitted all material allegations which would support a judgment declaring him to be an habitual motor vehicle offender. In his motion to dismiss, the Appellant argued that no summons was issued with the petition, and the trial court violated the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in signing an order which required, in part, that Appellant "may be held in violation of this order" if he did not appear and defend the petition to be declared an habitual motor vehicle offender. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment declaring Appellant to be an habitual motor vehicle offender. On appeal, the Appellant does not challenge the substantive grounds for having him declared an habitual motor vehicle offender. However, in three issues, he argues that the judgment should be reversed and the petition dismissed because: (1) The trial court's order entered subsequent to the filing of the petition required Appellant to appear and defend or "he may be held in violation of this order," (2) the trial court's order giving notice of the hearing on the petition was not signed by an assistant district attorney, (3) the trial court did not have the authority to issue an order directing the Appellant to appear at a hearing on the petition and did not have the authority to state in the order that he might be held in violation of the order if he did not appear and defend the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Stomm, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Donald Mitchell Green, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred by ordering a dismissal without an evidentiary hearing. The judgment is reversed and remanded to the trial court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The Defendant pled nolo contendere to one count of felony child neglect, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of possession of marijuana, and two counts of public intoxication. At issue in this appeal is the sentence for felony child neglect, a Class D felony for which the Defendant received a two-year Community Corrections sentence. Subsequently, based upon a warrant alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence, the trial court revoked the Defendant's Community Corrections sentence and increased his original sentence from two years to four years, to be served with the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his two-year sentence for felony child neglect to four years and that the court erred by failing to impose some form of alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court properly increased the length of the Defendant's sentence from two to four years and that the Defendant's prison sentence was properly imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the sentence imposed by the trial court. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the sentence is proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Loudon County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The Defendant's first jury trial resulted in a mistrial. Following a second trial, a Loudon County jury convicted the Defendant of the offense charged. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days incarceration, with all but four days suspended, and fined him $400. The Defendant now appeals his conviction, arguing (1) that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction, and we conclude that the Defendant received adequate representation at trial. We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mary Christine Whiteside Cook, seeks to appeal as of right from the trial court's denying her petition to enforce a plea bargain agreement and her request for a writ of habeas corpus. She asserts that pursuant to the agreement, she is entitled to immediate release from her imprisonment, which results from her 1986 conviction upon her plea of guilty to first degree murder. We are constrained to dismiss the appeal because of the lack of jurisdiction.

The Appellant, Donald W. Rhea, Jr. was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery stemming from a single criminal episode. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rhea pled guilty to the lesser offenses of robbery and attempt to commit robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the Davidson County Criminal Court sentenced Rhea to the maximum sentence of six years for robbery and three years for attempted robbery. The court, finding Rhea's history of criminal activity extensive, further ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. Rhea appeals to this court, contending that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After review of the record, we affirm.

The Appellant, Waylon D. Knott, was indicted by a Stewart County Grand Jury on one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, one count of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, and one count of felony possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a traffic stop for improper registration, Knott, after first refusing, granted consent to search his vehicle, which resulted in the seizure of a quantity of drugs. Knott moved to suppress the evidence upon grounds that consent was not voluntarily given. The trial court granted Knott's motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment, finding that the "search was unconstitutional because the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of further criminal activity to justify the request to search the vehicle and further detain [Knott]." The State appeals from the trial court's ruling asserting that Knott's consent was voluntary and therefore the search was valid. We find that the dispositive issues presented are: (1) whether Knott was unlawfully detained at the time that he consented to the search and, if so; (2) whether Knott's consent to search was voluntarily given. Because no findings were entered relevant to these issues, we are required to remand for findings of fact on these questions. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded.

The appellant, Lisa White, a/k/a Lisa Croft, appeals her conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and alleges she was prejudiced by allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during opening arguments. After a thorough review of the record, this Court disagrees and affirms the appellant's conviction.