APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Tracy Lamar Belle, Sr., appeals the denial of post-conviction relief contending that his right to due process has been violated by the application of the statute of limitations. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed and because "the interest of justice" does not require the waiver of a timely notice, this appeal is dismissed. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a).

The defendant, Larry D. Upshaw, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of 38 years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Fayette County jury convicted the defendant of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of 15 years as a Range III persistent offender. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Augusto Oviedo, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of robbery and was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) whether the trial court failed to fully consider all mitigating factors when it sentenced the appellant to the maximum in the range for the crime. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. The defendant was sentenced to a fifteen-year sentence at the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II offender. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at the defendant’s trial was sufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After trial, a Putnam County jury found Defendant guilty of the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine over .5 grams, for resale, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, the unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and evading arrest. Further, the jury determined Defendant should pay fines of $100,000, $2,500, $2,500, and $1,500 for each respective offense. Subject to a sentencing agreement, the trial court imposed a sentence of nine (9) years on the cocaine offense and 11 months and 29 days for each misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently and imposed judgment for the fines in accordance with the verdict of the jury. Defendant presents two appellate issues: (1) Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams, driving under the influence and possession of drug paraphernalia?; and (2) Whether Defendant's fines are excessive? After a review of the entire record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment

The defendant, Anthony Reid, was convicted by a Bradley County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, Class A felonies, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and evading arrest, a Class E felony. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for his first degree murder conviction, twenty-five years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, ten years for his aggravated robbery conviction, six years for his attempted aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for evading arrest. The trial court further ordered Defendant's sentence for life imprisonment to be served consecutively to his other four sentences, which were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant contends that his convictions cannot stand because the State failed to comply with the mandatory procedures concerning proper presentation and filing of the indictment in his case as required by statute, and the trial court erred by refusing Defendant's request for a mistrial after the State improperly solicited testimony concerning the fact that Defendant invoked his right to remain silent upon arrest. Defendant also alleges that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeremy Michael Shelton, was convicted of theft of property over $10,000. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence. One year is to be served in continuous confinement and the remaining two years are to be served in Community Corrections. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that the sentence is excessive. The conviction is affirmed. The judgment is modified, however, to reflect that the confinement portion of the split sentence is to be served in the local jail.

The appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on two counts of second degree murder pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-210, and on one count of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-302. After the court found the appellant not guilty by reason of insanity, the appellant was committed to Western Mental Health Institute for diagnosis and evaluation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303. At the conclusion of the appellant's diagnosis and evaluation, the doctors conducting the evaluation determined that the appellant was not committable under the Tennessee Code Annotated and refused to sign certificates of certification for the appellant to be involuntarily committed. At the end of the initial sixty (60) day diagnosis and evaluation period, the doctors at Western Mental Health Institute sought to have the appellant released into a mandatory outpatient treatment program. A hearing was conducted after the ninety (90) day mandatory release date, and the trial court ordered that the appellant be returned to Western Mental Health Institute. The appellant brought this appeal asserting that the trial court erred in ordering her continued detention after the expiration of the maximum ninety (90) day commitment period, and that such detention violates her rights. The state in its brief concedes error. After a thorough review of the issue presented in this case, we agree with the appellant and the state that the trial court erred. This case is remanded to the trial court for further action consistent with the instruction set forth herein.

The defendant was indicted for attempted especially aggravated robbery, and a Shelby County jury subsequently convicted the defendant as charged. In this appeal, the defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the conviction.

The Petitioner pled guilty to first degree felony murder and to forgery, receiving concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and one year's incarceration, respectively. The Petitioner subsequently petitioned the trial court for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals this decision. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his pleas of guilty, causing him to enter his pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Petitioner's representation was not deficient and thus affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Defendant, Wheatley Jamar Graham, III, was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon in commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-four (24) years incarceration as a Range I offender for two counts of attempted first degree murder, 4.5 years incarceration for three counts of aggravated assault and 1.9 years for possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served concurrently, but merged two counts of aggravated assault with the two counts of attempted first degree murder. In this appeal as of right Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict Defendant of attempted first degree murder in counts 3 and 4 of the indictment; (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence that Defendant refused to permit law enforcement officers to obtain a "hand swab" from him; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not dismissing Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in counts 7 and 8 instead of merging these convictions with counts 3 and 4, attempted first degree murder, as being in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. We conclude that the evidence in this record supports Defendant's convictions for attempted first degree murder, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling Defendant's refusal for hand swabs was admissible and the trial court's merging of the two counts of aggravated assault with the attempted first degree murder conviction was not double jeopardy. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ralph Phillips, appeals as of right from the sentence imposed by the trial court, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his request for community corrections. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Daniel L. Scott, entered a best interest guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of animal fighting, one count of cruelty to animals, and one count of keeping unvaccinated dogs. The trial court sentenced the appellant to incarceration in the Shelby County workhouse for one year for the animal fighting conviction, six months for the animal cruelty conviction, and thirty days for the keeping unvaccinated dogs conviction. The trial court further ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. The appellant requested probation, which request the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Anthony E. Brasfield, appeals from the dismissal by the Weakley County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Brasfield asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to preserve in his direct appeal the issues of (1) the trial court's suppression of his confession to the police and (2) the trial court's failure to charge misdemeanor escape as a lesser-included offense of felony escape. With regard to the first issue, we find that although trial counsel was deficient, no prejudice resulted. With regard to Brasfield's second issue, we find that misdemeanor escape is not a lesser-included offense of felony escape; therefore, no error occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Margo Ellis, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit Court's judgment revoking her sentence of community corrections. Following revocation, Ellis' three-year sentence was ordered to be served in the Department of Correction. At the time of Ellis' indictment and on the date her guilty plea was entered, the trial judge who presided at Ellis' revocation hearing was employed as an assistant district attorney in the same office that prosecuted Ellis. On appeal, Ellis raises one issue for our review: Whether "the trial court erred by neglecting to disqualify himself from presiding over [her] revocation hearing." After review, we find no error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant, Bobby J. Armstrong, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Armstrong's convictions stem from his guilty pleas to two counts of felony murder and two resulting consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, Armstrong raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing to determine Armstrong's mental condition. After review, we find Armstrong's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and that he received effective assistance of counsel. As such, we affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.