APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault for shooting a coworker with a handgun during an altercation at their workplace. The trial court sentenced him to five years in the county workhouse, denying his request for probation. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentencing, arguing that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence, and that the trial court erred in sentencing him to five years imprisonment. Based upon our review, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the nature and circumstances of the defendant's offense justifies the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape of a child. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues, one with subparts: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting the following: (a) testimony of the sister of the victim concerning a prior bad act of the defendant; (b) testimony of the mother of the victim concerning statements made by the victim to her following the rape; and (c) testimony of the nurse practitioner concerning statements made to her by the victim and his mother; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the victim's sister concerning the defendant's sitting her on his lap and asking for a kiss. Nevertheless, we conclude that such error was harmless. The testimony of the mother of the victim was properly admitted pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant's failure to timely object to the testimony of the nurse practitioner constitutes a waiver of that issue. We further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for child rape. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This workers' compensation case presents two issues for review concerning the merits of the employee's claim for benefits. The first is whether this action is barred by the statute of limitations. The second is whether the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the employee's injury was work-related. The trial court ruled that the statute of limitations had expired, and it also addressed the merits and found that the employee failed to prove that his injury was work-related. We hold that the statute of limitations had not expired, and we further hold that the trial court's dismissal of the employee's claim should be affirmed on the merits because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury was not work-related. In addition to the merits of this suit, we also granted review to determine the legality of the trial court's practice of referring workers' compensation cases to a clerk and master for trial. We hold that the proper procedure for appointing a special/substitute judge was not followed; however, reversal is not required because the Clerk and Master was acting as a de facto judge.

This appeal from the Roane County Chancery Court concerns whether the Chancery Court erred in determining that a collective bargaining agreement entered into between Appellant, Local Union 760 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and Appellees, the City of Harriman and the Harriman Utility Board, is null and void. We affirm the decision of the Chancery Court and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against the Appellants.

This appeal involves a dispute between the owners of a bed and breakfast and the City of Winchester regarding a proposed expansion of the business's bar and banquet facilities. When the city's Board of Zoning Appeals declined to approve the expansion, the owners of the bed and breakfast filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Franklin County challenging the Board's decision. After reviewing the record of the proceedings before the Board, the trial court determined that the Board acted within its discretion when it declined to approve the proposed expansion of the bed and breakfast. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of an award of child support to the appellee, the child's paternal grandmother and legal custodian, from the child's mother. For reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jesse C. Goodman, Jr., was convicted by a Hickman County jury of one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, three counts of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. All counts arose out of a single incident of domestic violence, with ramifications that included a four-hour standoff between the defendant and five law enforcement officers. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years for aggravated assault; two years for each of the reckless endangerment convictions; and eleven months and twenty-nine days for assault. The sentences for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment were ordered to be served consecutively, and the misdemeanor conviction was ordered to be served concurrently as to the other sentences, for an effective sentence of fifteen years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents two issues: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him of either aggravated assault or assault; and (2) Whether the sentences were appropriate, both as to length of the aggravated assault sentence and the consecutive manner of service of the aggravated assault sentence and the reckless endangerment sentences. We conclude that the convicting evidence was sufficient, both as to the aggravated assault charge and the assault charge. We further conclude that the nine-year sentence for aggravated assault was appropriate, as was the consecutive manner of service of the sentences for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiffs, purchasers of house from defendants, were awarded damages for defects in house not revealed by defendants. Plaintiffs appeal, asking punitive damages and an increase in compensatory damages. We affirm.

Plaintiff's car was caught between the minivan in front of him and the dump truck behind him when the minivan and Plaintiff's car stopped to avoid an obstruction in the roadway. The dump truck was unable to stop and hit Plaintiff's car. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff for $225,000. The jury allocated 80 percent of the fault against the dump truck driver and owner and 20 percent of the fault against Plaintiff's uninsured motorist insurance carrier on behalf of the unknown driver of a truck which dropped the obstruction onto the road. The dump truck driver and owner appeal, raising issues of law including the introduction of claimed inadmissible evidence, prejudicial final argument, improper and incomplete jury instructions, jury misconduct and the failure of the Trial Court to grant Defendants' motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

QUESTION CERTIFIED Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules,1 we have accepted a question certified to us by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked: Which of the following is the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E): (1) Once asserted in any judicial proceeding, the exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective with respect to all subsequent executions, seizures or attachments of alimony; or (2) The exemption in alimony described in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure or attachment of alimony is sought. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the alimony exemption set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 26-2-111(1)(E) is effective only if claimed in each judicial proceeding in which execution, seizure, or attachment of alimony is sought.

We granted the State's appeal to consider whether the defendant's federal or state constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the admission into evidence of surveillance photographs taken at the scene of the robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated and that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, they reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction.

The Court has accepted for decision two questions of law certified by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 23, Supreme Court Rules, which questions are as follows:

( l ) Whether the tort of negligent misrepresentation applies only to professinals and others who  specialize in providing information as a service; and not to commercial entities or businesses which allegedly supply misleading information for the guidance of others in their business transactions; and

(2) Whether a party alleging negligent misrepresentation, in order to recover 'economic losses," must be in privity of contract with the defendant. The decision of the Court is that liability for the tort of  negligent misrepresentation is not limited to 'professionals'; however, the record in this case does not establish the essentials of that cause of action.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employer, Famous Hospitality, Inc., defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County finding that the employee, Debra Lambert, plaintiff-appellee, sustained a 60 percent permanent impairment to the whole body due to a workrelated shoulder injury. The trial court also directed the employer to pay various medical and litigation related expenses incurred by the employee, but did not require the employer to pay for future medical treatment by doctors that had been selected by the employee and who had treated her before trial. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(5)(B). We granted the motion to determine whether the employee should have been authorized to seek future medical treatment, at the employer’s expense, from doctors selected by her who had treated her injuries. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment except to the extent that the judgment does not authorize future medical treatment by the employee’s treating physicians at the employer’s expense.