APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Troy Wayne Davis, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years, to be served consecutively to a robbery sentence for which the defendant was on probation at the time of the aggravated assault. The single issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient. The judgment is affirmed.

I must respectfully depart from the lead opinion in this case. I cannot conclude that the misdemeanor offense of casually exchanging a controlled substance is a lesser-included offense of felony possession with the intent to sell or deliver. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4) (1997) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418(a) (1997).

I, like Judge Witt, respectfully disagree with Judge Welles’ conclusion that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to charge “casual exchange” as a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to sell. However, I also respectfully disagree with Judge Witt’s conclusion that the failure to give the casual exchange inference instruction was plain error. I would affirm.

The Defendant, Grady Paul Gatlin, was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to sell a schedule IV controlled substance, possession with intent to sell a schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy to possess with intent to sell a schedule II
controlled substance. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to prove that the Defendant intended to sell controlled substances and (2) that it was plain error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of casual exchange. We reverse the Defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance and also his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell a controlled substance.  The Defendant’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia remains unaffected.

The defendant, Neil Friedman, was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, six months of which was to be served in the county jail, for driving under the influence. A consecutive sentence of six months, 30 days of which was to be served, was imposed for driving on a revoked license. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. State v. Neil M. Friedman, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00140 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 14, 1998). The application for permission to appeal to the supreme court was denied December 21, 1998. In a hearing conducted on the following day, the trial court reduced the DUI sentence to 120 days, which the defendant has since served, followed by seven months and 29 days of probation. Over one year later, the trial court revoked the probation and ordered service of the remainder of the sentence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court no longer had authority to revoke the probation. Because the sentence had been fully served and the probationary term had ended when the probation revocation warrant was issued, the judgment must be reversed and the cause dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder and was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-one years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial because of improper jury instructions characterizing the appellant's statement as a confession. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas E. Cowan, Jr., was found guilty of contempt. The trial court imposed a jail sentence of 10 days, six of which were suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient; that the trial judge should not have acted as a witness; and that the sentence was excessive. Because the evidence was insufficient, the judgment is reversed and the cause dismissed.

In July 1999, the Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and possession of marijuana, both Class A misdemeanors, and received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days supervised probation. In December 1999, the Defendant was indicted for assault and aggravated criminal trespass, both of which are also Class A misdemeanors. In January 2000, a violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had violated his probation in the first two cases. In March 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to the assault and aggravated criminal trespass charges, and a combined sentencing hearing and probation violation hearing was held by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant's probation in the first two cases and imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration. The court also imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the second two cases, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed in the first two cases. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentences of incarceration in each case. Because our review of the record reveals that the sentences were proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Matthew Patrick Frontera, pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. As part of his plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the legality of his stop, detention and questioning by police officers. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained against him due to an unlawful stop and detention. He also argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve six months in the county jail with release eligibility at seventy-five percent. Because the Defendant failed to properly reserve his issue concerning his stop and detention, we are unable to reach the merits of that issue. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, King David Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation. She raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence supported the trial court's finding that she violated the terms of her probation by committing the offense of accessory after the fact; and (2) whether the trial court had the authority to order her to continue her supervised probation pending this appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find both issues have merit; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.