APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I fully concur in Judge Hayes’s thorough, incisive opinion. With respect to a portion of the analysis of the especially aggravated robbery sentencing issues, I concur merely in the results.

Defendant, Joseph Darryl Taylor, was convicted of attempt to commit sexual battery, attempt to commit rape, and aggravated kidnapping. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial concerning all three offenses was insufficient to find him guilty and that the trial court erred when it sentenced Defendant. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Pittman, was convicted of aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to twenty years incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that his prior convictions for robbery and theft were admissible to impeach his credibility should he elect to testify. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the Defendant's prior convictions were admissible. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, later amended by appointed counsel, claiming that his 1999 pleas of guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court were involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner timely appealed, raising the same two issues. We affirm the judgments of the trial court dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Frankie L. Richardson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation. He argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by revoking probation. We find no abuse of discretion; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal by the State pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Alkita M. Odom, was indicted for the offenses of forgery and criminal simulation, each in the amount of $250,000. The indictment reflected that each offense was a Class B felony. Upon the Defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the indictment to the extent that it reflected Class B felonies because the court found that for the crime to be anything other than Class E felonies, the Defendant would have had to have actually obtained goods or services. The court then granted the State's motion to amend the indictment to reflect Class E felonies for the purposes of appeal. The State argues on appeal that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment based on the grade of the offense charged. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the indictment and reinstate it as originally returned by the Grand Jury.

The Defendant, Kenneth Anderson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation by the trial court. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration after finding that he had violated his probation. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty in Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of arson, a Class C felony, based on his setting fire to a rental house. According to a plea agreement with the State, he received a four-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. A sentencing hearing was held to determine the manner of service of his sentence and the amount and manner of payment of any restitution. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve his entire sentence in confinement in the workhouse and that he pay $10,000 in restitution to the victim. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying any alternative sentence and in ordering restitution in the amount of $10,000. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the manner of service. As to restitution, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

The defendant was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. He appealed the aggravated robbery convictions, arguing that the proof was insufficient to sustain the convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for resentencing as to the conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.

In his original trial, the Petitioner, Richard Lee Franklin, was convicted of first degree murder by a Cumberland County jury for the death of David Kirkland. Due to procedural errors at Petitioner's first trial, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion for a new trial. Petitioner was retried and the jury convicted him of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-two years of incarceration. State v. Richard Lee Franklin, No. 03C01-9706-CR-00219, 1998 WL 458580, at *1, Cumberland County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, August 10, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1999). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was denied. In this appeal as of right, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in finding his trial counsel's performance to be effective. Specifically, the appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and present witnesses that would support a defense of self-defense; (2) for failing to discuss trial strategies and defenses with the Petitioner; and (3) for failing to request an instruction on self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William R. Stevens, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, arising out of the deaths of his wife and mother-in-law. For each of his murder convictions, he was sentenced to death. He now appeals as of right, raising the following eleven issues for our review: (1) whether it was error to limit the testimony of crime-scene expert Gregg McCrary; (2) whether it was error to exclude evidence which tended to show that Corey Milliken had an independent motive to commit the murders; (3) whether it was error to admit a redacted version of Sandi Stevens' diary; (4) whether the trial court failed to apply the hearsay and other evidentiary rules in an evenhanded manner; (5) whether the hearsay statements of Corey Milliken to Sarah Suttle should have been excluded as not being "in furtherance of the conspiracy"; (6) whether the cumulative effect of all errors at trial violated the Defendant's right to due process of law; (7) whether instructing the jury that it must agree unanimously in order to impose a life sentence and prohibiting it from being told the effect of a non-unanimous verdict violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (8) whether the Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(4) aggravating circumstance fails to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (9) whether the failure to articulate meaningful standards for proportionality review mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 violates the Defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (10) whether the unlimited discretion vested in the prosecutor as to whether or not to seek the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (11) whether the death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant legal authorities, we find no reversible error on the part of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant's convictions and his sentences of death.

The petitioner was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence on December 13, 1990, and on December 20, 1991, he received an additional two-year sentence for felony escape, to be served consecutively to his original sentences. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being illegally restrained because, by his calculations, his sentence had expired. The post-conviction court denied the petition, as well as a subsequent petition to rehear, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the petition.

The defendant appealed the trial court's loss of jurisdiction when he was transferred into the custody of the Department of Correction. The issue is now moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal trespass, attempted aggravated assault, and two counts of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, two years for attempted aggravated assault, and one year each for both counts of felony reckless endangerment. The defendant was granted probation after service of 120 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Both Petitioners appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of their post-conviction relief petitions. The Petitioners claim ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal for failing to object to an erroneous jury instruction and failing to raise the erroneous jury instruction in their direct appeal. The post-conviction court found the jury instruction to be erroneous; however, it denied relief. After a thorough review, we conclude that the jury instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to the Petitioners and find that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the erroneous jury instruction at trial and for failing to raise it on direct appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court's denial of relief and remand the Petitioners' cases to the trial court for new trials on the issues of aggravated arson.

The petitioner, James Byron Transou, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are (1) whether the petitioner was denied his constitutional right to self-representation; (2) whether the denial of a motion for continuance is a basis for relief; (3) whether the election on the charge made by the state is a basis for relief; and (4) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner was indicted for three counts of aggravated robbery and convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years, and on direct appeal, this Court modified his sentence to an effective sentence of fifteen years. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorneys failed to challenge two of his indictments prior to trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Petitioner now appeals the trial court's denial of relief. We hold that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.