APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jeffery S. Shands, challenges the trial court's order upholding the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion for the charges of criminally negligent homicide and reckless driving. He contends that the District Attorney abused his discretion in failing to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors presented in the evidence. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's order denying pretrial diversion.

A Crockett County jury convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant challenges (1) the introduction of statements he made to officers, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted defendant of one count of premeditated first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder and twenty years for each attempted first degree murder conviction. The two twenty-year sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the defendant's life sentence. In this appeal as of right, defendant challenges: (1) the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his identification by the two surviving victims, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence, and (3) the length and consecutive nature of his sentences. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case raises issues of first impression in Tennessee. The defendants are convicted felons from Montana who were sent to serve portions of their Montana sentences at a private, for-profit prison facility in Tennessee. Following their escape from the Tennessee facility, the defendants were each convicted of one count of escape, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-16-605. The defendants now appeal their convictions, raising two interrelated issues: 1) whether Tennessee's escape statute makes it a crime for a prisoner who has not been convicted under Tennessee law to escape from a private prison in this state; and 2) whether they were unlawfully imprisoned in Tennessee. After a thorough review of applicable law, we conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-16-605, by its plain language, applies to the escape of an out-of-state prisoner from a private prison facility in this state. We further conclude that the defendants, duly convicted of crimes in Montana and incarcerated at the private prison pursuant to a contract between the Montana Department of Corrections and a private prison company, were not unlawfully imprisoned in Tennessee. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motions seeking relief from the collection of litigation taxes and trial court costs. Because we have no jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 3 appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to the maximum term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served as a split sentence with five months and twenty-nine days served in confinement at the workhouse, and the balance served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the victim, his former wife, to testify as to two other bad acts committed by the defendant, one a prior beating incident and the other an act of vandalism of the victim’s car. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, indicted for aggravated sexual battery for intentionally engaging in sexual contact with a child under the age of thirteen, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve ninety consecutive days in jail, with the remainder of the sentence suspended, and the defendant placed on three years' probation. Counseling was ordered as a condition of probation. The defendant challenges the sentencing imposed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his requests for full probation, service of his sentence of incarceration on weekends, or judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Abebreellis Bond was convicted by a Carroll County jury of two counts of sale of cocaine. Based upon trial counsel's failure to perfect a direct appeal, Bond sought post-conviction relief in the Carroll County Circuit Court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court granted Bond's request for a delayed appeal. Additionally, the post-conviction court ordered that all remaining ineffective assistance of counsel issues raised in the post-conviction petition be consolidated with the delayed appeal. Bond now perfects his delayed appeal before this court, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the post-conviction court's procedural ruling, wherein the court refused to dismiss the remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims after granting the delayed appeal, conflicts with our previous holding in Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, we remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

Paul Freeman appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Freeman collaterally attacks his DUI conviction in the City Court of Jackson upon grounds that his uncounseled guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered. Freeman asserts that at the time he entered his guilty plea, he was still under the influence of alcohol from his arrest approximately eight hours earlier that same morning. After review, we find that the proof does not support a knowing and voluntary plea. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court, vacate Freeman’s judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the City Court of Jackson for further proceedings.