APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case arises from the decision of the Cold Creek Correctional Facility Disciplinary Board finding the Appellant guilty of attempting to intimidate an employee and being under the influence of alcohol. The Appellant filed a Petition for Common Law and Statutory Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court of Davidson County challenging the Disciplinary Board's decision. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Board and dismissed the Appellant's claim.

This appeal arises out of a default judgment rendered against the Appellant. The underlying cause of action was for the breach of a  construction contract. After the Appellant did not answer the complaint or otherwise defend the action, the Chancery Court of Williamson County  granted the plaintiffs’ motion for default and entered judgment accordingly.  A subsequent damage hearing was held at which the Appellant did not  appear. The Appellees obtained a judgment for $918,073.15. The  Appellant filed an application to set aside the default judgment which was  denied by the trial court.

This case involves the use of certain property in Dickson County in light of a 1988 zoning ordinance which provides that mining and quarrying on this property are permitted as a special exception only. When the county attempted to enjoin the property owners from mining or quarrying their property, the property owners argued that their property was being used as a quarrying operation prior to October 1988 when the city passed the zoning ordinance. Thus, it is the property owners' position that their quarrying operation constitutes a pre-existing nonconforming use and may continue pursuant to both the Dickson County zoning ordinance and Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b). In addition, the county enjoined the property owners from hauling rock in violation of a fifteen-ton weight limit on local roads. The property owners argued below that the enforcement of this local rule against them constitutes selective enforcement. The trial court found that the property owners had failed to show a nonconforming use, and it dismissed their claim for selective enforcement. On appeal, we find that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the property owners' operation was not a nonconforming use at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance. In light of that finding, the temporary injunction regarding the fifteen-ton weight limit is dissolved, and the selective enforcement issue does not need to be addressed.

A prisoner serving a life sentence petitioned the court to order the Department of Correction to restore sentence reduction credits it had deleted from his record after determining that his sentence was to be served without the possibility of parole. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court.

Plaintiffs, the owner and lessee of property on which a railroad track was located, obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting Defendants, owners of adjacent property, from building a house on what Plaintiffs alleged was their right-of-way. After Defendants presented evidence that Plaintiffs possessed only an easement as needed for railroad operations, rather than a right of-way, the court dissolved the temporary injunction and denied a permanent injunction. Defendants then filed a motion to assess damages and enforce liability of surety on injunction bond pursuant to Tenn.R. Civ. P. 65.05, seeking recovery for the losses resulting from the issuance of the temporary injunction. Defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion. We reverse. Tenn. R. App. P. 13 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded.
 

Plaintiff sued to recover monies paid to defendant. Defendant defended on the grounds that the monies were paid to a trust fund for which he was not liable. The Trial Court held the trust had no validity and entered judgment against the defendant. We affirm.

Sherman Dunlap appeals his sentence after pleading guilty in the Coffee County Circuit Court to facilitation of theft over $10,000, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant, as a Range II multiple offender, to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, requiring the appellant to serve one year of his sentence in continuous confinement. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issue for review: whether the trial court erred in denying him full probation or, in the alternative, in denying him an opportunity to serve his sentence in periodic confinement. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I concur fully in the judgment of the Court denying the appellant full probation, I do so because the record reflects the appellant has received probation for a number of previous offenses, but has yet to be rehabilitated. Thus, “measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the [appellant].” See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(c).  This reason alone amply justifies the denial of probation in this case.<?xml:namespace prefix = o /?>

Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Prior to entering a guilty plea in the instant case, the petitioner had been sentenced to twelve years for other state convictions and a consecutive 105 months on federal charges. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the current charges, which included six counts of theft over $1,000 and one count of burglary, Class D felonies, and nineteen counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the petitioner received an effective sentence of eighteen years as a Range I, standard offender. The agreement provided that this sentence would be served concurrently with both his prior state and federal sentences. The petitioner now claims that, but for counsel's ineffective assistance, he would not have pled guilty. Following a review of the record, we find trial counsel was not ineffective and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The majority finds the defendant's suppression issue non meritorious under Fifth Amendment analysis. While I do not disagree with the analysis, I believe the factual scenario presented requires review under Sixth Amendment analysis. At both the suppression hearing and at trial, the interviewing officer testified that the defendant "had been arrested the night before by uniformed officers and was in juvenile court." The defendant was interviewed the following morning around 11:00 a.m., after the officer "checked him out of juvenile court" and transported him to the police department's homicide division. I can only assume from these facts that, at the time of the police questioning, the defendant had been charged with the homicide of Terrell Deon Bullard. If this assumption is correct, then adversarial proceedings had been initiated and the defendant's Sixth Amendment, rather than his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, had attached.

This appeal arises from a guilty verdict returned by a Carroll County jury against the defendant for two counts of delivering less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. On appeal, the defendant challenges her convictions on the basis that the introduction of evidence bolstering the informant's testimony was plain error, and the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kenneth D. Melton, was convicted by a jury in the Sumner County Criminal Court of disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty days incarceration in the Sumner County Jail. The court then suspended all but five days of the appellant's sentence, placing the appellant on unsupervised probation for the remainder. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues: (1) whether the indictment provided adequate notice to the appellant of the charged offense; and (2) whether the evidence adduced at trial supports his conviction of disorderly conduct. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he has presented as issues that the trial court should have suppressed his confession and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Having pled guilty to various counts of aggravated burglary, robbery, auto theft, and theft, the defendant appeals from his sentences. He argues that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences and that his effective twelve-year sentence is therefore excessive. After a de novo review, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

The defendant, facing a third trial for first degree murder, has filed this interlocutory appeal. The defendant alleges that the trial court erred in disqualifying his counsel because of an appearance of impropriety. We affirm.

The defendant pled guilty in 1990 to thirty-two Class A misdemeanors, consisting of violations of the bad check law, and was placed on probation. During the probationary period, which was scheduled to end in 1994, the defendant was to pay restitution and costs. Shortly before the probationary period ended, the defendant signed an agreement, presented by her probation officer, extending indefinitely the probation so that restitution and costs could be paid. The trial court approved this extension. Probation violation reports were filed in 1997 and 1999, the court revoking the probation in 1999. The defendant timely appealed, arguing that the trial court was without authority to extend the probationary period without a hearing and to extend the period indefinitely. Based upon our review, we conclude that the defendant's probationary period ended in 1994, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. The defendants were convicted by a Dickson County jury of criminal trespass and fined $50. Upon a review of the record, we find the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Henry Lee Berry appeals his Knox County conviction for second degree murder. Berry contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence two recorded 911 telephone calls and an order of protection entered against the appellant by the victim; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial when evidence of a pending rape charge in Nashville was introduced before the jury. Additionally, the appellant urges adoption of DNA testing on decomposed bodies to positively establish the identity of the victim. Although we conclude that admission of the 911 telephone calls and the order of protection was error, the error was harmless. Moreover, finding no other reversible error of law, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court.