APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The majority departs from settled principles of law in holding that a jury may allocate fault to an immune nonparty. In so doing, it refuses to apply and overrules the application in this case of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous decision just four years ago in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), that a jury may not allocate fault to an immune nonparty because the immune nonparty owes no duty to the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has no cause of action against the immune nonparty.

In November 1997, the Defendant, Donald Marbley, was arrested for aggravated robbery in Lincoln County. Approximately two weeks after being released on bond, the Defendant was arrested in Marshall County for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. The Defendant was found guilty by a Lincoln County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II multiple offender. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the Marshall County attempted aggravated robbery charge and was sentenced to eight years as a Range II multiple offender. The two sentences were to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of twenty-five years as a Range II multiple offender. In this consolidated appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery in Lincoln County; (2) whether the Lincoln County trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's prior criminal convictions into evidence; (3) whether the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant in both the Lincoln and Marshall County cases; and (4) whether the Defendant received effective assistance of counsel in the Lincoln County case. Finding no error in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to state the basis for my
concurrence. In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), we adopted a modified system of comparative fault in which parties contributing to the plaintiff’s injuries were to be held liable only to the extent of their relative percentages of fault. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), highlighted the problems inherent in the application of McIntyre to workers who sustained employment-related injuries and who filed tort actions against persons other than their employers. These workers found themselves in a unique situation. They were subject to both the tort system’s doctrine of comparative fault adopted by this Court and the workers’ compensation system’s doctrine of no-fault recovery created by the legislature.

Defendant, Joseph E. Suggs, pled guilty to three counts of child rape, for which he received three consecutive 25-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for each count; and 2) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on all counts. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense, and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The defendant was ordered to serve forty-five days in continuous confinement and five days on the weekends, with the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the defendant makes the following allegations of error: (1) the trial court used an invalid judgment to elevate his DUI charge to a DUI second; (2) the trial court's initial denial of an appeal bond violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; and (3) the trial court incorrectly concluded it was not authorized to grant work release or periodic confinement during the defendant's mandatory minimum period of incarceration for DUI. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not commit the above errors and affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

I must respectfully dissent because, while I agree that the appellant’s confession to the police should have been suppressed, I do not believe that the trial court’s admission of the confession at trial constituted reversible error.

Defendant appeals his jury convictions on two counts of premeditated first degree murder for which he received concurrent life sentences. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in disallowing impeachment evidence against a state witness; (3) whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant being a beneficiary of life insurance policies on one of the victims; (4) whether the trial court erroneously admitted inflammatory evidence relating to the crime scene; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of alleged threats made by the defendant; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of a prior argument between the defendant and one of the victims; and (7) whether the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of defendant's failure to flee and avoid arrest. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Phillip Shead Jr., appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation and reinstating his original eight year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R

This is a case involving two defendants: O'Connor, the mother's friend, was convicted of Aggravated Child Abuse through injury and Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect. Lekin, the mother, was convicted of Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect. We affirm the conviction of Aggravated Child Abuse through injury, as we hold that a four-year-old who received a skull fracture, epidural bleeding, swelling and bruising around the eyes and face, and the pain associated with said injuries has sustained "serious bodily injury." Further, we find sufficient evidence to support both convictions for Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect. Finally, we reject the arguments that the state was required to elect a specific "serious bodily injury" and that Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect is not an offense in Tennessee.