APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee,1 this Court accepted certification of the following question from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee: Whether the omission of the official notary seal in the acknowledgment on
a Tennessee deed of trust as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-22-110, renders the instrument “null and void as to . . . subsequent creditors . . . or bona fide purchasers . . . without notice” as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-26-103. After careful consideration, we conclude that the official seal of the acknowledging notary public must be affixed to a deed of trust if that instrument is to constitute notice to subsequent creditors or bona fide purchasers. Because the deed of trust before us did not bear the official notary seal, it does not constitute notice to subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers without notice.

This is an appeal from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s finding of criminal contempt against Dewayne Rogers, Shanie Rogers and Billie Jean Ritchie Jones. Mrs. Jones, Defendant-Appellant, raises the following issue, which we restate: Whether the Appellant was improperly convicted of criminal contempt solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice?

This is a dispute between adjoining property owners over a tract of land which the Chancellor determined was owned by plaintiffs.

This an appeal of a Roane Chancery Court order which enjoined Appellants, Joe Parker, Mary Lynn Parker and Tiger Haven, Inc., from maintaining any Class I, wild or exotic animals, on certain parcels of land in Roane Count, and from expanding theoperation of Tiger Haven, Inc., except upon proper applicatin and approval by the County. While not as exactly stated by the parties, the issues raised on appeal aare whether (1) Appellant's refusal to rezone Appellant' property was arbitrary and capricious, (2) Appellants' use of parcel 22.06 is a pre-existing nonconforming use which may be expanded by Appellants, (3) Appellee's affirmative respresentations to Appellants and its failure to enforce its zoning ordinance for over six years estops it from now enforcing the zoning ordinances, (4) the A-2 zoning regulations are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad (5) the A-1 zoning regulations and Appellee's actions in not rezoning Parcel 29.01 work an unreasonable discrimination against Appellant's property, and (6) the Trial Court erred in denying Appellant's motion asking that the judgment be altered or amended or a new trial had based on evidence discovered after the trial. For the reasons herein stated, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is a third appeal in this divorce action which was filed more than six years ago between plaintiff (“husband”) and defendant (“wife”).

This is a suit wherein the Plaintiff Barbara Brunum, inter alia, seeks to set aside a conveyance by her mother, the Defendant Corrine W. Akins--who held certain real property in trust for her--to her brother, Defendant Melvin L. Akins. The basis of the suit is that her mother violated her fiduciary duty by conveying the property to her brother and that he was guilty of fraud and conspiracy in accepting the transfer. The only consideration for the transfer was the assumption and payment of a prior secured indebtedness against the property in the amount of $29,392.25. The Trial Court found in favor of the daughter against the mother, awarded damages in the amount of $34,607.75, plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum, beginning April 28, 1998, the date our opinion in a prior appeal of this case was filed. The Chancellor dismissed the claim as to the brother. The daughter appeals insisting the Trial Court was in error in not setting aside the transfer. We are of the opinion that the Trial Judge acted properly and affirm the judgment entered.

Appellant, Rochelle Andre Triplett, pled guilty to aggravated assault, simple assault, criminal impersonation, and possession of drug paraphernalia in March 1998. He received an effective three-year sentence and was placed on probation.  In June 1998, his probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging failure to report and failure to pay fines and costs. The trial court conducted a full revocation hearing, found appellant in violation and revoked his probation.  Appellant challenges that revocation. We AFFIRM.

This case came to be heard on the motion of the State of Tennessee for an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. In November 1997, the petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was sentenced to one year at thirty percent (30%), with this sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence from Texas. The petitioner was apparently returned to Texas following his guilty plea, but Tennessee authorities have lodged a detainer against him providing for his return to serve his Tennessee sentence upon  completion of his Texas sentence.

Petitioner was convicted of theft and felony escape, and brought a post-conviction proceeding challenging his convictions. The petition was denied by the trial court. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Robert Emmet Dunlap, Jr., was convicted on three counts of the sale of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(3). Fines totaled $225,000.00. The trial court imposed sentences of ten years on each count to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to a prior sentence for a conviction in Montgomery County.

The defendant, Freddie Lee Cunningham, pled guilty to the possession of more than .5 gram of crack cocaine with the intent to manufacture,  deliver, or sell, a Class B felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1). The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years to be served in the Department of Correction. Fines totaled $2,000.00.

The defendant, Mickey Jeffries, was convicted of felony murder. The trial court imposed a life sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Weems, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel for having failed to timely file an interlocutory appeal of an order denying the suppression of certain of the state's evidence. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a case involving breach of contract. Plaintiffs/appellants, Carl Scott and Alma Scott (referred to herein as “the Scotts”) appeal from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant/appellee, Rogers Group, Inc.

The plaintiff repeatedly cursed and insulted the defendant’s attorney during a taped deposition. The attorney played portions of the tape during the trial. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s utterances constituted criminal contempt. We affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over the surname of a child born to unmarried parents. The biological father (“Father”) of the minor child, seeks reversal of the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to change the child’s last name. Over the objections of the mother (“Mother”),1 Father sought to change his son’s last name to his own to reflect his paternity. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand.2

This appeal involves a contract dispute between a manufacturer of automobile parts and one of its suppliers. After the manufacturer complained repeatedly about the quality of its parts, the supplier informed the manufacturer that it would no longer supply the parts even though two years remained on its contract. The manufacturer rejected a portion of the supplier’s last shipment of parts and contracted with another supplier to take over the manufacturing of the parts. The original supplier then filed suit against the manufacturer in the Chancery Court for Sumner County for the balance due on its last shipment, and the manufacturer counterclaimed for breach of the supply contract. The trial court heard the case without a jury and determined that the supplier had breached the supply contract but was also entitled to a set-off based on its last delivery of parts. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the manufacturer a $133,542.66 judgment against the supplier. On this appeal, the supplier takes issue with the judgment on three grounds: that the parties modified their original contract; that the manufacturer waived its breach of contract claim; and that the trial court did not employ the proper measure of damages. We have determined that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the supplier breached the contract but that the trial court incorrectly calculated the damages. Accordingly, we reduce the manufacturer’s     judgment against the supplier to $18,953.

This case involves a dispute over custody of two children upon their parents’ divorce. The trial court awarded custody to Lynn Rose Watson (“Mother”) with visitation to Ferris E. Watson (“Father”). Father appeals, claiming he is comparatively the better parent. We affirm the award of custody to Mother.

This appeal involves a father’s obligation to pay support for a non-marital child. Fifteen years after the child’s birth, the Tennessee Department of Human Services, acting on behalf of the child’s mother, filed suit in the Montgomery County Juvenile Court seeking to establish paternity and to obtain past and future support from the father. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order establishing paternity and ordering the father to pay $542.50 per month in child support. The juvenile court also awarded the mother $50,000 in back child support. The father now takes issue with the amount of the award for back child support. We have concluded that the evidence does not support the amount of the award for back child support and accordingly remand the case for further proceedings.

The appellants have asked the court to rehear this appeal because we did not address the facial conflict between the definitions of Class II and Class III wildlife, leaving the public without any guidance as to what species are in Class II. Since the possession of Class II wildlife without a permit is a crime, and no permit is required for the possession of those species in Class III, the determination of what is included in Class II is the critical determination. And a person of ordinary intelligence must be able to make it. State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114 (Tenn. 1982).

The appellant, Johnnie Lamont Dalton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 5, 1997, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder second degree during the voir dire of a jury, wherein he was charged with the offense of murder first degree. The petitioner, collaterally, attacks his guilty plea and conviction for murder second degree upon the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, he contends that trial counsel failed to (a) adequately investigate and prepare for trial; (b) failed to interview and subpoena state witnesses; and (c) failed to subpoena potential witnesses, including one witness who the defendant contends would have established that the defendant was not the murderer. The petitioner asserts that were it not for the above actions, he would not have pled guilty on the mistaken advice of counsel.  After a review of the record, we AFFIRM the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.<?xml:namespace prefix = o /?>

The Chancery Court for Dickson County terminated a mother’s parental rights to three young children and allowed the foster parents to proceed with the adoption of the children. Because we find that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence upon which to base the termination of the mother’s parental rights, we reverse.