APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Westside Health & Racquet Club, Inc. (“Westside”) filed this action against Jefferson Financial Services, Inc. (“ Jefferson”). Westside’s theory of its claim -- which theory was adopted by the trial court -- is that Westside’s transfer to Jefferson, over time, of some 495 installment sales
contracts was, in each case, part and parcel of a usurious loan made by Jefferson to Westside, rather than a sale of the contract. The trial court awarded Westside damages of $68,519.71 for usurious interest, which was enhanced by a further award of pre-judgment interest pursuant to T.C.A. § 47-14-123 (1995)1. Jefferson appeals, raising several issues. The issue that we will focus on can be stated thusly: Does the Retail Installment Sales Act, T.C.A. § 47-11-101, et seq., (“ the Act”) operate to exempt the dealings between these parties from Tennessee’s usury statutes?

The petitioner, Victor James Cazes, appeals as of right from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying him post-conviction relief from his 1990 convictions for felony murder,  aggravated rape and first degree burglary. The petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder conviction and received twenty-five-year and six-year sentences, respectively, for the aggravated rape and burglary convictions. The judgments of conviction were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994). In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner raises the  following issues:

The Defendant, Ronald W ayne Smith, pleaded guilty in the C ircuit Court of Dickson County to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of marijuana for resale, reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law is whether there were sufficient spec ific and articu lable facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle and/or whether the duration of the stop excessive. We find that there were not sufficient specific and articulabe facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Because we conclude that the stop was illegal, we reverse the order of the trial judge overruling the motion to suppress.

On December 1, 1999, the State of Tennessee on behalf of the appellants Judge James Beasley, Judge Robert T. Dwyer and Mark Glankler, filed a Rule 10 T.R.A.P. application for Page 1 extraordinary appeal. Specifically, the State sought to set aside the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas served on the aforementioned appellants.

The appellant, Arthur Copeland, was convicted by a Blount County jury of one (1) coun t of simple assa ult, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail and ordered tha t the appellant’s sentence for assault run consecutively to his sentence for a prior aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) im posing sentence immediately after the jury rendered its verdict without affording the appellant a separate sentencing hearing; and (2) ordering consecutive sentences. After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that th ere is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for another sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, John Paul Seals, entered a guilty plea to first degree murder on December 12, 1988. The state had originally sought the death penalty. The trial court imposed a life sentence. Six years later, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, post-conviction relief. The trial court, which treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief, dismissed based upon the statute of limitations. This court affirmed on direct appeal. John Paul Seals v. State, No. 03C01-9409-CR-00319 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 22, 1995), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 1995). On January 7, 1998, the petitioner filed this claim for post-conviction relief alleging several constitutional violations. The petitioner argued that the statute of limitations should not apply because he had been mentally incompetent since before the commission of the offense. The petitioner also contended that none of the grounds had been waived or previously determined because the first petition had been filed by someone other than himself. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition at the preliminary stage. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(a), (f). In John Paul Seals v. State, No. 03C01-9802-CC-00050 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 6, 1999), this court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court to allow the petitioner to present evidence on the issue of his mental capacity as it related to the statute of limitations: If the petitioner carries his burden of proving facts which require tolling the statute of limitations due to mental incompetence, then the trial court shall proceed to the merits of the constitutional issues presented in the petition. On the other hand, if the petitioner does not carry his burden of proving mental incompetence as regards the statute of limitations, the trial court shall dismiss the petition as untimely. Id., slip op. at 8.

On July 21, 1998, Ronald Reece Cross (the “defendant”) pled gu ilty to the following charges arising out of a single incident: violating an habitual traffic offender order, evading arrest, driving under the influence of alcohol (eighth offense), running a stop sign, reckless driving, and violation of registration. Following a sentencing hearing on the above charges, the trial court denied alternative sentencing for the defendant, and instead ordered the defendant to serve an effective ten (10) year, eleven (11) month, and twenty-nine (29) day sentence. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing to the defendant, and (2) whether the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve consecutive sentences. Because we find that the trial court sentenced the defendant appropriately, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to be paroled from an eight-year sentence for aggravated child abuse. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole him, the prisoner filed a certiorari petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to obtain judicial review of a disciplinary action taken by the Nashville Community Service Center. After the Commissioner of Correction upheld the finding that he been drinking while on work release, the prisoner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court clerk refused to file the petition and required the prisoner to file a second petition because the pauper’s oath accompanying the first petition was not on the proper form and had not been notarized. Thereafter, the trial court granted the Department of Correction’s motion to dismiss the second petition because it was not timely filed. We have determined that the trial court clerk exceeded his authority when he declined to accept and file the prisoner’ petition and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the petition.

This is a constitutional challenge to an Act of the legislature regulating the possession and sale of animals. Owners, dealers, and licensed propagators of various wildlife species challenged the Act on grounds that it is vague, overbroad, and a burden on interstate commerce. The Chancery Court of Davidson County rejected the constitutional challenge. We affirm the decision on the vagueness and overbreadth charge. We think, however, that there are disputed facts bearing on the question of whether parts of the Act impermissibly burden interstate commerce. We, therefore,  remand for further proceedings on that issue.

Lori Ann Parr, proceeding pro se, has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of this invasion of privacy, breach of confidentiality, and civil rights intimidation via malicious harassment1 action that was brought against Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU), Treyton Williams (Williams) and other unnamed individuals. Based upon the following, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This case concerns a claim filed by SunTrust Bank, Nashville, N.A.(hereinafter SunTrust) against the estate of Effie S. Hooker, the second wife of famed Middle Tennessee lawyer John J. Hooker, Sr. Mr. Hooker died on Christmas Eve of 1970, leaving the majority of his estate to his widow. According to the prevailing probate practice of the day, a portion of Mr. Hooker’s estate was placed
in a trust for the benefit of Mrs. Hooker during her life, the remainder to the children of Mr. Hooker’s first marriage.

This case concerns the burden placed on a commercial landlord in mitigating damages caused by a commercial tenant’s abandonment of the leased property. Although our courts heretofore have required a landlord who suffers breach to use reasonable commercial methods to reduce his damages, this tenant-in-breach would read two additional duties into those reasonable commercial methods. First, the tenant would require that the abandoned property be marketed specially and apart from the landlord’s other commercial space inventory. Second, the landlord would be required to market the property at the original contract rental rather than its going market value. Under the facts as established in the record and according to the common law of this jurisdiction, we disagree.

The suit presently on appeal originated by Steven R. Linn and his son, David L. Linn, and their wives filing suit against Vera E. Elrod and Olin D. Elrod, seeking a mandatory injunction requiring removal of a fence erected upon property the Linns claim to be owned by them. Upon the filing of an answer and the counter-complaint by the Elrods and the adding of a third-party, Anna Lee Leinart Gross, as a Defendant, it resolved itself into a property line dispute.