APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns an option agreement. St. George Holdings, LLC (“SGH”), an entity formed to purchase the old St. George Hotel (“the Hotel”) in Chattanooga, entered into an agreement with James D. Hutcherson (“Hutcherson”) under which SGH would borrow $700,000 from Hutcherson to develop the Hotel. An option agreement, one of four documents executed in the transaction, provided that if SGH was unable to obtain a full development loan in 18 months, Hutcherson could purchase the Hotel for the amount of his loan. SGH never obtained a development loan. When Hutcherson attempted to exercise his right to purchase, SGH refused to comply. Instead, SGH sued Hutcherson in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Hutcherson filed a counterclaim. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Hutcherson on SGH’s claims. After trial on Hutcherson’s counterclaim, the Trial Court granted him specific performance. SGH appeals, arguing among other things, that a jury waiver provision in the deed of trust did not serve to waive its right to jury under the option agreement. We hold, inter alia, that the deed of trust’s separately-initialed jury waiver, broad in its language as to its scope across the transaction, was sufficient to waive the right to jury for actions arising out of the option agreement. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects.

This appeal concerns a dispute over ownership of two corporations and five limited liability companies, operating as Nashville Ready Mix. The ultimate issue on appeal is whether the Trial Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Mark Steven Meadows; Nashville Ready Mix, Inc.; Nashville Ready Mix of Murfreesboro, Inc.; Nashville Ready Mix of Columbia, LLC; Nashville Ready Mix of Franklin, LLC; Nashville Ready Mix of Clarksville, LLC; Nashville Ready Mix of Dickson, LLC; and Nashville Ready Mix of West Nashville, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiffs in this action, The Meadows Community Property Trust and Sharon Kay Story and Mary Helen Meadows, as co-trustees of Meadows Community Property Trust, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the dismissal of all their claims. Determining that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, we reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment concerning the issues of statute of limitations, implied partnership, and accounting and remand for further proceedings. Plaintiffs have waived the issues regarding unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and de facto merger due to their noncompliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order dismissing a claim of false imprisonment against a hospital and two of its employees, wherein the trial court found that the acts alleged all constituted “health care services” as defined by the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act. Specifically, the trial court found that the Appellant failed to provide pre-suit notice and failed to file a certificate of good faith as required by statute. As a result, the trial court dismissed the Appellant’s claims with prejudice. The Appellant now appeals the trial court’s decision. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court

This appeal concerns the termination of two parents’ parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Marshall County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jared H. (“Father”) and Annalisa P. (“Mother”) to their minor child, Ryan J. H. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father and Mother’s parental rights on a host of grounds and finding that termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Father and Mother appeal. We reverse several grounds rightly conceded on appeal by DCS. We affirm the grounds of failure to support as to Father and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as to both Father and Mother. In addition, we reverse the Juvenile Court’s finding that DCS failed to prove the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and instead find that ground proven as to both Father and Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find further that termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Thus, while we reverse the Juvenile Court’s judgment in part, we affirm its termination of Father and Mother’s parental rights to the Child.

Two men were driving along I-40 in Memphis when their cars collided. One driver sued the other driver for damages, alleging negligence, and the other driver counter-sued, also alleging negligence. The defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to supplement his discovery responses. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to serve his supplemental discovery on the defendant’s attorney by August 2, 2019, and stated that the case would be dismissed if he failed to comply. The plaintiff failed to meet the deadline or ask for an extension, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

The Lincoln County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Christopher Ryan Simmons, for aggravated burglary in count one; vandalism less than $1,000 in count two; theft of property valued between $2,500 and $10,000 in counts three and four; evading arrest by motor vehicle in count five; and evading arrest on foot in count six.  Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant on all counts as charged.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses.  Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and a father. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination had been proven and that termination was in the best interest of the two children. The mother and the father separately appealed. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” some of the grounds that the trial court concluded were established. However, DCS maintains that three grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the mother and that one ground was sufficiently proven against the father. We conclude that two of the remaining grounds for termination alleged against the mother were sufficiently proven, but we do not find clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the sole remaining ground alleged against the father was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. As such, we reverse the termination of parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Carlos Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed dismissal of this case and remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees owed to the appellee due to the appellant’s frivolous appeal. On remand, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay the sum of $11,901.35. The appellant then filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing, for the first time, that the trial court’s order was “void ab initio” because it was “adjudicated by an adjudicator with compromised neutrality in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” As support for this claim, the appellant pointed to comments made by the trial judge during hearings in a separate but related case in 2010 and 2012. The appellant argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required the trial judge to disqualify herself sua sponte and that her failure to do so rendered all subsequent orders entered by the trial judge void. The trial court treated this as a request for recusal “embedded” in the motion to alter or amend and denied the motion in all respects. The appellant has appealed. We affirm.

Employee sued his former employer for the compensation that he alleged he was owed under an employment contract. Following a bench trial, the employee was awarded damages representing thirty days’ compensation. The employer appeals, arguing that its nonperformance on the contract was excused by an implied condition. We affirm.

This case arises from an investigatory order issued by the Juvenile Court for Rutherford County allowing DCS to investigate abuse allegations regarding a minor child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. section 37-1-406. The order also prohibited the mother of the child from interfering with the investigation. The mother appeals. Because the issues raised by mother are moot, we dismiss the appeal.  

Petitioner, Tiffany Michelle Taylor, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. More than a year after this court affirmed her conviction, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that her juvenile life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The post-conviction court subsequently denied the petition on its merits. Following our review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the post-conviction court should have dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed.  The judgment dismissing the petition is affirmed.

Darius M. (“Father M.”) and Denzel W. (“Father W.”) appeal the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. They also challenge the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Because the juvenile court erred in allowing Father W.’s attorney to withdraw from representation on the first day of trial, we vacate the court’s termination of his parental rights on all grounds and remand for a new trial. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Father M.’s parental rights.

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse.  The father argues that the trial court erred in finding that he committed severe child abuse and in finding termination to be in the child’s best interest.  He asserts that there was no evidence that he knew or should have known about the child’s injuries.  In light of all of the facts, including the nature of the child’s injuries, the medical evidence, and the trial court’s finding concerning the father’s credibility, we conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating the father’s parental rights.  

Margle Otis Ward, Defendant, admitted to violating the conditions of his probation. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the execution of the judgments as originally entered. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by fully revoking his probation “without considering alternative sanctions or tailoring a sanction to address Defendant’s drug use.” We determine that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in both revoking probation and in ordering the execution of the judgments as originally entered.

A jury found the mother of an adult child liable for negligent entrustment after the adult child injured a jogger while driving his truck. The mother moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, which the court denied. After the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, the mother failed to file a post-trial motion seeking a new trial. On appeal, we conclude that the mother waived her right to contest the trial court’s denial of her motion for a directed verdict by failing to file a motion asking for a new trial as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e).

Appellee purchased real property at foreclosure and filed this forcible entry and detainer action seeking possession. Appellee received a judgment for possession in the general sessions court, and Appellant, the former owner of the property, petitioned for de novo review in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment; Appellant filed no response to the motion and no countervailing statement of undisputed material facts. On the undisputed facts, Appellee is the bona fide purchaser for value of the property and has good title pursuant to the “Substitute Trustee’s Deed.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, granting it immediate possession of the Property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. After a trial on the petition, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the biological parents. In its written order, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k). For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113.

A Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B petition for recusal appeal was filed in this Court following the denial of a motion that sought the disqualification of the trial court judge. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Petitioner, Shantonio Lovett Hunter, was indicted for six counts of aggravated child abuse, one count of aggravated child neglect, and two counts of felony murder. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 28 years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective and her plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed, and having reviewed the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  

In this multiple indictment case, the Defendant, Matthew Norris, pleaded guilty to one count of burglary and two counts of theft over $2,500, in exchange for a total effective sentence of eight years. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for judicial diversion and his request for an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Declaring that the sale and distribution of illegal drugs affects every community in the country, the Tennessee Legislature enacted the Tennessee Drug Dealer Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-38-101 to -116. This Act provides a cause of action against a knowing participant in the illegal drug market for injuries caused by illegal drug use. In response to the opioid epidemic in East Tennessee, seven District Attorneys General and two Baby Doe plaintiffs sued several drug companies under the Act. The District Attorneys and the Baby Doe plaintiffs alleged that the drug companies knowingly participated in the illegal drug market by intentionally flooding East Tennessee communities with prescription opioid medications, leading to widespread addiction and diversion of the opioids into the black market. The District Attorneys claimed that the opioid epidemic had damaged the communities in their districts, and the Baby Doe plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by exposure to opioids in utero. The drug companies moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the pleadings. Their two-fold challenge asserted that the Act did not authorize the District Attorneys to sue for damages and that the Act did not apply to the drug companies’ conduct. The trial court ruled that the Act did not apply and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed. The issues we decide are whether the District Attorneys had statutory standing to sue under the Act and whether the Act applies to the drug companies based on factual allegations in the complaint that the drug companies knowingly participated in the illegal drug market. We hold that the District Attorneys lack standing because the Act does not name them as parties who can sue under the Act. This leaves the Baby Doe plaintiffs, who alleged facts showing that the drug companies knowingly participated in the illegal drug market by facilitating the marketing or distribution of opioids. Taking these factual allegations as true, as required at this stage of the case, we hold that the Baby Doe plaintiffs have stated a claim against the drug companies under the Act. 

In this judicial review of an administrative decision, the trial court reversed the civil service commission’s decision to reinstate a police officer to his position upon finding that the commission’s reversal of the police department’s termination of the employee was arbitrary and capricious.  The employee has appealed.  Having determined that the findings of the civil service commission were supported by substantial and material evidence but that its ultimate decision was arbitrary and capricious, we affirm the judgment of the trial court reversing the commission’s decision.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Demarcus Stevenson, of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which Defendant received an effective sentence of forty-three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the prior written statement of a witness, in its entirety, as a prior inconsistent statement under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26) and by admitting testimony under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding Defendant’s prior act of violence against the murder victim. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff/Appellant’s Governmental Tort Liability action against the county and an unknown deputy. The trial court determined that Appellant’s lawsuit was barred by the Public Duty Doctrine. Because Appellant has not pled facts sufficient to establish a special duty exception to the Public Duty Doctrine, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit.